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The Guideline for Isolation Precautions: Preventing Transmission of Infectious Agents in 
Healthcare Settings 2007 updates and expands the 1996 Guideline for Isolation 
Precautions in Hospitals. The following developments led to revision of the 1996 
guideline: 
 
1. The transition of healthcare delivery from primarily acute care hospitals to other 
healthcare settings (e.g., home care, ambulatory care, free-standing specialty care 
sites, long-term care) created a need for recommendations that can be applied in all 
healthcare settings using common principles of infection control practice, yet can be 
modified to reflect setting-specific needs. Accordingly, the revised guideline 
addresses the spectrum of healthcare delivery settings. Furthermore, the term 
“nosocomial infections” is replaced by “healthcare-associated infections” (HAIs) to 
reflect the changing patterns in healthcare delivery and difficulty in determining the 
geographic site of exposure to an infectious agent and/or acquisition of infection. 
2. The emergence of new pathogens (e.g., SARS-CoV associated with the severe 
acute respiratory syndrome [SARS], Avian influenza in humans), renewed concern 
for evolving known pathogens (e.g., C. difficile, noroviruses, community-associated 
MRSA [CA-MRSA]), development of new therapies (e.g., gene therapy), and 
increasing concern for the threat of bioweapons attacks, established a need to 
address a broader scope of issues than in previous isolation guidelines. 
3. The successful experience with Standard Precautions, first recommended in the 
1996 guideline, has led to a reaffirmation of this approach as the foundation for 
preventing transmission of infectious agents in all healthcare settings. New additions 
to the recommendations for Standard Precautions are Respiratory Hygiene/Cough 
Etiquette and safe injection practices, including the use of a mask when performing 
certain high-risk, prolonged procedures involving spinal canal punctures (e.g., 
myelography, epidural anesthesia). The need for a recommendation for Respiratory 
Hygiene/Cough Etiquette grew out of observations during the SARS outbreaks 
where failure to implement simple source control measures with patients, visitors, 
and healthcare personnel with respiratory symptoms may have contributed to SARS 
coronavirus (SARS-CoV) transmission. The recommended practices have a strong 
evidence base. The continued occurrence of outbreaks of hepatitis B and hepatitis C 
viruses in ambulatory settings indicated a need to re-iterate safe injection practice 
recommendations as part of Standard Precautions. The addition of a mask for 
certain spinal injections grew from recent evidence of an associated risk for 
developing meningitis caused by respiratory flora. 
4. The accumulated evidence that environmental controls decrease the risk of life-
threatening fungal infections in the most severely immunocompromised patients 
(allogeneic hematopoietic stem-cell transplant patients) led to the update on the 
components of the Protective Environment (PE). 
5. Evidence that organizational characteristics (e.g., nurse staffing levels and 
composition, establishment of a safety culture) influence healthcare personnel 
adherence to recommended infection control practices, and therefore are important 
factors in preventing transmission of infectious agents, led to a new emphasis and 
recommendations for administrative involvement in the development and support of 
infection control programs. 
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6. Continued increase in the incidence of HAIs caused by multidrug-resistant organisms 
(MDROs) in all healthcare settings and the expanded body of knowledge concerning 
prevention of transmission of MDROs created a need for more specific 
recommendations for surveillance and control of these pathogens that would be 
practical and effective in various types of healthcare settings. 
This document is intended for use by infection control staff, healthcare epidemiologists, 
healthcare administrators, nurses, other healthcare providers, and persons responsible 
for developing, implementing, and evaluating infection control programs for healthcare 
settings across the continuum of care. The reader is referred to other guidelines and 
websites for more detailed information and for recommendations concerning specialized 
infection control problems. 
 
Parts I - III: Review of the Scientific Data Regarding Transmission of 
Infectious Agents in Healthcare Settings 
Part I reviews the relevant scientific literature that supports the recommended prevention 
and control practices. As with the 1996 guideline, the modes and factors that influence 
transmission risks are described in detail. New to the section on transmission are 
discussions of bioaerosols and of how droplet and airborne transmission may contribute 
to infection transmission. This became a concern during the SARS outbreaks of 2003, 
when transmission associated with aerosol-generating procedures was observed. Also 
new is a definition of “epidemiologically important organisms” that was developed to 
assist in the identification of clusters of infections that require investigation (i.e. multidrug-
resistant organisms, C. difficile). Several other pathogens that hold special infection 
control interest (i.e., norovirus, SARS, Category A bioterrorist agents, prions, monkeypox, 
and the hemorrhagic fever viruses) also are discussed to present new information and 
infection control lessons learned from experience with these agents. This section of the 
guideline also presents information on infection risks associated with specific healthcare 
settings and patient populations. 
Part II updates information on the basic principles of hand hygiene, barrier precautions, 
safe work practices and isolation practices that were included in previous guidelines. 
However, new to this guideline, is important information on healthcare system 
components that influence transmission risks, including those under the influence of 
healthcare administrators. An important administrative priority that is described is the 
need for appropriate infection control staffing to meet the ever-expanding role of infection 
control professionals in the modern, complex healthcare system. Evidence presented 
also demonstrates another administrative concern, the importance of nurse staffing 
levels, including numbers of appropriately trained nurses in ICUs for preventing HAIs. 
The role of the clinical microbiology laboratory in supporting infection control is described 
to emphasize the need for this service in healthcare facilites. Other factors that influence 
transmission risks are discussed i.e., healthcare worker adherence to recommended 
infection control practices, organizational safety culture or climate, education and 
training. 
Discussed for the first time in an isolation guideline is surveillance of healthcare-
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associated infections. The information presented will be useful to new infection control 
professionals as well as persons involved in designing or responding to state programs 
for public reporting of HAI rates. 
Part III describes each of the categories of precautions developed by the Healthcare 
Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC) and the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) and provides guidance for their application in various 
healthcare settings. The categories of Transmission-Based Precautions are unchanged 
from those in the 1996 guideline: Contact, Droplet, and Airborne. One important change is 
the recommendation to don the indicated personal protective equipment (gowns, gloves, 
mask) upon entry into the patient’s room for patients who are on Contact and/or Droplet 
Precautions since the nature of the interaction with the patient cannot be predicted with 
certainty and contaminated environmental surfaces are important sources for transmission 
of pathogens. 
In addition, the Protective Environment (PE) for allogeneic hematopoietic stem cell 
transplant patients, described in previous guidelines, has been updated.  
Tables, Appendices, and Other Information 
There are several tables that summarize important information:  
1. a summary of the evolution of this document;  
2. guidance on using empiric isolation precautions according to a clinical syndrome;  
3. a summary of infection control recommendations for category A agents of bioterrorism;  
4. components of Standard Precautions and recommendations for their application;  
5. components of the Protective Environment; and  
6. a glossary of definitions used in this guideline.  
New in this guideline is a figure that shows a recommended sequence for donning and 
removing personal protective equipment used for isolation precautions to optimize safety 
and prevent self-contamination during removal.  
Appendix A: Type and Duration of Precautions Recommended for 
Selected Infections and Conditions 
Appendix A consists of an updated alphabetical list of most infectious agents and clinical 
conditions for which isolation precautions are recommended. A preamble to the Appendix 
provides a rationale for recommending the use of one or more Transmission-Based 
Precautions, in addition to Standard Precautions, based on a review of the literature and 
evidence demonstrating a real or potential risk for person-to-person transmission in 
healthcare settings.The type and duration of recommended precautions are presented 
with additional comments concerning the use of adjunctive measures or other relevant 
considerations to prevent transmission of the specific agent. Relevant citations are 
included. 
Pre- Publication of the Guideline on Preventing Transmission of 
MDROs 
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New to this guideline is a comprehensive review and detailed recommendations for 
prevention of transmission of MDROs. This portion of the guideline was published 
electronically in October 2006 and updated in November, 2006 (Siegel JD, Rhinehart E, 
Jackson M, Chiarello L and HICPAC. Management of Multidrug-Resistant Organisms in 
Healthcare Settings (2006) (https://www.cdc.gov/infectioncontrol/guidelines/mdro/)), and is 
considered a part of the Guideline for Isolation Precautions. This section provides a 
detailed review of the complex topic of MDRO control in healthcare settings and is 
intended to provide a context for evaluation of MDRO at individual healthcare settings. A 
rationale and institutional requirements for developing an effective MDRO control program 
are summarized. Although the focus of this guideline is on measures to prevent 
transmission of MDROs in healthcare settings, information concerning the judicious use of 
antimicrobial agents is presented since such practices are intricately related to the size of 
the reservoir of MDROs which in turn influences transmission (e.g., colonization pressure). 
There are two tables that summarize recommended prevention and control practices using 
the following seven categories of interventions to control MDROs: administrative 
measures, education of healthcare personnel, judicious antimicrobial use, surveillance, 
infection control precautions, environmental measures, and decolonization. 
Recommendations for each category apply to and are adapted for the various healthcare 
settings. With the increasing incidence and prevalence of MDROs, all healthcare facilities 
must prioritize effective control of MDRO transmission. Facilities should identify prevalent 
MDROs at the facility, implement control measures, assess the effectiveness of control 
programs, and demonstrate decreasing MDRO rates. A set of intensified MDRO 
prevention interventions is presented to be added  
1. if the incidence of transmission of a target MDRO is NOT decreasing despite 
implementation of basic MDRO infection control measures, and  
2. when the first case(s) of an epidemiologically important MDRO is identified within a 
healthcare facility.  
 
Summary 
This updated guideline responds to changes in healthcare delivery and addresses new 
concerns about transmission of infectious agents to patients and healthcare workers in 
the United States and infection control. The primary objective of the guideline is to 
improve the safety of the nation’s healthcare delivery system by reducing the rates of 
HAIs. 
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Abbreviations Used in the Guideline 
 
Acronym Definition 
AIIR  Airborne infection isolation room 
CDC  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
CF  Cystic fibrosis 
CJD  Creutzfeld-Jakob Disease 
CLSI Clinical Laboratory Standards Institute 
ESBL  Extended spectrum beta-lactamases 
FDA  Food and Drug Administration 
HAI  Healthcare-associated infections 
HBV  Hepatitis B virus 
HCV  Hepatitis C virus 
HEPA  High efficiency particulate air [filtration] 
HICPAC Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee 
HIV  Human immunodeficiency virus 
HCW  Healthcare worker 
HSCT  Hematopoetic stem-cell transplant 
ICU Intensive care unit 
LTCF  Long-term care facility 
MDRO Multidrug-resistant organism 
MDR-GNB Multidrug-resistant gram-negative bacilli 
MRSA  Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus 
NCCLS National Committee for Clinical Laboratory Standards 
NICU  Neonatal intensive care unit 
NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, CDC 
NNIS  National Nosocomial Infection Surveillance 
NSSP  Nonsusceptible Streptococcus pneumoniae 
OSHA  Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
PICU  Pediatric intensive care unit 
PPE  Personal protective equipment 
RSV  Respiratory syncytial virus 
SARS  Severe acquired respiratory syndrome 
vCJD  variant Creutzfeld-Jakob Disease  
VRE  Vancomycin-resistant enterococci 
WHO  World Health Organization 
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Part I:  
Review of Scientific Data Regarding Transmission of 
Infectious Agents in Healthcare Settings 
 
I.A. Evolution of the 2007 Document  
The Guideline for Isolation Precautions: Preventing Transmission of Infectious Agents in 
Healthcare Settings 2007 builds upon a series of isolation and infection prevention 
documents promulgated since 1970. These previous documents are summarized and 
referenced in Table 1 and in Part I of the 1996 Guideline for Isolation Precautions in 
Hospitals 1.  
Objectives and methods The objectives of this guideline are to  
1. provide infection control recommendations for all components of the healthcare 
delivery system, including hospitals, long-term care facilities, ambulatory care, home 
care and hospice;  
2. reaffirm Standard Precautions as the foundation for preventing transmission during 
patient care in all healthcare settings;  
3. reaffirm the importance of implementing Transmission-Based Precautions based on 
the clinical presentation or syndrome and likely pathogens until the infectious 
etiology has been determined (Table 2); and  
4. provide epidemiologically sound and, whenever possible, evidence-based 
recommendations. 
This guideline is designed for use by individuals who are charged with administering 
infection control programs in hospitals and other healthcare settings. The information also 
will be useful for other healthcare personnel, healthcare administrators, and anyone 
needing information about infection control measures to prevent transmission of infectious 
agents. Commonly used abbreviations are provided on page 11 and terms used in the 
guideline are defined in the Glossary (page 137).  
Med-line and Pub Med were used to search for relevant studies published in English, 
focusing on those published since 1996. Much of the evidence cited for preventing 
transmission of infectious agents in healthcare settings is derived from studies that used 
“quasi-experimental designs”, also referred to as nonrandomized, pre- post-intervention 
study designs 2. Although these types of studies can provide valuable information regarding 
the effectiveness of various interventions, several factors decrease the certainty of 
attributing improved outcome to a specific intervention. These include: difficulties in 
controlling for important confounding variables; the use of multiple interventions during an 
outbreak; and results that are explained by the statistical principle of regression to the 
mean, (e.g., improvement over time without any intervention) 3. Observational studies 
remain relevant and have been used to evaluate infection control interventions 4, 5. The 
quality of studies, consistency of results and correlation with results from randomized, 
controlled trials when available were considered during the literature review and 
assignment of evidence-based categories (See Part IV: Recommendations) to the 
recommendations in this guideline. Several authors have summarized properties to 
consider when evaluating studies for the purpose of determining if the results should 
change practice or in designing new studies 2, 6, 7.
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Changes or clarifications in terminology. This guideline contains four changes in 
terminology from the 1996 guideline: 
• The term nosocomial infection is retained to refer only to infections acquired in 
hospitals. The term healthcare-associated infection (HAI) is used to refer to 
infections associated with healthcare delivery in any setting (e.g., hospitals, long-
term care facilities, ambulatory settings, home care). This term reflects the inability 
to determine with certainty where the pathogen is acquired since patients may be 
colonized with or exposed to potential pathogens outside of the healthcare setting, 
before receiving health care, or may develop infections caused by those pathogens 
when exposed to the conditions associated with delivery of healthcare. Additionally, 
patients frequently move among the various settings within a healthcare system 8. 
• A new addition to the practice recommendations for Standard Precautions is 
Respiratory Hygiene/Cough Etiquette. While Standard Precautions generally apply 
to the recommended practices of healthcare personnel during patient care, 
Respiratory Hygiene/Cough Etiquette applies broadly to all persons who enter a 
healthcare setting, including healthcare personnel, patients and visitors. These 
recommendations evolved from observations during the SARS epidemic that failure 
to implement basic source control measures with patients, visitors, and healthcare 
personnel with signs and symptoms of respiratory tract infection may have 
contributed to SARS coronavirus (SARS-CoV) transmission. This concept has been 
incorporated into CDC planning documents for SARS and pandemic influenza 9, 10. 
• The term “Airborne Precautions” has been supplemented with the term “Airborne 
Infection Isolation Room (AIIR)” for consistency with the Guidelines for 
Environmental Infection Control in Healthcare Facilities 11, the Guidelines for 
Preventing the Transmission of Mycobacterium tuberculosis in Health-Care Settings 
200512 and the American Institute of Architects (AIA) guidelines for design and 
construction of hospitals, 2006 13 
• A set of prevention measures termed Protective Environment has been added to the 
precautions used to prevent HAIs. These measures, which have been defined in 
other guidelines, consist of engineering and design interventions that decrease the 
risk of exposure to environmental fungi for severely immunocompromised allogeneic 
hematiopoietic stem cell transplant (HSCT) patients during their highest risk phase, 
usually the first 100 days post transplant, or longer in the presence of graft-versus-
host disease 11, 13-15. Recommendations for a Protective Environment apply only to 
acute care hospitals that provide care to HSCT patients. 
 
Scope. This guideline, like its predecessors, focuses primarily on interactions between 
patients and healthcare providers. The Guidelines for the Prevention of MDRO Infection 
were published separately in November 2006, and are available online at Management 
of Multidrug-Resistant Organisms in Healthcare Settings 
(https://www.cdc.gov/infectioncontrol/guidelines/mdro/). Several other HICPAC 
guidelines to prevent transmission of infectious agents associated with healthcare 
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delivery are cited; e.g., Guideline for Hand Hygiene, Guideline for Environmental 
Infection Control, Guideline for Prevention of Healthcare-Associated Pneumonia, and 
Guideline for Infection Control in Healthcare Personnel 11, 14, 16, 17. In combination, these 
provide comprehensive guidance on the primary infection control measures for ensuring 
a safe environment for patients and healthcare personnel. 
This guideline does not discuss in detail specialized infection control issues in defined 
populations that are addressed elsewhere, (e.g., Recommendations for Preventing 
Transmission of Infections among Chronic Hemodialysis Patients, Guidelines for 
Preventing the Transmission of Mycobacterium tuberculosis in Health-Care Facilities 
2005, Guidelines for Infection Control in Dental Health-Care Settings and Infection 
Control Recommendations for Patients with Cystic Fibrosis 12, 18-20. An exception has 
been made by including abbreviated guidance for a Protective Environment used for 
allogeneic HSCT recipients because components of the Protective Environment have 
been more completely defined since publication of the Guidelines for Preventing 
Opportunistic Infections Among HSCT Recipients in 2000 and the Guideline for 
Environmental Infection Control in Healthcare Facilities 11, 15.  
I.B. Rationale for Standard and Transmission-Based Precautions in 
healthcare settings 
Transmission of infectious agents within a healthcare setting requires three elements: a 
source (or reservoir) of infectious agents, a susceptible host with a portal of entry 
receptive to the agent, and a mode of transmission for the agent. This section describes 
the interrelationship of these elements in the epidemiology of HAIs.  
I.B.1. Sources of infectious agents. Infectious agents transmitted during healthcare 
derive primarily from human sources but inanimate environmental sources also are 
implicated in transmission. Human reservoirs include patients 20-28, healthcare 
personnel 29-35 17, 36-39, and household members and other visitors 40-45. Such source 
individuals may have active infections, may be in the asymptomatic and/or incubation 
period of an infectious disease, or may be transiently or chronically colonized with 
pathogenic microorganisms, particularly in the respiratory and gastrointestinal tracts. 
The endogenous flora of patients (e.g., bacteria residing in the respiratory or 
gastrointestinal tract) also are the source of HAIs 46-54. 
I.B.2. Susceptible hosts. Infection is the result of a complex interrelationship between 
a potential host and an infectious agent. Most of the factors that influence infection and 
the occurrence and severity of disease are related to the host. However, characteristics 
of the host-agent interaction as it relates to pathogenicity, virulence and antigenicity are 
also important, as are the infectious dose, mechanisms of disease production and route 
of exposure 55. There is a spectrum of possible outcomes following exposure to an 
infectious agent. Some persons exposed to pathogenic microorganisms never develop 
symptomatic disease while others become severely ill and even die. Some individuals 
are prone to becoming transiently or permanently colonized but remain asymptomatic. 
Still others progress from colonization to symptomatic disease either immediately 
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following exposure, or after a period of asymptomatic colonization. The immune state at 
the time of exposure to an infectious agent, interaction between pathogens, and 
virulence factors intrinsic to the agent are important predictors of an individuals’ 
outcome. Host factors such as extremes of age and underlying disease (e.g., diabetes 
56, 57), human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome [HIV/AIDS] 
58, 59, malignancy, and transplants 18, 60, 61 can increase susceptibility to infection as do a 
variety of medications that alter the normal flora (e.g., antimicrobial agents, gastric acid 
suppressants, corticosteroids, antirejection drugs, antineoplastic agents, and 
immunosuppressive drugs). Surgical procedures and radiation therapy impair defenses 
of the skin and other involved organ systems. Indwelling devices such as urinary 
catheters, endotracheal tubes, central venous and arterial catheters 62-64 and synthetic 
implants facilitate development of HAIs by allowing potential pathogens to bypass local 
defenses that would ordinarily impede their invasion and by providing surfaces for 
development of bioflms that may facilitate adherence of microorganisms and protect 
from antimicrobial activity 65. Some infections associated with invasive procedures result 
from transmission within the healthcare facility; others arise from the patient’s 
endogenous flora 46-50. High-risk patient populations with noteworthy risk factors for 
infection are discussed further in Sections I.D, I.E., and I.F. 
I.B.3. Modes of transmission. Several classes of pathogens can cause infection, 
including bacteria, viruses, fungi, parasites, and prions. The modes of transmission vary 
by type of organism and some infectious agents may be transmitted by more than one 
route: some are transmitted primarily by direct or indirect contact, (e.g., Herpes simplex 
virus [HSV], respiratory syncytial virus, Staphylococcus aureus), others by the droplet, 
(e.g., influenza virus, B. pertussis) or airborne routes (e.g., M. tuberculosis). Other 
infectious agents, such as bloodborne viruses (e.g., hepatitis B and C viruses [HBV, 
HCV] and HIV are transmitted rarely in healthcare settings, via percutaneous or mucous 
membrane exposure. Importantly, not all infectious agents are transmitted from person 
to person. These are distinguished in Appendix A. The three principal routes of 
transmission are summarized below.  
I.B.3.a. Contact transmission. The most common mode of transmission, contact 
transmission is divided into two subgroups: direct contact and indirect contact. 
I.B.3.a.i. Direct contact transmission. Direct transmission occurs when 
microorganisms are transferred from one infected person to another person without a 
contaminated intermediate object or person. Opportunities for direct contact 
transmission between patients and healthcare personnel have been summarized in the 
Guideline for Infection Control in Healthcare Personnel, 1998 17 and include: 
• blood or other blood-containing body fluids from a patient directly enters a 
caregiver’s body through contact with a mucous membrane 66 or breaks (i.e., cuts, 
abrasions) in the skin 67. 
• mites from a scabies-infested patient are transferred to the skin of a caregiver while 
he/she is having direct ungloved contact with the patient’s skin 68, 69.  
• a healthcare provider develops herpetic whitlow on a finger after contact with HSV 
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when providing oral care to a patient without using gloves or HSV is transmitted to a 
patient from a herpetic whitlow on an ungloved hand of a healthcare worker (HCW) 
70, 71. 
I.B.3.a.ii. Indirect contact transmission. Indirect transmission involves the transfer of 
an infectious agent through a contaminated intermediate object or person. In the 
absence of a point-source outbreak, it is difficult to determine how indirect transmission 
occurs. However, extensive evidence cited in the Guideline for Hand Hygiene in Health-
Care Settings suggests that the contaminated hands of healthcare personnel are 
important contributors to indirect contact transmission 16. Examples of opportunities for 
indirect contact transmission include: 
• Hands of healthcare personnel may transmit pathogens after touching an infected or 
colonized body site on one patient or a contaminated inanimate object, if hand 
hygiene is not performed before touching another patient.72, 73.  
• Patient-care devices (e.g., electronic thermometers, glucose monitoring devices) 
may transmit pathogens if devices contaminated with blood or body fluids are shared 
between patients without cleaning and disinfecting between patients74 75-77.  
• Shared toys may become a vehicle for transmitting respiratory viruses (e.g., 
respiratory syncytial virus 24, 78, 79 or pathogenic bacteria (e.g., Pseudomonas 
aeruginosa 80) among pediatric patients.  
• Instruments that are inadequately cleaned between patients before disinfection or 
sterilization (e.g., endoscopes or surgical instruments) 81-85 or that have 
manufacturing defects that interfere with the effectiveness of reprocessing 86, 87 may 
transmit bacterial and viral pathogens. 
Clothing, uniforms, laboratory coats, or isolation gowns used as personal protective 
equipment (PPE), may become contaminated with potential pathogens after care of a 
patient colonized or infected with an infectious agent, (e.g., MRSA 88, VRE 89, and C. 
difficile 90. Although contaminated clothing has not been implicated directly in 
transmission, the potential exists for soiled garments to transfer infectious agents to 
successive patients. 
I.B.3.b. Droplet transmission. Droplet transmission is, technically, a form of contact 
transmission, and some infectious agents transmitted by the droplet route also may be 
transmitted by the direct and indirect contact routes. However, in contrast to contact 
transmission, respiratory droplets carrying infectious pathogens transmit infection when 
they travel directly from the respiratory tract of the infectious individual to susceptible 
mucosal surfaces of the recipient, generally over short distances, necessitating facial 
protection. Respiratory droplets are generated when an infected person coughs, 
sneezes, or talks 91, 92 or during procedures such as suctioning, endotracheal intubation, 
93-96, cough induction by chest physiotherapy 97 and cardiopulmonary resuscitation 98, 99. 
Evidence for droplet transmission comes from epidemiological studies of disease 
outbreaks 100-103, experimental studies 104 and from information on aerosol dynamics 91, 
105. Studies have shown that the nasal mucosa, conjunctivae and less frequently the 
mouth, are susceptible portals of entry for respiratory viruses 106. The maximum 
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distance for droplet transmission is currently unresolved, although pathogens 
transmitted by the droplet route have not been transmitted through the air over long 
distances, in contrast to the airborne pathogens discussed below. Historically, the area 
of defined risk has been a distance of ≤3 feet around the patient and is based on 
epidemiologic and simulated studies of selected infections 103, 104. Using this distance for 
donning masks has been effective in preventing transmission of infectious agents via 
the droplet route. However, experimental studies with smallpox 107, 108 and investigations 
during the global SARS outbreaks of 2003 101 suggest that droplets from patients with 
these two infections could reach persons located 6 feet or more from their source. It is 
likely that the distance droplets travel depends on the velocity and mechanism by which 
respiratory droplets are propelled from the source, the density of respiratory secretions, 
environmental factors such as temperature and humidity, and the ability of the pathogen 
to maintain infectivity over that distance 105. Thus, a distance of ≤3 feet around the 
patient is best viewed as an example of what is meant by “a short distance from a 
patient” and should not be used as the sole criterion for deciding when a mask should 
be donned to protect from droplet exposure. Based on these considerations, it may be 
prudent to don a mask when within 6 to 10 feet of the patient or upon entry into the 
patient’s room, especially when exposure to emerging or highly virulent pathogens is 
likely. More studies are needed to improve understanding of droplet transmission under 
various circumstances.  
Droplet size is another variable under discussion. Droplets traditionally have been defined 
as being >5 µm in size. Droplet nuclei, particles arising from desiccation of suspended 
droplets, have been associated with airborne transmission and defined as ≤5 µm in size 
105, a reflection of the pathogenesis of pulmonary tuberculosis which is not generalizeable 
to other organisms. Observations of particle dynamics have demonstrated that a range of 
droplet sizes, including those with diameters of 30µm or greater, can remain suspended 
in the air 109. The behavior of droplets and droplet nuclei affect recommendations for 
preventing transmission. Whereas fine airborne particles containing pathogens that are 
able to remain infective may transmit infections over long distances, requiring AIIR to 
prevent its dissemination within a facility; organisms transmitted by the droplet route do 
not remain infective over long distances, and therefore do not require special air handling 
and ventilation. Examples of infectious agents that are transmitted via the droplet route 
include Bordetella pertussis 110, influenza virus 23, adenovirus 111, rhinovirus 104, 
Mycoplasma pneumoniae 112, SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV) 21, 96, 113, group 
A streptococcus 114, and Neisseria meningitidis 95, 103, 115. Although respiratory syncytial 
virus may be transmitted by the droplet route, direct contact with infected respiratory 
secretions is the most important determinant of transmission and consistent adherence to 
Standard plus Contact Precautions prevents transmission in healthcare settings 24, 116, 117.  
Rarely, pathogens that are not transmitted routinely by the droplet route are dispersed 
into the air over short distances. For example, although S. aureus is transmitted most 
frequently by the contact route, viral upper respiratory tract infection has been 
associated with increased dispersal of S. aureus from the nose into the air for a 
distance of 4 feet under both outbreak and experimental conditions and is known as the 
“cloud baby” and “cloud adult” phenomenon118-120.  
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I.B.3.c. Airborne transmission. Airborne transmission occurs by dissemination of 
either airborne droplet nuclei or small particles in the respirable size range containing 
infectious agents that remain infective over time and distance (e.g., spores of 
Aspergillus spp, and Mycobacterium tuberculosis). Microorganisms carried in this 
manner may be dispersed over long distances by air currents and may be inhaled by 
susceptible individuals who have not had face-to-face contact with (or been in the same 
room with) the infectious individual 121-124. Preventing the spread of pathogens that are 
transmitted by the airborne route requires the use of special air handling and ventilation 
systems (e.g., AIIRs) to contain and then safely remove the infectious agent 11, 12. 
Infectious agents to which this applies include Mycobacterium tuberculosis 124-127, 
rubeola virus (measles) 122, and varicella-zoster virus (chickenpox) 123. In addition, 
published data suggest the possibility that variola virus (smallpox) may be transmitted 
over long distances through the air under unusual circumstances and AIIRs are 
recommended for this agent as well; however, droplet and contact routes are the more 
frequent routes of transmission for smallpox 108, 128, 129. In addition to AIIRs, respiratory 
protection with NIOSH certified N95 or higher level respirator is recommended for 
healthcare personnel entering the AIIR to prevent acquisition of airborne infectious 
agents such as M. tuberculosis 12.  
For certain other respiratory infectious agents, such as influenza 130, 131 and rhinovirus 
104, and even some gastrointestinal viruses (e.g., norovirus 132 and rotavirus 133 ) there is 
some evidence that the pathogen may be transmitted via small-particle aerosols, under 
natural and experimental conditions. Such transmission has occurred over distances 
longer than 3 feet but within a defined airspace (e.g., patient room), suggesting that it is 
unlikely that these agents remain viable on air currents that travel long distances. AIIRs 
are not required routinely to prevent transmission of these agents. Additional issues 
concerning examples of small particle aerosol transmission of agents that are most 
frequently transmitted by the droplet route are discussed below. 
I.B.3.d. Emerging issues concerning airborne transmission of infectious agents. 
I.B.3.d.i. Transmission from patients. The emergence of SARS in 2002, the importation 
of monkeypox into the United States in 2003, and the emergence of avian influenza 
present challenges to the assignment of isolation categories because of conflicting 
information and uncertainty about possible routes of transmission. Although SARS-CoV is 
transmitted primarily by contact and/or droplet routes, airborne transmission over a limited 
distance (e.g., within a room), has been suggested, though not proven 134-141. This is true 
of other infectious agents such as influenza virus 130 and noroviruses 132, 142, 143. Influenza 
viruses are transmitted primarily by close contact with respiratory droplets 23, 102 and 
acquisition by healthcare personnel has been prevented by Droplet Precautions, even 
when positive pressure rooms were used in one center 144 However, inhalational 
transmission could not be excluded in an outbreak of influenza in the passengers and crew 
of a single aircraft 130. Observations of a protective effect of UV lights in preventing 
influenza among patients with tuberculosis during the influenza pandemic of 1957-’58 have 
been used to suggest airborne transmission 145, 146.  
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In contrast to the strict interpretation of an airborne route for transmission (i.e., long 
distances beyond the patient room environment), short distance transmission by small 
particle aerosols generated under specific circumstances (e.g., during endotracheal 
intubation) to persons in the immediate area near the patient has been demonstrated. 
Also, aerosolized particles <100 µm can remain suspended in air when room air current 
velocities exceed the terminal settling velocities of the particles 109. SARS-CoV 
transmission has been associated with endotracheal intubation, noninvasive positive 
pressure ventilation, and cardio-pulmonary resuscitation 93, 94, 96, 98, 141. Although the most 
frequent routes of transmission of noroviruses are contact and food and waterborne 
routes, several reports suggest that noroviruses may be transmitted through aerosolization 
of infectious particles from vomitus or fecal material 142, 143, 147, 148. It is hypothesized that 
the aerosolized particles are inhaled and subsequently swallowed.  
Roy and Milton proposed a new classification for aerosol transmission when evaluating 
routes of SARS transmission:  
1. obligate: under natural conditions, disease occurs following transmission of the agent 
only through inhalation of small particle aerosols (e.g., tuberculosis);  
2. preferential: natural infection results from transmission through multiple routes, but 
small particle aerosols are the predominant route (e.g., measles, varicella); and  
3. opportunistic: agents that naturally cause disease through other routes, but under 
special circumstances may be transmitted via fine particle aerosols 149.  
This conceptual framework can explain rare occurrences of airborne transmission of 
agents that are transmitted most frequently by other routes (e.g., smallpox, SARS, 
influenza, noroviruses). Concerns about unknown or possible routes of transmission of 
agents associated with severe disease and no known treatment often result in more 
extreme prevention strategies than may be necessary; therefore, recommended 
precautions could change as the epidemiology of an emerging infection is defined and 
controversial issues are resolved. 
I.B.3.d.ii. Transmission from the environment. Some airborne infectious agents are 
derived from the environment and do not usually involve person-to-person transmission. 
For example, anthrax spores present in a finely milled powdered preparation can be 
aerosolized from contaminated environmental surfaces and inhaled into the respiratory 
tract 150, 151. Spores of environmental fungi (e.g., Aspergillus spp.) are ubiquitous in the 
environment and may cause disease in immunocompromised patients who inhale 
aerosolized (e.g., via construction dust) spores 152, 153. As a rule, neither of these 
organisms is subsequently transmitted from infected patients. However, there is one well-
documented report of person-to-person transmission of Aspergillus sp. in the ICU setting 
that was most likey due to the aerosolization of spores during wound debridement 154. A 
Protective Environment refers to isolation practices designed to decrease the risk of 
exposure to environmental fungal agents in allogeneic HSCT patients 11, 14, 15, 155-158.  
Environmental sources of respiratory pathogens (eg. Legionella) transmitted to humans 
through a common aerosol source is distinct from direct patient-to-patient transmission. 
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I.B.3.e. Other sources of infection. Transmission of infection from sources other than 
infectious individuals include those associated with common environmental sources or 
vehicles (e.g., contaminated food, water, or medications (e.g., intravenous fluids). 
Although Aspergillus spp. have been recovered from hospital water systems 159, the role 
of water as a reservoir for immunosuppressed patients remains uncertain. Vectorborne 
transmission of infectious agents from mosquitoes, flies, rats, and other vermin also can 
occur in healthcare settings. Prevention of vector borne transmission is not addressed in 
this document.  
I.C. Infectious Agents of Special Infection Control Interest for 
Healthcare Settings  
Several infectious agents with important infection control implications that either were 
not discussed extensively in previous isolation guidelines or have emerged recently are 
discussed below. These are epidemiologically important organisms (e.g., C. difficile), 
agents of bioterrorism, prions, SARS-CoV, monkeypox, noroviruses, and the 
hemorrhagic fever viruses. Experience with these agents has broadened the 
understanding of modes of transmission and effective preventive measures. These 
agents are included for purposes of information and, for some (i.e., SARS-CoV, 
monkeypox), because of the lessons that have been learned about preparedness 
planning and responding effectively to new infectious agents. 
I.C.1. Epidemiologically important organisms. Any infectious agents transmitted in 
healthcare settings may, under defined conditions, become targeted for control because 
they are epidemiologically important. C. difficile is specifically discussed below because 
of wide recognition of its current importance in U.S. healthcare facilities. In determining 
what constitutes an “epidemiologically important organism”, the following characteristics 
apply:  
• A propensity for transmission within healthcare facilities based on published reports 
and the occurrence of temporal or geographic clusters of > 2 patients, (e.g., 
C..difficile, norovirus, respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), influenza, rotavirus, 
Enterobacter spp; Serratia spp., group A streptococcus). A single case of 
healthcare-associated invasive disease caused by certain pathogens (e.g., group A 
streptococcus post-operatively 160, in burn units 161, or in a LTCF 162; Legionella sp. 
14, 163, Aspergillus sp. 164 ) is generally considered a trigger for investigation and 
enhanced control measures because of the risk of additional cases and severity of 
illness associated with these infections. Antimicrobial resistance  
• Resistance to first-line therapies (e.g., MRSA, VISA, VRSA, VRE, ESBL-producing 
organisms). 
• Common and uncommon microorganisms with unusual patterns of resistance within 
a facility (e.g., the first isolate of Burkholderia cepacia complex or Ralstonia spp. in 
non-CF patients or a quinolone-resistant strain of Pseudomonas aeruginosa in a 
facility). 
• Difficult to treat because of innate or acquired resistance to multiple classes of 
antimicrobial agents (e.g., Stenotrophomonas maltophilia, Acinetobacter spp.). 
• Association with serious clinical disease, increased morbidity and mortality (e.g., 
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MRSA and MSSA, group A streptococcus) 
• A newly discovered or reemerging pathogen  
I.C.1.a. C.difficile. C. difficile is a spore-forming gram positive anaerobic bacillus that 
was first isolated from stools of neonates in 1935 165 and identified as the most 
commonly identified causative agent of antibiotic-associated diarrhea and 
pseudomembranous colitis in 1977 166. This pathogen is a major cause of healthcare-
associated diarrhea and has been responsible for many large outbreaks in healthcare 
settings that were extremely difficult to control. Important factors that contribute to 
healthcare-associated outbreaks include environmental contamination, persistence of 
spores for prolonged periods of time, resistance of spores to routinely used disinfectants 
and antiseptics, hand carriage by healthcare personnel to other patients, and exposure 
of patients to frequent courses of antimicrobial agents 167. Antimicrobials most 
frequently associated with increased risk of C. difficile include third generation 
cephalosporins, clindamycin, vancomycin, and fluoroquinolones. 
Since 2001, outbreaks and sporadic cases of C. difficile with increased morbidity and 
mortality have been observed in several U.S. states, Canada, England and the 
Netherlands 168-172. The same strain of C. difficile has been implicated in these 
outbreaks 173. This strain, toxinotype III, North American PFGE type 1, and PCR-
ribotype 027 (NAP1/027) has been found to hyperproduce toxin A (16 fold increase) and 
toxin B (23 fold increase) compared with isolates from 12 different pulsed-field gel 
electrophoresisPFGE types. A recent survey of U.S. infectious disease physicians found 
that 40% perceived recent increases in the incidence and severity of C. difficile 
disease174. Standardization of testing methodology and surveillance definitions is 
needed for accurate comparisons of trends in rates among hospitals 175. It is 
hypothesized that the incidence of disease and apparent heightened transmissibility of 
this new strain may be due, at least in part, to the greater production of toxins A and B, 
increasing the severity of diarrhea and resulting in more environmental contamination. 
Considering the greater morbidity, mortality, length of stay, and costs associated with C. 
difficile disease in both acute care and long term care facilities, control of this pathogen 
is now even more important than previously. Prevention of transmission focuses on 
syndromic application of Contact Precautions for patients with diarrhea, accurate 
identification of patients, environmental measures (e.g., rigorous cleaning of patient 
rooms) and consistent hand hygiene. Use of soap and water, rather than alcohol based 
handrubs, for mechanical removal of spores from hands, and a bleach-containing 
disinfectant (5000 ppm) for environmental disinfection, may be valuable when there is 
transmission in a healthcare facility. See Appendix A for specific recommendations. 
I.C.1. b. Multidrug-resistant organisms (MDROs). In general, MDROs are defined as 
microorganisms – predominantly bacteria – that are resistant to one or more classes of 
antimicrobial agents176. Although the names of certain MDROs suggest resistance to 
only one agent (e.g., methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus [MRSA], vancomycin 
resistant enterococcus [VRE]), these pathogens are usually resistant to all but a few 
commercially available antimicrobial agents. This latter feature defines MDROs that are 
considered to be epidemiologically important and deserve special attention in 
healthcare facilities177. Other MDROs of current concern include multidrug-resistant 
Guideline for Isolation Precautions: Preventing Transmission of Infectious Agents in Healthcare Settings (2007) 
Last update: Feburary 15, 2017  Page 22 of 209 
 
Streptococcus pneumoniae (MDRSP) which is resistant to penicillin and other broad-
spectrum agents such as macrolides and fluroquinolones, multidrug-resistant gram-
negative bacilli (MDR- GNB), especially those producing extended spectrum beta-
lactamases (ESBLs); and strains of S. aureus that are intermediate or resistant to 
vancomycin (i.e., VISA and VRSA)178-197 198.  
MDROs are transmitted by the same routes as antimicrobial susceptible infectious 
agents. Patient-to-patient transmission in healthcare settings, usually via hands of HCWs, 
has been a major factor accounting for the increase in MDRO incidence and prevalence, 
especially for MRSA and VRE in acute care facilities199-201. Preventing the emergence 
and transmission of these pathogens requires a comprehensive approach that includes 
administrative involvement and measures (e.g., nurse staffing, communication systems, 
performance improvement processes to ensure adherence to recommended infection 
control measures), education and training of medical and other healthcare personnel, 
judicious antibiotic use, comprehensive surveillance for targeted MDROs, application of 
infection control precautions during patient care, environmental measures (e.g., cleaning 
and disinfection of the patient care environment and equipment, dedicated single-patient-
use of non-critical equipment), and decolonization therapy when appropriate. 
The prevention and control of MDROs is a national priority - one that requires that all 
healthcare facilities and agencies assume responsibility and participate in community-
wide control programs176, 177. A detailed discussion of this topic and recommendations for 
prevention was published in 2006 may be found at Management of Multidrug-Resistant 
Organisms in Healthcare Settings (2006) 
(https://www.cdc.gov/infectioncontrol/guidelines/mdro/). 
I.C.2. Agents of bioterrorism. CDC has designated the agents that cause anthrax, 
smallpox, plague, tularemia, viral hemorrhagic fevers, and botulism as Category A (high 
priority) because these agents can be easily disseminated environmentally and/or 
transmitted from person to person; can cause high mortality and have the potential for 
major public health impact; might cause public panic and social disruption; and require 
special action for public health preparedness202. General information relevant to infection 
control in healthcare settings for Category A agents of bioterrorism is summarized in 
Table 3. Consult [This link is no longer active: www.bt.cdc.gov. Similar information may 
be found at CDC Bioterrorism Agents/Diseases 
(https://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist.asp) Accessed May 2016.] for additional, 
updated Category A agent information as well as information concerning Category B and 
C agents of bioterrorism and updates. Category B and C agents are important but are not 
as readily disseminated and cause less morbidity and mortality than Category A agents. 
Healthcare facilities confront a different set of issues when dealing with a suspected 
bioterrorism event as compared with other communicable diseases. An understanding of 
the epidemiology, modes of transmission, and clinical course of each disease, as well as 
carefully drafted plans that provide an approach and relevant websites and other 
resources for disease-specific guidance to healthcare, administrative, and support 
personnel, are essential for responding to and managing a bioterrorism event. Infection 
Guideline for Isolation Precautions: Preventing Transmission of Infectious Agents in Healthcare Settings (2007) 
Last update: Feburary 15, 2017  Page 23 of 209 
 
control issues to be addressed include:  
1. identifying persons who may be exposed or infected;  
2. preventing transmission among patients, healthcare personnel, and visitors;  
3. providing treatment, chemoprophylaxis or vaccine to potentially large numbers of 
people;  
4. protecting the environment including the logistical aspects of securing sufficient 
numbers of AIIRs or designating areas for patient cohorts when there are an 
insufficient number of AIIRs available; 
5. providing adequate quantities of appropriate personal protective equipment; and  
6. identifying appropriate staff to care for potentially infectious patients (e.g., vaccinated 
healthcare personnel for care of patients with smallpox).  
The response is likely to differ for exposures resulting from an intentional release 
compared with naturally occurring disease because of the large number persons that can 
be exposed at the same time and possible differences in pathogenicity. 
A variety of sources offer guidance for the management of persons exposed to the most 
likely agents of bioterrorism. Federal agency websites (e.g., [This link is no longer active: 
www.usamriid.army.mil/publications/index.html. Similar information may be found at 
USAMRIID: Biodefense Solutions to Protect our Nation (http://www.usamriid.army.mil/) 
accessed May 2016.], [This link is no longer active: www.bt.cdc.gov. Similar information 
may be found at CDC Bioterrorism Agents/Diseases 
(https://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist.asp) Accessed May 2016.)] and state and 
county health department web sites should be consulted for the most up-to-date 
information. Sources of information on specific agents include: anthrax 203; smallpox 204-
206; plague 207, 208; botulinum toxin 209; tularemia 210; and hemorrhagic fever viruses: 211, 212. 
I.C.2.a. Pre-event administration of smallpox (vaccinia) vaccine to healthcare 
personnel. Vaccination of personnel in preparation for a possible smallpox exposure has 
important infection control implications 213-215. These include the need for meticulous 
screening for vaccine contraindications in persons who are at increased risk for adverse 
vaccinia events; containment and monitoring of the vaccination site to prevent 
transmission in the healthcare setting and at home; and the management of patients with 
vaccinia-related adverse events 216, 217. The pre-event U.S. smallpox vaccination program 
of 2003 is an example of the effectiveness of carefully developed recommendations for 
both screening potential vaccinees for contraindications and vaccination site care and 
monitoring. Approximately 760,000 individuals were vaccinated in the Department of 
Defense and 40,000 in the civilian or public health populations from December 2002 to 
February 2005, including approximately 70,000 who worked in healthcare settings. There 
were no cases of eczema vaccinatum, progressive vaccinia, fetal vaccinia, or contact 
transfer of vaccinia in healthcare settings or in military workplaces 218, 219. Outside the 
healthcare setting, there were 53 cases of contact transfer from military vaccinees to 
close personal contacts (e.g., bed partners or contacts during participation in sports such 
as wrestling 220). All contact transfers were from individuals who were not following 
recommendations to cover their vaccination sites. Vaccinia virus was confirmed by culture 
or PCR in 30 cases, and two of the confirmed cases resulted from tertiary transfer. All 
recipients, including one breast-fed infant, recovered without complication. Subsequent 
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studies using viral culture and PCR techniques have confirmed the effectiveness of 
semipermeable dressings to contain vaccinia 221-224. This experience emphasizes the 
importance of ensuring that newly vaccinated healthcare personnel adhere to 
recommended vaccination-site care, especially if they are to care for high-risk patients. 
Recommendations for pre-event smallpox vaccination of healthcare personnel and 
vaccinia-related infection control recommendations are published in the MMWR 216, 225 
with updates posted on the CDC bioterrorism web site 205. 
I.C.3. Prions. Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) is a rapidly progressive, degenerative, 
neurologic disorder of humans with an incidence in the United States of approximately 1 
person/million population/year 226, 227 (Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease, Classic (CJD) 
(https://www.cdc.gov/prions/cjd/index.html) [Current version of this document may differ 
from original.]). CJD is believed to be caused by a transmissible proteinaceous infectious 
agent termed a prion. Infectious prions are isoforms of a host-encoded glycoprotein 
known as the prion protein. The incubation period (i.e., time between exposure and and 
onset of symptoms) varies from two years to many decades. However, death typically 
occurs within 1 year of the onset of symptoms. Approximately 85% of CJD cases occur 
sporadically with no known environmental source of infection and 10% are familial. 
Iatrogenic transmission has occurred with most resulting from treatment with human 
cadaveric pituitary-derived growth hormone or gonadotropin 228, 229, from implantation of 
contaminated human dura mater grafts 230 or from corneal transplants 231). Transmission 
has been linked to the use of contaminated neurosurgical instruments or stereotactic 
electroencephalogram electrodes 232, 233, 234, 235. 
Prion diseases in animals include scrapie in sheep and goats, bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE, or “mad cow disease”) in cattle, and chronic wasting disease in 
deer and elk 236. BSE, first recognized in the United Kingdom (UK) in 1986, was 
associated with a major epidemic among cattle that had consumed contaminated meat 
and bone meal. 
The possible transmission of BSE to humans causing variant CJD (vCJD) was first 
described in 1996 and subsequently found to be associated with consumption of BSE-
contaminated cattle products primarily in the United Kingdom. There is strong 
epidemiologic and laboratory evidence for a causal association between the causative 
agent of BSE and vCJD 237. Although most cases of vCJD have been reported from the 
UK, a few cases also have been reported from Europe, Japan, Canada, and the United 
States. Most vCJD cases worldwide lived in or visited the UK during the years of a large 
outbreak of BSE (1980-96) and may have consumed contaminated cattle products during 
that time (Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease, Classic (CJD) 
(https://www.cdc.gov/prions/cjd/index.html) [Current version of this document may differ 
from original.]). Although there has been no indigenously acquired vCJD in the United 
States, the sporadic occurrence of BSE in cattle in North America has heightened 
awareness of the possibility that such infections could occur and have led to increased 
surveillance activities. Updated information may be found on the following website: 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease, Classic (CJD) (https://www.cdc.gov/prions/cjd/index.html) 
[Current version of this document may differ from original.]. The public health impact of 
prion diseases has been reviewed 238. 
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vCJD in humans has different clinical and pathologic characteristics from sporadic or 
classic CJD 239, including the following:  
1. younger median age at death: 28 (range 16-48) vs. 68 years;  
2. longer duration of illness: median 14 months vs. 4-6 months;  
3. increased frequency of sensory symptoms and early psychiatric symptoms with 
delayed onset of frank neurologic signs; and  
4. detection of prions in tonsillar and other lymphoid tissues from vCJD patients but not 
from sporadic CJD patients 240.  
Similar to sporadic CJD, there have been no reported cases of direct human-to-human 
transmission of vCJD by casual or environmental contact, droplet, or airborne routes. 
Ongoing blood safety surveillance in the U.S. has not detected sporadic CJD 
transmission through blood transfusion 241-243. However, bloodborne transmission of vCJD 
is believed to have occurred in two UK patients 244, 245. The following FDA websites 
provide information on steps that are being taken in the US to protect the blood supply 
from CJD and vCJD: [This link is no longer active: 
http://www.fda.gov/cber/gdlns/cjdvcjd.htm. Similar information may be found at Guidance 
for Industry: Revised Preventive Measures 
(http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/
Guidances/Blood/ucm074089.htm), accessed May 2016.]; [This link is no longer active: 
http://www.fda.gov/cber/gdlns/cjdvcjdq&a.htm. Similar information may be found at 
Questions and Answers on Guidance for Industry: Revised Preventive Measures 
(http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/
Guidances/Blood/ucm074100.htm), accessed May 2016.].  
Standard Precautions are used when caring for patients with suspected or confirmed CJD 
or vCJD. However, special precautions are recommended for tissue handling in the 
histology laboratory and for conducting an autopsy, embalming, and for contact with a 
body that has undergone autopsy 246. Recommendations for reprocessing surgical 
instruments to prevent transmission of CJD in healthcare settings have been published by 
the World Health Organization (WHO) and are currently under review at CDC. 
Questions concerning notification of patients potentially exposed to CJD or vCJD through 
contaminated instruments and blood products from patients with CJD or vCJD or at risk of 
having vCJD may arise. The risk of transmission associated with such exposures is 
believed to be extremely low but may vary based on the specific circumstance. Therefore 
consultation on appropriate options is advised. The United Kingdom has developed 
several documents that clinicians and patients in the US may find useful ([This link is no 
longer active: http://www.hpa.org.uk/ infections/topics_az/cjd/information_documents.htm. 
Similar information may be found at Health Protection Agency: Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease 
(CJD) 
(http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100121072521/hpa.org.uk/hpa/topics/infecti
ousdiseases/infectionsaz/1191942152861/), accessed May 2016.]). 
I.C.4. Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). SARS is a newly discovered 
respiratory disease that emerged in China late in 2002 and spread to several countries 
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135, 140; Mainland China, Hong Kong, Hanoi, Singapore, and Toronto were affected 
significantly. SARS is caused by SARS CoV, a previously unrecognized member of the 
coronavirus family 247, 248. The incubation period from exposure to the onset of symptoms 
is 2 to 7 days but can be as long as 10 days and uncommonly even longer 249. The illness 
is initially difficult to distinguish from other common respiratory infections. Signs and 
symptoms usually include fever >38.0°C and chills and rigors, sometimes accompanied 
by headache, myalgia, and mild to severe respiratory symptoms. Radiographic finding of 
atypical pneumonia is an important clinical indicator of possible SARS. Compared with 
adults, children have been affected less frequently, have milder disease, and are less 
likely to transmit SARS-CoV 135, 249-251. The overall case fatality rate is approximately 
6.0%; underlying disease and advanced age increase the risk of mortality (WHO Update 
49 - SARS case fatality ratio, incubation period 
(http://www.who.int/csr/sarsarchive/2003_05_07a/en/)). 
Outbreaks in healthcare settings, with transmission to large numbers of healthcare 
personnel and patients have been a striking feature of SARS; undiagnosed, infectious 
patients and visitors were important initiators of these outbreaks 21, 252-254. The relative 
contribution of potential modes of transmission is not precisely known. There is ample 
evidence for droplet and contact transmission 96, 101, 113; however, opportunistic airborne 
transmission cannot be excluded 101, 135-139, 149, 255. For example, exposure to aerosol-
generating procedures (e.g., endotracheal intubation, suctioning) was associated with 
transmission of infection to large numbers of healthcare personnel outside of the United 
States 93, 94, 96, 98, 253.Therefore, aerosolization of small infectious particles generated 
during these and other similar procedures could be a risk factor for transmission to others 
within a multi-bed room or shared airspace. A review of the infection control literature 
generated from the SARS outbreaks of 2003 concluded that the greatest risk of 
transmission is to those who have close contact, are not properly trained in use of 
protective infection control procedures, do not consistently use PPE; and that N95 or 
higher respirators may offer additional protection to those exposed to aerosol- generating 
procedures and high risk activities 256, 257. Organizational and individual factors that 
affected adherence to infection control practices for SARS also were identified 257. 
Control of SARS requires a coordinated, dynamic response by multiple disciplines in a 
healthcare setting 9. Early detection of cases is accomplished by screening persons with 
symptoms of a respiratory infection for history of travel to areas experiencing community 
transmission or contact with SARS patients, followed by implementation of Respiratory 
Hygiene/Cough Etiquette (i.e., placing a mask over the patient’s nose and mouth) and 
physical separation from other patients in common waiting areas.The precise combination 
of precautions to protect healthcare personnel has not been determined. At the time of 
this publication, CDC recommends Standard Precautions, with emphasis on the use of 
hand hygiene, Contact Precautions with emphasis on environmental cleaning due to the 
detection of SARS CoV RNA by PCR on surfaces in rooms occupied by SARS patients 
138, 254, 258, Airborne Precautions, including use of fit-tested NIOSH-approved N95 or 
higher level respirators, and eye protection 259. In Hong Kong, the use of Droplet and 
Contact Precautions, which included use of a mask but not a respirator, was effective in 
protecting healthcare personnel113. However, in Toronto, consistent use of an N95 
respirator was slightly more protective than a mask 93. It is noteworthy that there was no 
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transmission of SARS-CoV to public hospital workers in Vietnam despite inconsistent use 
of infection control measures, including use of PPE, which suggests other factors (e.g., 
severity of disease, frequency of high risk procedures or events, environmental features) 
may influence opportunities for transmission 260. 
SARS-CoV also has been transmitted in the laboratory setting through breaches in 
recommended laboratory practices. Research laboratories where SARS-CoV was under 
investigation were the source of most cases reported after the first series of outbreaks in 
the winter and spring of 2003 261, 262. Studies of the SARS outbreaks of 2003 and 
transmissions that occurred in the laboratory re-affirm the effectiveness of recommended 
infection control precautions and highlight the importance of consistent adherence to 
these measures. 
Lessons from the SARS outbreaks are useful for planning to respond to future public 
health crises, such as pandemic influenza and bioterrorism events. Surveillance for cases 
among patients and healthcare personnel, ensuring availability of adequate supplies and 
staffing, and limiting access to healthcare facilities were important factors in the response 
to SARS that have been summarized 9. Guidance for infection control precautions in 
various settings is available at [This link is no longer active: www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars. 
Similar information may be found at CDC Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 
(https://www.cdc.gov/sars/index.html), accessed May 2016.]. 
I.C.5. Monkeypox. Monkeypox is a rare viral disease found mostly in the rain forest 
countries of Central and West Africa. The disease is caused by an orthopoxvirus that is 
similar in appearance to smallpox but causes a milder disease. The only recognized 
outbreak of human monkeypox in the United States was detected in June 2003 after 
several people became ill following contact with sick pet prairie dogs. Infection in the 
prairie dogs was subsequently traced to their contact with a shipment of animals from 
Africa, including giant Gambian rats 263. This outbreak demonstrates the importance of 
recognition and prompt reporting of unusual disease presentations by clinicians to enable 
prompt identification of the etiology; and the potential of epizootic diseases to spread from 
animal reservoirs to humans through personal and occupational exposure 264. 
Limited data on transmission of monkeypox are available. Transmission from infected 
animals and humans is believed to occur primarily through direct contact with lesions and 
respiratory secretions; airborne transmission from animals to humans is unlikely but cannot 
be excluded, and may have occurred in veterinary practices (e.g., during administration of 
nebulized medications to ill prairie dogs 265). Among humans, four instances of monkeypox 
transmission within hospitals have been reported in Africa among children, usually related 
to sharing the same ward or bed 266, 267. Additional recent literature documents transmission 
of Congo Basin monkeypox in a hospital compound for an extended number of generations 
268. 
There has been no evidence of airborne or any other person-to-person transmission of 
monkeypox in the United States, and no new cases of monkeypox have been identified 
since the outbreak in June 2003 269. The outbreak strain is a clade of monkeypox distinct 
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from the Congo Basin clade and may have different epidemiologic properties (including 
human-to-human transmission potential) from monkeypox strains of the Congo Basin 270; 
this awaits further study. Smallpox vaccine is 85% protective against Congo Basin 
monkeypox 271. Since there is an associated case fatality rate of ≤10%, administration of 
smallpox vaccine within 4 days to individuals who have had direct exposure to patients or 
animals with monkeypox is a reasonable consideration 272. For the most current 
information, see CDC Monkeypox (https://www.cdc.gov/poxvirus/monkeypox/index.html) 
[Current version of this document may differ from original.]. 
I.C.6. Noroviruses. Noroviruses, formerly referred to as Norwalk-like viruses, are 
members of the Caliciviridae family. These agents are transmitted via contaminated food 
or water and from person-to-person, causing explosive outbreaks of gastrointestinal 
disease 273. Environmental contamination also has been documented as a contributing 
factor in ongoing transmission during outbreaks 274, 275. Although noroviruses cannot be 
propagated in cell culture, DNA detection by molecular diagnostic techniques has 
facilitated a greater appreciation of their role in outbreaks of gastrointestinal disease 276. 
Reported outbreaks in hospitals 132, 142, 277, nursing homes 275, 278-283, cruise ships 284, 285, 
hotels 143, 147, schools 148, and large crowded shelters established for hurricane evacuees 
286, demonstrate their highly contagious nature, the disruptive impact they have in 
healthcare facilities and the community, and the difficulty of controlling outbreaks in 
settings where people share common facilites and space. Of note, there is nearly a 5 fold 
increase in the risk to patients in outbreaks where a patient is the index case compared 
with exposure of patients during outbreaks where a staff member is the index case 287. 
The average incubation period for gastroenteritis caused by noroviruses is 12-48 hours 
and the clinical course lasts 12-60 hours 273. Illness is characterized by acute onset of 
nausea, vomiting, abdominal cramps, and/or diarrhea. The disease is largely self-limited; 
rarely, death caused by severe dehydration can occur, particularly among the elderly with 
debilitating health conditions. 
The epidemiology of norovirus outbreaks shows that even though primary cases may 
result from exposure to a fecally-contaminated food or water, secondary and tertiary 
cases often result from person-to-person transmission that is facilitated by contamination 
of fomites 273, 288 and dissemination of infectious particles, especially during the process of 
vomiting 132, 142, 143, 147, 148, 273, 279, 280. Widespread, persistent and inapparent contamination 
of the environment and fomites can make outbreaks extremely difficult to control 147, 275, 
284.These clinical observations and the detection of norovirus DNA on horizontal surfaces 
5 feet above the level that might be touched normally suggest that, under certain 
circumstances, aerosolized particles may travel distances beyond 3 feet 147. It is 
hypothesized that infectious particles may be aerosolized from vomitus, inhaled, and 
swallowed. In addition, individuals who are responsible for cleaning the environment may 
be at increased risk of infection. Development of disease and transmission may be 
facilitated by the low infectious dose (i.e., <100 viral particles) 289 and the resistance of 
these viruses to the usual cleaning and disinfection agents (i.e., may survive ≤10 ppm 
chlorine) 290-292. An alternate phenolic agent that was shown to be effective against feline 
calicivirus was used for environmental cleaning in one outbreak 275, 293. There are 
insufficient data to determine the efficacy of alcohol-based hand rubs against noroviruses 
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when the hands are not visibly soiled 294. Absence of disease in certain individuals during 
an outbreak may be explained by protection from infection conferred by the B histo-blood 
group antigen 295. Consultation on outbreaks of gastroenteritis is available through CDC’s 
Division of Viral and Rickettsial Diseases 296. 
I.C.7. Hemorrhagic fever viruses (HFV). The hemorrhagic fever viruses are a mixed 
group of viruses that cause serious disease with high fever, skin rash, bleeding diathesis, 
and in some cases, high mortality; the disease caused is referred to as viral hemorrhagic 
fever (VHF). Among the more commonly known HFVs are Ebola and Marburg viruses 
(Filoviridae), Lassa virus (Arenaviridae), Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever and Rift 
Valley Fever virus (Bunyaviridae), and Dengue and Yellow fever viruses (Flaviviridae) 212, 
297. These viruses are transmitted to humans via contact with infected animals or via 
arthropod vectors. While none of these viruses is endemic in the United States, outbreaks 
in affected countries provide potential opportunities for importation by infected humans 
and animals. Furthermore, there are concerns that some of these agents could be used 
as bioweapons 212. Person-to-person transmission is documented for Ebola, Marburg, 
Lassa and Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever viruses. In resource-limited healthcare 
settings, transmission of these agents to healthcare personnel, patients and visitors has 
been described and in some outbreaks has accounted for a large proportion of cases 298-
300. Transmissions within households also have occurred among individuals who had 
direct contact with ill persons or their body fluids, but not to those who did not have such 
contact 301. 
Evidence concerning the transmission of HFVs has been summarized 212, 302. Person-to-
person transmission is associated primarily with direct blood and body fluid contact. 
Percutaneous exposure to contaminated blood carries a particularly high risk for 
transmission and increased mortality 303, 304. The finding of large numbers of Ebola viral 
particles in the skin and the lumina of sweat glands has raised concern that transmission 
could occur from direct contact with intact skin though epidemiologic evidence to support 
this is lacking 305. Postmortem handling of infected bodies is an important risk for 
transmission 301, 306, 307. In rare situations, cases in which the mode of transmission was 
unexplained among individuals with no known direct contact, have led to speculation that 
airborne transmission could have occurred 298. However, airborne transmission of 
naturally occurring HFVs in humans has not been seen. In one study of airplane 
passengers exposed to an in-flight index case of Lassa fever, there was no transmission 
to any passengers308. 
In the laboratory setting, animals have been infected experimentally with Marburg or 
Ebola viruses via direct inoculation of the nose, mouth and/or conjunctiva 309, 310 and by 
using mechanically generated virus-containing aerosols 311, 312. Transmission of Ebola 
virus among laboratory primates in an animal facility has been described 313. Secondarily 
infected animals were in individual cages and separated by approximately 3 meters. 
Although the possibility of airborne transmission was suggested, the authors were not 
able to exclude droplet or indirect contact transmission in this incidental observation. 
Guidance on infection control precautions for HVFs that are transmitted person-to-person 
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have been published by CDC 1, 211 and by the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian 
Biodefense Strategies 212. The most recent recommendations at the time of publication of 
this document were posted on the CDC website on 5/19/05 314. Inconsistencies among 
the various recommendations have raised questions about the appropriate precautions to 
use in U.S. hospitals. In less developed countries, outbreaks of HFVs have been 
controlled with basic hygiene, barrier precautions, safe injection practices, and safe burial 
practices 299, 306. The preponderance of evidence on HFV transmission indicates that 
Standard, Contact and Droplet Precautions with eye protection are effective in protecting 
healthcare personnel and visitors who may attend an infected patient. Single gloves are 
adequate for routine patient care; double-gloving is advised during invasive procedures 
(e.g., surgery) that pose an increased risk for blood exposure. Routine eye protection (i.e. 
goggles or face shield) is particularly important. Fluid-resistant gowns should be worn for 
all patient contact. Airborne Precautions are not required for routine patient care; 
however, use of AIIRs is prudent when procedures that could generate infectious 
aerosols are performed (e.g., endotracheal intubation, bronchoscopy, suctioning, autopsy 
procedures involving oscillating saws). N95 or higher level respirators may provide added 
protection for individuals in a room during aerosol-generating procedures (Table 3, 
Appendix A). When a patient with a syndrome consistent with hemorrhagic fever also has 
a history of travel to an endemic area, precautions are initiated upon presentation and 
then modified as more information is obtained (Table 2). Patients with hemorrhagic fever 
syndrome in the setting of a suspected bioweapon attack should be managed using 
Airborne Precautions, including AIIRs, since the epidemiology of a potentially weaponized 
hemorrhagic fever virus is unpredictable. 
I.D. Transmission Risks Associated with Specific Types of Healthcare 
Settings 
 Numerous factors influence differences in transmission risks among the various 
healthcare settings. These include the population characteristics (e.g., increased 
susceptibility to infections, type and prevalence of indwelling devices), intensity of care, 
exposure to environmental sources, length of stay, and frequency of interaction between 
patients/residents with each other and with HCWs. These factors, as well as 
organizational priorities, goals, and resources, influence how different healthcare settings 
adapt transmission prevention guidelines to meet their specific needs 315, 316. Infection 
control management decisions are informed by data regarding institutional 
experience/epidemiology, trends in community and institutional HAIs, local, regional, and 
national epidemiology, and emerging infectious disease threats. 
I.D.1. Hospitals. Infection transmission risks are present in all hospital settings. However, 
certain hospital settings and patient populations have unique conditions that predispose 
patients to infection and merit special mention. These are often sentinel sites for the 
emergence of new transmission risks that may be unique to that setting or present 
opportunities for transmission to other settings in the hospital. 
I.D.1.a. Intensive care units. Intensive care units (ICUs) serve patients who are 
immunocompromised by disease state and/or by treatment modalities, as well as 
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patients with major trauma, respiratory failure and other life-threatening conditions (e.g., 
myocardial infarction, congestive heart failure, overdoses, strokes, gastrointestinal 
bleeding, renal failure, hepatic failure, multi-organ system failure, and the extremes of 
age). Although ICUs account for a relatively small proportion of hospitalized patients, 
infections acquired in these units accounted for >20% of all HAIs 317. In the National 
Nosocomial Infection Surveillance (NNIS) system, 26.6% of HAIs were reported from 
ICU and high risk nursery (NICU) patients in 2002 (NNIS, unpublished data). This 
patient population has increased susceptibility to colonization and infection, especially 
with MDROs and Candida sp. 318, 319, because of underlying diseases and conditions, 
the invasive medical devices and technology used in their care (e.g., central venous 
catheters and other intravascular devices, mechanical ventilators, extracorporeal 
membrane oxygenation (ECMO), hemodialysis/-filtration, pacemakers, implantable left 
ventricular assist devices), the frequency of contact with healthcare personnel, 
prolonged length of stay, and prolonged exposure to antimicrobial agents 320-331. 
Furthermore, adverse patient outcomes in this setting are more severe and are 
associated with a higher mortality 332. Outbreaks associated with a variety of bacterial, 
fungal and viral pathogens due to common-source and person-to-person transmissions 
are frequent in adult and pediatric ICUs 31, 333-336, 337, 338 . 
I.D.1.b. Burn units. Burn wounds can provide optimal conditions for colonization, 
infection, and transmission of pathogens; infection acquired by burn patients is a 
frequent cause of morbidity and mortality 320, 339, 340. In patients with a burn injury 
involving ≥30% of the total body surface area (TBSA), the risk of invasive burn wound 
infection is particularly high 341, 342. Infections that occur in patients with burn injury 
involving <30% TBSA are usually associated with the use of invasive devices. 
Methicillin-susceptible Staphylococcus aureus, MRSA, enterococci, including VRE, 
gram-negative bacteria, and candida are prevalent pathogens in burn infections 53, 340, 
343-350 and outbreaks of these organisms have been reported 351-354. Shifts over time in 
the predominance of pathogens causing infections among burn patients often lead to 
changes in burn care practices 343, 355-358. Burn wound infections caused by Aspergillus 
sp. or other environmental molds may result from exposure to supplies contaminated 
during construction 359 or to dust generated during construction or other environmental 
disruption 360. 
Hydrotherapy equipment is an important environmental reservoir of gram-negative 
organisms. Its use for burn care is discouraged based on demonstrated associations 
between use of contaminated hydrotherapy equipment and infections. Burn wound 
infections and colonization, as well as bloodstream infections, caused by multidrug-
resistant P. aeruginosa 361, A. baumannii 362, and MRSA 352 have been associated with 
hydrotherapy; excision of burn wounds in operating rooms is preferred. 
Advances in burn care, specifically early excision and grafting of the burn wound, use of 
topical antimicrobial agents, and institution of early enteral feeding, have led to 
decreased infectious complications. Other advances have included prophylactic 
antimicrobial usage, selective digestive decontamination (SDD), and use of 
antimicrobial-coated catheters (ACC), but few epidemiologic studies and no efficacy 
studies have been performed to show the relative benefit of these measures 357. 
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There is no consensus on the most effective infection control practices to prevent 
transmission of infections to and from patients with serious burns (e.g., single-bed rooms 
358, laminar flow 363 and high efficiency particulate air filtration [HEPA] 360 or maintaining 
burn patients in a separate unit without exposure to patients or equipment from other 
units 364). There also is controversy regarding the need for and type of barrier 
precautions for routine care of burn patients. One retrospective study demonstrated 
efficacy and cost effectiveness of a simplified barrier isolation protocol for wound 
colonization, emphasizing handwashing and use of gloves, caps, masks and plastic 
impermeable aprons (rather than isolation gowns) for direct patient contact 365. However, 
there have been no studies that define the most effective combination of infection control 
precautions for use in burn settings. Prospective studies in this area are needed. 
I.D.1.c. Pediatrics. Studies of the epidemiology of HAIs in children have identified 
unique infection control issues in this population 63, 64, 366-370. Pediatric intensive care unit 
(PICU) patients and the lowest birthweight babies in the high-risk nursery (HRN) 
monitored in the NNIS system have had high rates of central venous catheter-associated 
bloodstream infections 64, 320, 369-372. Additionally, there is a high prevalence of 
community-acquired infections among hospitalized infants and young children who have 
not yet become immune either by vaccination or by natural infection. The result is more 
patients and their sibling visitors with transmissible infections present in pediatric 
healthcare settings, especially during seasonal epidemics (e.g., pertussis 36, 40, 41, 
respiratory viral infections including those caused by RSV 24, influenza viruses 373, 
parainfluenza virus 374, human metapneumovirus 375, and adenoviruses 376; rubeola 
[measles] 34, varicella [chickenpox] 377, and rotavirus 38, 378). 
Close physical contact between healthcare personnel and infants and young children 
(eg. cuddling, feeding, playing, changing soiled diapers, and cleaning copious 
uncontrolled respiratory secretions) provides abundant opportunities for transmission of 
infectious material. Practices and behaviors such as congregation of children in play 
areas where toys and bodily secretions are easily shared and family members rooming-
in with pediatric patients can further increase the risk of transmission. Pathogenic 
bacteria have been recovered from toys used by hospitalized patients 379; contaminated 
bath toys were implicated in an outbreak of multidrug-resistant P. aeruginosa on a 
pediatric oncology unit 80. In addition, several patient factors increase the likelihood that 
infection will result from exposure to pathogens in healthcare settings (e.g., immaturity of 
the neonatal immune system, lack of previous natural infection and resulting immunity, 
prevalence of patients with congenital or acquired immune deficiencies, congenital 
anatomic anomalies, and use of life-saving invasive devices in neontal and pediatric 
intensive care units) 63. There are theoretical concerns that infection risk will increase in 
association with innovative practices used in the NICU for the purpose of improving 
developmental outcomes, Such factors include co-bedding 380 and kangaroo care 381 that 
may increase opportunity for skin-to-skin exposure of multiple gestation infants to each 
other and to their mothers, respectively; although infection risk smay actually be reduced 
among infants receiving kangaroo care 382. Children who attend child care centers 383, 384 
and pediatric rehabilitation units 385 may increase the overall burden of antimicrobial 
resistance (eg. by contributing to the reservoir of community-associated MRSA [CA-
MRSA]) 386-391. Patients in chronic care facilities may have increased rates of 
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colonization with resistant GNBs and may be sources of introduction of resistant 
organisms to acute care settings 50. 
I.D.2. Non-acute healthcare settings. Healthcare is provided in various settings 
outside of hospitals including facilities, such as long-term care facilities (LTCF) (e.g., 
nursing homes), homes for the developmentally disabled, settings where behavioral 
health services are provided, rehabilitation centers and hospices392. In addition, 
healthcare may be provided in nonhealthcare settings such as workplaces with 
occupational health clinics, adult day care centers, assisted living facilities, homeless 
shelters, jails and prisons, school clinics and infirmaries. Each of these settings has 
unique circumstances and population risks to consider when designing and 
implementing an infection control program. Several of the most common settings and 
their particular challenges are discussed below. While this Guideline does not address 
each setting, the principles and strategies provided may be adapted and applied as 
appropriate. 
I.D.2.a. Long-term care. The designation LTCF applies to a diverse group of residential 
settings, ranging from institutions for the developmentally disabled to nursing homes for 
the elderly and pediatric chronic-care facilities 393-395. Nursing homes for the elderly 
predominate numerically and frequently represent long-term care as a group of facilities. 
Approximately 1.8 million Americans reside in the nation’s 16,500 nursing homes.396 
Estimates of HAI rates of 1.8 to 13.5 per 1000 resident-care days have been reported 
with a range of 3 to 7 per 1000 resident-care days in the more rigorous studies 397-401. 
The infrastructure described in the Department of Veterans Affairs nursing home care 
units is a promising example for the development of a nationwide HAI surveillance 
system for LTCFs 402. 
LCTFs are different from other healthcare settings in that elderly patients at increased 
risk for infection are brought together in one setting and remain in the facility for 
extended periods of time; for most residents, it is their home. An atmosphere of 
community is fostered and residents share common eating and living areas, and 
participate in various facility-sponsored activities 403, 404. Since able residents interact 
freely with each other, controlling transmission of infection in this setting is challenging 
405. Residents who are colonized or infected with certain microorganisms are, in some 
cases, restricted to their room. However, because of the psychosocial risks associated 
with such restriction, it has been recommended that psychosocial needs be balanced 
with infection control needs in the LTCF setting 406-409. Documented LTCF outbreaks 
have been caused by various viruses (e.g., influenza virus 35, 410-412, rhinovirus 413, 
adenovirus [conjunctivitis] 414, norovirus 278, 279 275, 281) and bacteria (e.g., group A 
streptococcus 162, B. pertussis 415, non-susceptible S. pneumoniae 197, 198, other 
MDROs, and Clostridium difficile 416) These pathogens can lead to substantial morbidity 
and mortality, and increased medical costs; prompt detection and implementation of 
effective control measures are required. 
Risk factors for infection are prevalent among LTCF residents 395, 417, 418. Age-related 
declines in immunity may affect responses to immunizations for influenza and other 
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infectious agents, and increase susceptibility to tuberculosis. Immobility, incontinence, 
dysphagia, underlying chronic diseases, poor functional status, and age-related skin 
changes increase susceptibility to urinary, respiratory and cutaneous and soft tissue 
infections, while malnutrition can impair wound healing 419-423. Medications (e.g., drugs 
that affect level of consciousness, immune function, gastric acid secretions, and normal 
flora, including antimicrobial therapy) and invasive devices (e.g., urinary catheters and 
feeding tubes) heighten susceptibility to infection and colonization in LTCF residents 424-
426. Finally, limited functional status and total dependence on healthcare personnel for 
activities of daily living have been identified as independent risk factors for infection 401, 
417, 427 and for colonization with MRSA 428, 429 and ESBL-producing K. pneumoniae 430. 
Several position papers and review articles have been published that provide guidance 
on various aspects of infection control and antimicrobial resistance in LTCFs 406-408, 431-
436. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) have established 
regulations for the prevention of infection in LTCFs 437. 
Because residents of LTCFs are hospitalized frequently, they can transfer pathogens 
between LTCFs and healthcare facilities in which they receive care 8, 438-441. This is also 
true for pediatric long-term care populations. Pediatric chronic care facilities have been 
associated with importing extended-spectrum cephalosporin-resistant, gram-negative 
bacilli into one PICU 50. Children from pediatric rehabilitation units may contribute to the 
reservoir of community-associated MRSA 385, 389-391. 
I.D.2.b. Ambulatory care. In the past decade, healthcare delivery in the United States 
has shifted from the acute, inpatient hospital to a variety of ambulatory and community-
based settings, including the home. Ambulatory care is provided in hospital-based 
outpatient clinics, nonhospital-based clinics and physician offices, public health clinics, 
free-standing dialysis centers, ambulatory surgical centers, urgent care centers, and 
many others. In 2000, there were 83 million visits to hospital outpatient clinics and more 
than 823 million visits to physician offices 442; ambulatory care now accounts for most 
patient encounters with the health care system 443. In these settings, adapting 
transmission prevention guidelines is challenging because patients remain in common 
areas for prolonged periods waiting to be seen by a healthcare provider or awaiting 
admission to the hospital, examination or treatment rooms are turned around quickly 
with limited cleaning, and infectious patients may not be recognized immediately. 
Furthermore, immunocompromised patients often receive chemotherapy in infusion 
rooms where they stay for extended periods of time along with other types of patients. 
There are few data on the risk of HAIs in ambulatory care settings, with the exception of 
hemodialysis centers 18, 444, 445. Transmission of infections in outpatient settings has 
been reviewed in three publications 446-448. Goodman and Solomon summarized 53 
clusters of infections associated with the outpatient setting from 1961-1990 446. Overall, 
29 clusters were associated with common source transmission from contaminated 
solutions or equipment, 14 with person-to-person transmission from or involving 
healthcare personnel and ten associated with airborne or droplet transmission among 
patients and healthcare workers. Transmission of bloodborne pathogens (i.e., hepatitis 
B and C viruses and, rarely, HIV) in outbreaks, sometimes involving hundreds of 
patients, continues to occur in ambulatory settings. These outbreaks often are related to 
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common source exposures, usually a contaminated medical device, multi-dose vial, or 
intravenous solution 82, 449-453. In all cases, transmission has been attributed to failure to 
adhere to fundamental infection control principles, including safe injection practices and 
aseptic technique.This subject has been reviewed and recommended infection control 
and safe injection practices summarized 454. 
Airborne transmission of M.tuberculosis and measles in ambulatory settings, most 
frequently emergency departments, has been reported 34, 127, 446, 448, 455-457. Measles 
virus was transmitted in physician offices and other outpatient settings during an era 
when immunization rates were low and measles outbreaks in the community were 
occurring regularly 34, 122, 458. Rubella has been transmitted in the outpatient obstetric 
setting 33; there are no published reports of varicella transmission in the outpatient 
setting. In the ophthalmology setting, adenovirus type 8 epidemic keratoconjunctivitis 
has been transmitted via incompletely disinfected ophthalmology equipment and/or from 
healthcare workers to patients, presumably by contaminated hands 17, 446, 448, 459-462. 
If transmission in outpatient settings is to be prevented, screening for potentially 
infectious symptomatic and asymptomatic individuals, especially those who may be at 
risk for transmitting airborne infectious agents (e.g., M. tuberculosis, varicella-zoster 
virus, rubeola [measles]), is necessary at the start of the initial patient encounter. Upon 
identification of a potentially infectious patient, implementation of prevention measures, 
including prompt separation of potentially infectious patients and implementation of 
appropriate control measures (e.g., Respiratory Hygiene/Cough Etiquette and 
Transmission-Based Precautions) can decrease transmission risks 9, 12. Transmission of 
MRSA and VRE in outpatient settings has not been reported, but the association of CA-
MRSA in healthcare personnel working in an outpatient HIV clinic with environmental 
CA-MRSA contamination in that clinic, suggests the possibility of transmission in that 
setting 463. Patient-to-patient transmission of Burkholderia species and Pseudomonas 
aeruginosa in outpatient clinics for adults and children with cystic fibrosis has been 
confirmed 464, 465. 
I.D.2.c. Home care. Home care in the United States is delivered by over 20,000 
provider agencies that include home health agencies, hospices, durable medical 
equipment providers, home infusion therapy services, and personal care and support 
services providers. Home care is provided to patients of all ages with both acute and 
chronic conditions. The scope of services ranges from assistance with activities of daily 
living and physical and occupational therapy to the care of wounds, infusion therapy, 
and chronic ambulatory peritoneal dialysis (CAPD). 
The incidence of infection in home care patients, other than those associated with 
infusion therapy is not well studied 466-471. However, data collection and calculation of 
infection rates have been accomplished for central venous catheter-associated 
bloodstream infections in patients receiving home infusion therapy 470-474 and for the risk 
of blood contact through percutaneous or mucosal exposures, demonstrating that 
surveillance can be performed in this setting 475. Draft definitions for home care 
associated infections have been developed 476. 
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Transmission risks during home care are presumed to be minimal. The main 
transmission risks to home care patients are from an infectious healthcare provider or 
contaminated equipment; providers also can be exposed to an infectious patient during 
home visits. Since home care involves patient care by a limited number of personnel in 
settings without multiple patients or shared equipment, the potential reservoir of 
pathogens is reduced. Infections of home care providers, that could pose a risk to home 
care patients include infections transmitted by the airborne or droplet routes (e.g., 
chickenpox, tuberculosis, influenza), and skin infestations (e.g., scabies 69 and lice) and 
infections (e.g.,impetigo) transmitted by direct or indirect contact. There are no 
published data on indirect transmission of MDROs from one home care patient to 
another, although this is theoretically possible if contaminated equipment is transported 
from an infected or colonized patient and used on another patient. Of note, investigation 
of the first case of VISA in homecare 186 and the first 2 reported cases of VRSA 178, 180, 
181, 183 found no evidence of transmission of VISA or VRSA to other home care 
recipients. Home health care also may contribute to antimicrobial resistance; a review of 
outpatient vancomycin use found 39% of recipients did not receive the antibiotic 
according to recommended guidelines 477. 
Although most home care agencies implement policies and procedures to prevent 
transmission of organisms, the current approach is based on the adaptation of the 1996 
Guideline for Isolation Precautions in Hospitals 1 as well as other professional guidance 
478, 479. This issue has been very challenging in the home care industry and practice has 
been inconsistent and frequently not evidence-based. For example, many home health 
agencies continue to observe “nursing bag technique,” a practice that prescribes the 
use of barriers between the nursing bag and environmental surfaces in the home 480. 
While the home environment may not always appear clean, the use of barriers between 
two non-critical surfaces has been questioned 481, 482. Opportunites exist to conduct 
research in home care related to infection transmission risks 483. 
I.D.2.d. Other sites of healthcare delivery. Facilities that are not primarily healthcare 
settings but in which healthcare is delivered include clinics in correctional facilities and 
shelters. Both settings can have suboptimal features, such as crowded conditions and 
poor ventilation. Economically disadvantaged individuals who may have chronic 
illnesses and healthcare problems related to alcoholism, injection drug use, poor 
nutrition, and/or inadequate shelter often receive their primary healthcare at sites such 
as these 484. Infectious diseases of special concern for transmission include 
tuberculosis, scabies, respiratory infections (e.g., N. meningitides, S. pneumoniae), 
sexually transmitted and bloodborne diseases (e.g.,HIV, HBV, HCV, syphilis, 
gonorrhea), hepatitis A virus (HAV), diarrheal agents such as norovirus, and foodborne 
diseases 286, 485-488. A high index of suspicion for tuberculosis and CA-MRSA in these 
populations is needed as outbreaks in these settings or among the populations they 
serve have been reported 489-497. 
Patient encounters in these types of facilities provide an opportunity to deliver 
recommended immunizations and screen for M. tuberculosis infection in addition to 
diagnosing and treating acute illnesses 498. Recommended infection control measures in 
these non-traditional areas designated for healthcare delivery are the same as for other 
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ambulatory care settings. Therefore, these settings must be equipped to observe 
Standard Precautions and, when indicated, Transmission-based Precautions. 
I.E. Transmission Risks Associated with Special Patient Populations  
As new treatments emerge for complex diseases, unique infection control challenges 
associated with special patient populations need to be addressed. 
I.E.1. Immunocompromised patients. Patients who have congenital primary immune 
deficiencies or acquired disease (eg. treatment-induced immune deficiencies) are at 
increased risk for numerous types of infections while receiving healthcare and may be 
located throughout the healthcare facility. The specific defects of the immune system 
determine the types of infections that are most likely to be acquired (e.g., viral infections 
are associated with T-cell defects and fungal and bacterial infections occur in patients 
who are neutropenic). As a general group, immunocompromised patients can be cared 
for in the same environment as other patients; however, it is always advisable to 
minimize exposure to other patients with transmissible infections such as influenza and 
other respiratory viruses 499, 500. The use of more intense chemotherapy regimens for 
treatment of childhood leukemia may be associated with prolonged periods of 
neutropenia and suppression of other components of the immune system, extending the 
period of infection risk and raising the concern that additional precautions may be 
indicated for select groups 501, 502. With the application of newer and more intense 
immunosuppressive therapies for a variety of medical conditions (e.g., rheumatologic 
disease 503, 504, inflammatory bowel disease 505), immunosuppressed patients are likely 
to be more widely distributed throughout a healthcare facility rather than localized to 
single patient units (e.g., hematology-oncology). Guidelines for preventing infections in 
certain groups of immunocompromised patients have been published 15, 506, 507. 
Published data provide evidence to support placing allogeneic HSCT patients in a 
Protective Environment 15, 157, 158. Also, three guidelines have been developed that 
address the special requirements of these immunocompromised patients, including use 
of antimicrobial prophylaxis and engineering controls to create a Protective Environment 
for the prevention of infections caused by Aspergillus spp. and other environmental 
fungi 11, 14, 15. As more intense chemotherapy regimens associated with prolonged 
periods of neutropenia or graft-versus-host disease are implemented, the period of risk 
and duration of environmental protection may need to be prolonged beyond the 
traditional 100 days 508. 
I.E.2. Cystic fibrosis patients. Patients with cystic fibrosis (CF) require special 
consideration when developing infection control guidelines. Compared to other patients, 
CF patients require additional protection to prevent transmission from contaminated 
respiratory therapy equipment 509-513. Infectious agents such as Burkholderia cepacia 
complex and P. aeruginosa 464, 465, 514, 515 have unique clinical and prognostic 
significance. In CF patients, B. cepacia infection has been associated with increased 
morbidity and mortality 516-518, while delayed acquisition of chronic P.aeruginosa 
infection may be associated with an improved long-term clinical outcome 519, 520. 
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Person-to-person transmission of B. cepacia complex has been demonstrated among 
children 517 and adults 521 with CF in healthcare settings 464, 522, during various social 
contacts 523, most notably attendance at camps for patients with CF 524, and among 
siblings with CF 525. Successful infection control measures used to prevent transmission 
of respiratory secretions include segregation of CF patients from each other in 
ambulatory and hospital settings (including use of private rooms with separate 
showers), environmental decontamination of surfaces and equipment contaminated with 
respiratory secretions, elimination of group chest physiotherapy sessions, and 
disbanding of CF camps 97, 526. The Cystic Fibrosis Foundation published a consensus 
document with evidence-based recommendations for infection control practices for CF 
patients 20. 
I.F. New Therapies Associated with Potentially Transmissible 
Infectious Agents 
I.F.1. Gene therapy. Gene therapy has has been attempted using a number of different 
viral vectors, including nonreplicating retroviruses, adenoviruses, adeno-associated 
viruses, and replication-competent strains of poxviruses. Unexpected adverse events 
have restricted the prevalence of gene therapy protocols. 
The infectious hazards of gene therapy are theoretical at this time, but require 
meticulous surveillance due to the possible occurrence of in vivo recombination and the 
subsequent emergence of a transmissible genetically altered pathogen. Greatest 
concern attends the use of replication-competent viruses, especially vaccinia. As of the 
time of publication, no reports have described transmission of a vector virus from a 
gene therapy recipient to another individual, but surveillance is ongoing. 
Recommendations for monitoring infection control issues throughout the course of gene 
therapy trials have been published 527-529. 
I.F.2. Infections transmitted through blood, organs and other tissues. The potential 
hazard of transmitting infectious pathogens through biologic products is a small but ever 
present risk, despite donor screening. Reported infections transmitted by transfusion or 
transplantation include West Nile Virus infection 530 cytomegalovirus infection 531, 
Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease 230, hepatitis C 532, infections with Clostridium spp. 533 and 
group A streptococcus 534, malaria 535, babesiosis 536, Chagas disease 537, lymphocytic 
choriomeningitis 538, and rabies 539, 540. Therefore, it is important to consider receipt of 
biologic products when evaluating patients for potential sources of infection. 
I.F.3. Xenotransplantation. The transplantation of nonhuman cells, tissues, and organs 
into humans potentially exposes patients to zoonotic pathogens. Transmission of known 
zoonotic infections (e.g., trichinosis from porcine tissue), constitutes one concern, but 
also of concern is the possibility that transplantation of nonhuman cells, tissues, or 
organs may transmit previously unknown zoonotic infections (xenozoonoses) to 
immunosuppressed human recipients. Potential infections that might accompany 
transplantation of porcine organs have been described 541. Guidelines from the U.S. 
Public Health Service address many infectious diseases and infection control issues that 
surround the developing field of xenotransplantation, 542 work in this area is ongoing. 
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Part II:  
Fundamental Elements Needed to Prevent Transmission of 
Infectious Agents in Healthcare Settings  
 
II.A. Healthcare System Components that Influence the Effectiveness 
of Precautions to Prevent Transmission  
 
II.A.1. Administrative measures. Healthcare organizations can demonstrate a 
commitment to preventing transmission of infectious agents by incorporating infection 
control into the objectives of the organization’s patient and occupational safety 
programs 543-547. An infrastructure to guide, support, and monitor adherence to Standard 
and Transmission-Based Precautions 434, 548, 549 will facilitate fulfillment of the 
organization’s mission and achievement of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of 
Healthcare Organization’s patient safety goal to decrease HAIs 550. Policies and 
procedures that explain how Standard and Transmission-Based Precautions are 
applied, including systems used to identify and communicate information about patients 
with potentially transmissible infectious agents, are essential to ensure the success of 
these measures and may vary according to the characteristics of the organization. 
A key administrative measure is provision of fiscal and human resources for maintaining 
infection control and occupational health programs that are responsive to emerging 
needs. Specific components include bedside nurse 551 and infection prevention and 
control professional (ICP) staffing levels 552, inclusion of ICPs in facility construction and 
design decisions 11, clinical microbiology laboratory support 553, 554, adequate supplies 
and equipment including facility ventilation systems 11, adherence monitoring 555, 
assessment and correction of system failures that contribute to transmission 556, 557, and 
provision of feedback to healthcare personnel and senior administrators 434, 548, 549, 558. 
The positive influence of institutional leadership has been demonstrated repeatedly in 
studies of HCW adherence to recommended hand hygiene practices 176, 177, 434, 548, 549, 
559-564. Healthcare administrator involvement in infection control processes can improve 
administrators’ awareness of the rationale and resource requirements for following 
recommended infection control practices. 
Several administrative factors may affect the transmission of infectious agents in 
healthcare settings: institutional culture, individual worker behavior, and the work 
environment. Each of these areas is suitable for performance improvement monitoring 
and incorporation into the organization’s patient safety goals 543, 544, 546, 565.  
II.A.1.a.Scope of work and staffing needs for infection control professionals. The 
effectiveness of infection surveillance and control programs in preventing nosocomial 
infections in United States hospitals was assessed by the CDC through the Study on 
the Efficacy of Nosocomial Infection Control (SENIC Project) conducted 1970-76 566. In 
a representative sample of US general hospitals, those with a trained infection control 
physician or microbiologist involved in an infection control program, and at least one 
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infection control nurse per 250 beds, were associated with a 32% lower rate of four 
infections studied (CVC-associated bloodstream infections, ventilator-associated 
pneumonias, catheter-related urinary tract infections, and surgical site infections).  
Since that landmark study was published, responsibilities of ICPs have expanded 
commensurate with the growing complexity of the healthcare system, the patient 
populations served, and the increasing numbers of medical procedures and devices 
used in all types of healthcare settings. The scope of work of ICPs was first assessed in 
1982 567-569 by the Certification Board of Infection Control (CBIC), and has been re-
assessed every five years since that time 558, 570-572. The findings of these task analyses 
have been used to develop and update the Infection Control Certification Examination, 
offered for the first time in 1983. With each survey, it is apparent that the role of the ICP 
is growing in complexity and scope, beyond traditional infection control activities in 
acute care hospitals. Activities currently assigned to ICPs in response to emerging 
challenges include:  
1. surveillance and infection prevention at facilities other than acute care hospitals e.g., 
ambulatory clinics, day surgery centers, long term care facilities, rehabilitation 
centers, home care;  
2. oversight of employee health services related to infection prevention, e.g., 
assessment of risk and administration of recommended treatment following 
exposure to infectious agents, tuberculosis screening, influenza vaccination, 
respiratory protection fit testing, and administration of other vaccines as indicated, 
such as smallpox vaccine in 2003;  
3. preparedness planning for annual influenza outbreaks, pandemic influenza, SARS, 
bioweapons attacks;  
4. adherence monitoring for selected infection control practices;  
5. oversight of risk assessment and implementation of prevention measures associated 
with construction and renovation;  
6. prevention of transmission of MDROs;  
7. evaluation of new medical products that could be associated with increased infection 
risk. e.g.,intravenous infusion materials;  
8. communication with the public, facility staff, and state and local health departments 
concerning infection control-related issues; and  
9. participation in local and multi-center research projects 434, 549, 552, 558, 573, 574.  
None of the CBIC job analyses addressed specific staffing requirements for the 
identified tasks, although the surveys did include information about hours worked; the 
2001 survey included the number of ICPs assigned to the responding facilities 558. 
There is agreement in the literature that 1 ICP per 250 acute care beds is no longer 
adequate to meet current infection control needs; a Delphi project that assessed staffing 
needs of infection control programs in the 21st century concluded that a ratio of 0.8 to 
1.0 ICP per 100 occupied acute care beds is an appropriate level of staffing 552. A 
survey of participants in the National Nosocomial Infections Surveillance (NNIS) system 
found the average daily census per ICP was 115 316. Results of other studies have been 
similar: 3 per 500 beds for large acute care hospitals, 1 per 150-250 beds in long term 
care facilities, and 1.56 per 250 in small rural hospitals 573, 575. The foregoing 
demonstrates that infection control staffing can no longer be based on patient census 
alone, but rather must be determined by the scope of the program, characteristics of the 
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patient population, complexity of the healthcare system, tools available to assist 
personnel to perform essential tasks (e.g., electronic tracking and laboratory support for 
surveillance), and unique or urgent needs of the institution and community 552. 
Furthermore, appropriate training is required to optimize the quality of work performed 
558, 572, 576.  
II.A.1.a.i. Infection control nurse liaison. Designating a bedside nurse on a patient 
care unit as an infection control liaison or “link nurse” is reported to be an effective 
adjunct to enhance infection control at the unit level 577-582. Such individuals receive 
training in basic infection control and have frequent communication with the ICPs, but 
maintain their primary role as bedside caregiver on their units. The infection control 
nurse liaison increases the awareness of infection control at the unit level. He or she is 
especially effective in implementation of new policies or control interventions because of 
the rapport with individuals on the unit, an understanding of unit-specific challenges, 
and ability to promote strategies that are most likely to be successful in that unit. This 
position is an adjunct to, not a replacement for, fully trained ICPs. Furthermore, the 
infection control liaison nurses should not be counted when considering ICP staffing. 
II.A.1.b. Bedside nurse staffing. There is increasing evidence that the level of bedside 
nurse-staffing influences the quality of patient care 583, 584. If there are adequate nursing 
staff, it is more likely that infection control practices, including hand hygiene and 
Standard and Transmission-Based Precautions, will be given appropriate attention and 
applied correctly and consistently 552. A national multicenter study reported strong and 
consistent inverse relationships between nurse staffing and five adverse outcomes in 
medical patients, two of which were HAIs: urinary tract infections and pneumonia 583. 
The association of nursing staff shortages with increased rates of HAIs has been 
demonstrated in several outbreaks in hospitals and long term care settings, and with 
increased transmission of hepatitis C virus in dialysis units 22, 418, 551, 585-597. In most 
cases, when staffing improved as part of a comprehensive control intervention, the 
outbreak ended or the HAI rate declined. In two studies 590, 596, the composition of the 
nursing staff (“pool” or “float” vs. regular staff nurses) influenced the rate of primary 
bloodstream infections, with an increased infection rate occurring when the proportion of 
regular nurses decreased and pool nurses increased.  
II.A.1.c. Clinical microbiology laboratory support. The critical role of the clinical 
microbiology laboratory in infection control and healthcare epidemiology is described 
well 553, 554, 598-600 and is supported by the Infectious Disease Society of America policy 
statement on consolidation of clinical microbiology laboratories published in 2001 553. 
The clinical microbiology laboratory contributes to preventing transmission of infectious 
diseases in healthcare settings by promptly detecting and reporting epidemiologically 
important organisms, identifying emerging patterns of antimicrobial resistance, and 
assisting in assessment of the effectiveness of recommended precautions to limit 
transmission during outbreaks 598. Outbreaks of infections may be recognized first by 
laboratorians 162. Healthcare organizations need to ensure the availability of the 
recommended scope and quality of laboratory services, a sufficient number of 
appropriately trained laboratory staff members, and systems to promptly communicate 
epidemiologically important results to those who will take action (e.g., providers of 
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clinical care, infection control staff, healthcare epidemiologists, and infectious disease 
consultants) 601. As concerns about emerging pathogens and bioterrorism grow, the role 
of the clinical microbiology laboratory takes on even greater importance. For healthcare 
organizations that outsource microbiology laboratory services (e.g., ambulatory care, 
home care, LTCFs, smaller acute care hospitals), it is important to specify by contract 
the types of services (e.g., periodic institution-specific aggregate susceptibility reports) 
required to support infection control.  
Several key functions of the clinical microbiology laboratory are relevant to this 
guideline: 
• Antimicrobial susceptibility by testing and interpretation in accordance with current 
guidelines developed by the National Committee for Clinical Laboratory Standards 
(NCCLS), known as the Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute (CLSI) since 
2005 602, for the detection of emerging resistance patterns 603, 604, and for the 
preparation, analysis, and distribution of periodic cumulative antimicrobial 
susceptibility summary reports 605-607. While not required, clinical laboratories ideally 
should have access to rapid genotypic identification of bacteria and their antibiotic 
resistance genes 608.  
• Performance of surveillance cultures when appropriate (including retention of 
isolates for analysis) to assess patterns of infection transmission and effectiveness 
of infection control interventions at the facility or organization. Microbiologists assist 
in decisions concerning the indications for initiating and discontinuing active 
surveillance programs and optimize the use of laboratory resources.  
• Molecular typing, on-site or outsourced, in order to investigate and control 
healthcare-associated outbreaks 609. 
• Application of rapid diagnostic tests to support clinical decisions involving patient 
treatment, room selection, and implementation of control measures including barrier 
precautions and use of vaccine or chemoprophylaxis agents (e.g., influenza 610-612, B. 
pertussis 613, RSV 614, 615, and enteroviruses 616). The microbiologist provides guidance 
to limit rapid testing to clinical situations in which rapid results influence patient 
management decisions, as well as providing oversight of point-of-care testing 
performed by non-laboratory healthcare workers 617. 
• Detection and rapid reporting of epidemiologically important organisms, including 
those that are reportable to public health agencies.  
• Implementation of a quality control program that ensures testing services are 
appropriate for the population served, and stringently evaluated for sensitivity, 
specificity, applicability, and feasibility.  
• Participation in a multidisciplinary team to develop and maintain an effective 
institutional program for the judicious use of antimicrobial agents 618, 619. 
II.A.2. Institutional safety culture and organizational characteristics. Safety culture 
(or safety climate) refers to a work environment where a shared commitment to safety 
on the part of management and the workforce is understood and followed 557, 620, 621. 
The authors of the Institute of Medicine Report, To Err is Human 543, acknowledge that 
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causes of medical error are multifaceted but emphasize repeatedly the pivotal role of 
system failures and the benefits of a safety culture. A safety culture is created through  
1. the actions management takes to improve patient and worker safety;  
2. worker participation in safety planning;  
3. the availability of appropriate protective equipment;  
4. influence of group norms regarding acceptable safety practices; and  
5. the organization’s socialization process for new personnel.  
Safety and patient outcomes can be enhanced by improving or creating organizational 
characteristics within patient care units as demonstrated by studies of surgical ICUs 622, 623. 
Each of these factors has a direct bearing on adherence to transmission prevention 
recommendations 257. Measurement of an institutional culture of safety is useful for 
designing improvements in healthcare 624, 625. Several hospital-based studies have linked 
measures of safety culture with both employee adherence to safe practices and reduced 
exposures to blood and body fluids 626-632. One study of hand hygiene practices concluded 
that improved adherence requires integration of infection control into the organization’s 
safety culture 561. Several hospitals that are part of the Veterans Administration Healthcare 
System have taken specific steps toward improving the safety culture, including error 
reporting mechanisms, performing root cause analysis on problems identified, providing 
safety incentives, and employee education. 633-635. 
II.A.3. Adherence of healthcare personnel to recommended guidelines. Adherence to 
recommended infection control practices decreases transmission of infectious agents in 
healthcare settings 116, 562, 636-640. However, several observational studies have shown 
limited adherence to recommended practices by healthcare personnel 559, 640-657. Observed 
adherence to universal precautions ranged from 43% to 89% 641, 642, 649, 651, 652. However, 
the degree of adherence depended frequently on the practice that was assessed and, for 
glove use, the circumstance in which they were used. Appropriate glove use has ranged 
from a low of 15% 645 to a high of 82% 650. However, 92% and 98% adherence with glove 
use have been reported during arterial blood gas collection and resuscitation, respectively, 
procedures where there may be considerable blood contact 643, 656. Differences in 
observed adherence have been reported among occupational groups in the same 
healthcare facility 641 and between experienced and nonexperienced professionals 645. In 
surveys of healthcare personnel, self-reported adherence was generally higher than that 
reported in observational studies. Furthermore, where an observational component was 
included with a self-reported survey, self-perceived adherence was often greater than 
observed adherence 657. Among nurses and physicians, increasing years of experience is 
a negative predictor of adherence 645, 651. Education to improve adherence is the primary 
intervention that has been studied. While positive changes in knowledge and attitude have 
been demonstrated, 640, 658, there often has been limited or no accompanying change in 
behavior 642, 644. Self-reported adherence is higher in groups that have received an 
educational intervention 630, 659. Educational interventions that incorporated videotaping 
and performance feedback were successful in improving adherence during the period of 
study; the long-term effect of these interventions is not known 654.The use of videotape 
also served to identify system problems (e.g., communication and access to personal 
protective equipment) that otherwise may not have been recognized.  
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Use of engineering controls and facility design concepts for improving adherence is 
gaining interest. While introduction of automated sinks had a negative impact on 
consistent adherence to hand washing 660, use of electronic monitoring and voice 
prompts to remind healthcare workers to perform hand hygiene, and improving 
accessibility to hand hygiene products, increased adherence and contributed to a 
decrease in HAIs in one study 661. More information is needed regarding how 
technology might improve adherence. 
Improving adherence to infection control practices requires a multifaceted approach that 
incorporates continuous assessment of both the individual and the work environment 
559, 561. Using several behavioral theories, Kretzer and Larson concluded that a single 
intervention (e.g., a handwashing campaign or putting up new posters about 
transmission precautions) would likely be ineffective in improving healthcare personnel 
adherence 662. Improvement requires that the organizational leadership make 
prevention an institutional priority and integrate infection control practices into the 
organization’s safety culture 561. A recent review of the literature concluded that 
variations in organizational factors (e.g., safety climate, policies and procedures, 
education and training) and individual factors (e.g., knowledge, perceptions of risk, past 
experience) were determinants of adherence to infection control guidelines for 
protection against SARS and other respiratory pathogens 257.  
II.B. Surveillance for Healthcare-Associated Infections (HAIs)  
Surveillance is an essential tool for case-finding of single patients or clusters of patients 
who are infected or colonized with epidemiologically important organisms (e.g., 
susceptible bacteria such as S. aureus, S. pyogenes [Group A streptococcus] or 
Enterobacter-Klebsiella spp; MRSA, VRE, and other MDROs; C. difficile; RSV; influenza 
virus) for which transmission-based precautions may be required. Surveillance is 
defined as the ongoing, systematic collection, analysis, interpretation, and 
dissemination of data regarding a health-related event for use in public health action to 
reduce morbidity and mortality and to improve health 663. The work of Ignaz 
Semmelweis that described the role of person-to-person transmission in puerperal 
sepsis is the earliest example of the use of surveillance data to reduce transmission of 
infectious agents 664. Surveillance of both process measures and the infection rates to 
which they are linked are important for evaluating the effectiveness of infection 
prevention efforts and identifying indications for change 555, 665-668. 
The Study on the Efficacy of Nosocomial Infection Control (SENIC) found that different 
combinations of infection control practices resulted in reduced rates of nosocomial 
surgical site infections, pneumonia, urinary tract infections, and bacteremia in acute 
care hospitals 566; however, surveillance was the only component essential for reducing 
all four types of HAIs. Although a similar study has not been conducted in other 
healthcare settings, a role for surveillance and the need for novel strategies have been 
described in LTCFs 398, 434, 669, 670 and in home care 470-473. The essential elements of a 
surveillance system are:  
1. standardized definitions;  
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2. identification of patient populations at risk for infection;  
3. statistical analysis (e.g., risk-adjustment, calculation of rates using appropriate 
denominators, trend analysis using methods such as statistical process control 
charts); and  
4. feedback of results to the primary caregivers 671-676.  
Data gathered through surveillance of high-risk populations, device use, procedures, 
and/or facility locations (e.g., ICUs) are useful for detecting transmission trends 671-673. 
Identification of clusters of infections should be followed by a systematic epidemiologic 
investigation to determine commonalities in persons, places, and time; and guide 
implementation of interventions and evaluation of the effectiveness of those 
interventions.  
Targeted surveillance based on the highest risk areas or patients has been preferred 
over facility-wide surveillance for the most effective use of resources 673, 676. However, 
surveillance for certain epidemiologically important organisms may need to be facility-
wide. Surveillance methods will continue to evolve as healthcare delivery systems 
change 392, 677 and user-friendly electronic tools become more widely available for 
electronic tracking and trend analysis 674, 678, 679. Individuals with experience in 
healthcare epidemiology and infection control should be involved in selecting software 
packages for data aggregation and analysis to assure that the need for efficient and 
accurate HAI surveillance will be met. Effective surveillance is increasingly important as 
legislation requiring public reporting of HAI rates is passed and states work to develop 
effective systems to support such legislation 680.  
II.C. Education of HCWs, Patients, and Families  
Education and training of healthcare personnel are a prerequisite for ensuring that 
policies and procedures for Standard and Transmission-Based Precautions are 
understood and practiced. Understanding the scientific rationale for the precautions will 
allow HCWs to apply procedures correctly, as well as safely modify precautions based 
on changing requirements, resources, or healthcare settings 14, 655, 681-688. In one study, 
the likelihood of HCWs developing SARS was strongly associated with less than 2 
hours of infection control training and lack of understanding of infection control 
procedures 689. Education about the important role of vaccines (e.g., influenza, measles, 
varicella, pertussis, pneumococcal) in protecting healthcare personnel, their patients, 
and family members can help improve vaccination rates 690-693. 
Education on the principles and practices for preventing transmission of infectious 
agents should begin during training in the health professions and be provided to anyone 
who has an opportunity for contact with patients or medical equipment (e.g., nursing 
and medical staff; therapists and technicians, including respiratory, physical, 
occupational, radiology, and cardiology personnel; phlebotomists; housekeeping and 
maintenance staff; and students). In healthcare facilities, education and training on 
Standard and Transmission-Based Precautions are typically provided at the time of 
orientation and should be repeated as necessary to maintain competency; updated 
Guideline for Isolation Precautions: Preventing Transmission of Infectious Agents in Healthcare Settings (2007) 
Last update: Feburary 15, 2017  Page 46 of 209 
 
education and training are necessary when policies and procedures are revised or when 
there is a special circumstance, such as an outbreak that requires modification of 
current practice or adoption of new recommendations. Education and training materials 
and methods appropriate to the HCW’s level of responsibility, individual learning habits, 
and language needs, can improve the learning experience 658, 694-702.  
Education programs for healthcare personnel have been associated with sustained 
improvement in adherence to best practices and a related decrease in device-
associated HAIs in teaching and non-teaching settings 639, 703 and in medical and 
surgical ICUs {Coopersmith, 2002 #2149; Babcock, 2004 #2126; Berenholtz, 2004 
#2289; [This link is no longer active: www.ihi.org/IHI/Programs/Campaign], #2563} 
Several studies have shown that, in addition to targeted education to improve specific 
practices, periodic assessment and feedback of the HCWs knowledge,and adherence 
to recommended practices are necessary to achieve the desired changes and to identify 
continuing education needs 562, 704-708. Effectiveness of this approach for isolation 
practices has been demonstrated for control of RSV 116, 684.  
Patients, family members, and visitors can be partners in preventing transmission of 
infections in healthcare settings 9, 42, 709-711. Information about Standard Precautions, 
especially hand hygiene, Respiratory Hygiene/Cough Etiquette, vaccination 
(especially against influenza) and other routine infection prevention strategies may be 
incorporated into patient information materials that are provided upon admission to the 
healthcare facility. Additional information about Transmission-Based Precautions is 
best provided at the time they are initiated. Fact sheets, pamphlets, and other printed 
material may include information on the rationale for the additional precautions, risks 
to household members, room assignment for Transmission-Based Precautions 
purposes, explanation about the use of personal protective equipment by HCWs, and 
directions for use of such equipment by family members and visitors. Such information 
may be particularly helpful in the home environment where household members often 
have primary responsibility for adherence to recommended infection control practices. 
Healthcare personnel must be available and prepared to explain this material and 
answer questions as needed.  
II.D. Hand Hygiene  
Hand hygiene has been cited frequently as the single most important practice to reduce 
the transmission of infectious agents in healthcare settings 559, 712, 713 and is an essential 
element of Standard Precautions. The term “hand hygiene” includes both handwashing 
with either plain or antiseptic-containing soap and water, and use of alcohol-based 
products (gels, rinses, foams) that do not require the use of water. In the absence of 
visible soiling of hands, approved alcohol-based products for hand disinfection are 
preferred over antimicrobial or plain soap and water because of their superior 
microbiocidal activity, reduced drying of the skin, and convenience 559. Improved hand 
hygiene practices have been associated with a sustained decrease in the incidence of 
MRSA and VRE infections primarily in the ICU 561, 562, 714-717. The scientific rationale, 
indications, methods, and products for hand hygiene are summarized in other 
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publications 559, 717.  
The effectiveness of hand hygiene can be reduced by the type and length of fingernails 
559, 718, 719. Individuals wearing artifical nails have been shown to harbor more 
pathogenic organisms, especially gram negative bacilli and yeasts, on the nails and in 
the subungual area than those with native nails 720, 721. In 2002, CDC/HICPAC 
recommended (Category IA) that artificial fingernails and extenders not be worn by 
healthcare personnel who have contact with high-risk patients (e.g., those in ICUs, 
ORs) due to the association with outbreaks of gram-negative bacillus and candidal 
infections as confirmed by molecular typing of isolates 30, 31, 559, 722-725.The need to 
restrict the wearing of artificial fingernails by all healthcare personnel who provide direct 
patient care or by healthcare personnel who have contact with other high risk groups 
(e.g., oncology, cystic fibrosis patients), has not been studied, but has been 
recommended by some experts 20. At this time such decisions are at the discretion of an 
individual facility’s infection control program. There is less evidence that jewelry affects 
the quality of hand hygiene. Although hand contamination with potential pathogens is 
increased with ring-wearing 559, 726, no studies have related this practice to HCW-to-
patient transmission of pathogens.  
II.E. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for Healthcare Personnel 
PPE refers to a variety of barriers and respirators used alone or in combination to protect 
mucous membranes, airways, skin, and clothing from contact with infectious agents. The 
selection of PPE is based on the nature of the patient interaction and/or the likely mode(s) 
of transmission. Guidance on the use of PPE is discussed in Part III. A suggested 
procedure for donning and removing PPE that will prevent skin or clothing contamination 
is presented in the Figure. Designated containers for used disposable or reusable PPE 
should be placed in a location that is convenient to the site of removal to facilitate 
disposal and containment of contaminated materials. Hand hygiene is always the final 
step after removing and disposing of PPE. The following sections highlight the primary 
uses and methods for selecting this equipment. 
II.E.1. Gloves. Gloves are used to prevent contamination of healthcare personnel hands 
when  
1. anticipating direct contact with blood or body fluids, mucous membranes, nonintact 
skin and other potentially infectious material;  
2. having direct contact with patients who are colonized or infected with pathogens 
transmitted by the contact route e.g., VRE, MRSA, RSV 559, 727, 728; or  
3. handling or touching visibly or potentially contaminated patient care equipment and 
environmental surfaces 72, 73, 559.  
Gloves can protect both patients and healthcare personnel from exposure to infectious 
material that may be carried on hands 73. The extent to which gloves will protect 
healthcare personnel from transmission of bloodborne pathogens (e.g., HIV, HBV, HCV) 
following a needlestick or other pucture that penetrates the glove barrier has not been 
determined. Although gloves may reduce the volume of blood on the external surface of a 
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sharp by 46-86% 729, the residual blood in the lumen of a hollowbore needle would not be 
affected; therefore, the effect on transmission risk is unknown.  
Gloves manufactured for healthcare purposes are subject to FDA evaluation and 
clearance 730. Nonsterile disposable medical gloves made of a variety of materials (e.g., 
latex, vinyl, nitrile) are available for routine patient care 731. The selection of glove type for 
non-surgical use is based on a number of factors, including the task that is to be 
performed, anticipated contact with chemicals and chemotherapeutic agents, latex 
sensitivity, sizing, and facility policies for creating a latex-free environment 17, 732-734. For 
contact with blood and body fluids during non-surgical patient care, a single pair of gloves 
generally provides adequate barrier protection 734. However, there is considerable 
variability among gloves; both the quality of the manufacturing process and type of 
material influence their barrier effectiveness 735. While there is little difference in the 
barrier properties of unused intact gloves 736, studies have shown repeatedly that vinyl 
gloves have higher failure rates than latex or nitrile gloves when tested under simulated 
and actual clinical conditions 731, 735-738. For this reason either latex or nitrile gloves are 
preferable for clinical procedures that require manual dexterity and/or will involve more 
than brief patient contact. It may be necessary to stock gloves in several sizes. Heavier, 
reusable utility gloves are indicated for non-patient care activities, such as handling or 
cleaning contaminated equipment or surfaces 11, 14, 739. 
During patient care, transmission of infectious organisms can be reduced by adhering to 
the principles of working from “clean” to “dirty”, and confining or limiting contamination to 
surfaces that are directly needed for patient care. It may be necessary to change gloves 
during the care of a single patient to prevent cross-contamination of body sites 559, 740. It 
also may be necessary to change gloves if the patient interaction also involves touching 
portable computer keyboards or other mobile equipment that is transported from room to 
room. Discarding gloves between patients is necessary to prevent transmission of 
infectious material. Gloves must not be washed for subsequent reuse because 
microorganisms cannot be removed reliably from glove surfaces and continued glove 
integrity cannot be ensured. Furthermore, glove reuse has been associated with 
transmission of MRSA and gram-negative bacilli 741-743.  
When gloves are worn in combination with other PPE, they are put on last. Gloves that 
fit snugly around the wrist are preferred for use with an isolation gown because they will 
cover the gown cuff and provide a more reliable continuous barrier for the arms, wrists, 
and hands. Gloves that are removed properly will prevent hand contamination (Figure). 
Hand hygiene following glove removal further ensures that the hands will not carry 
potentially infectious material that might have penetrated through unrecognized tears or 
that could contaminate the hands during glove removal 559, 728, 741.  
II.E.2. Isolation gowns. Isolation gowns are used as specified by Standard and 
Transmission-Based Precautions, to protect the HCW’s arms and exposed body areas 
and prevent contamination of clothing with blood, body fluids, and other potentially 
infectious material 24, 88, 262, 744-746. The need for and type of isolation gown selected is 
based on the nature of the patient interaction, including the anticipated degree of 
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contact with infectious material and potential for blood and body fluid penetration of the 
barrier. The wearing of isolation gowns and other protective apparel is mandated by the 
OSHA Bloodborne Pathogens Standard 739. Clinical and laboratory coats or jackets 
worn over personal clothing for comfort and/or purposes of identity are not considered 
PPE. 
When applying Standard Precautions, an isolation gown is worn only if contact with 
blood or body fluid is anticipated. However, when Contact Precautions are used (i.e., to 
prevent transmission of an infectious agent that is not interrupted by Standard 
Precautions alone and that is associated with environmental contamination), donning of 
both gown and gloves upon room entry is indicated to address unintentional contact 
with contaminated environmental surfaces 54, 72, 73, 88. The routine donning of isolation 
gowns upon entry into an intensive care unit or other high-risk area does not prevent or 
influence potential colonization or infection of patients in those areas365, 747-750.  
Isolation gowns are always worn in combination with gloves, and with other PPE when 
indicated. Gowns are usually the first piece of PPE to be donned. Full coverage of the 
arms and body front, from neck to the mid-thigh or below will ensure that clothing and 
exposed upper body areas are protected. Several gown sizes should be available in a 
healthcare facility to ensure appropriate coverage for staff members. Isolation gowns 
should be removed before leaving the patient care area to prevent possible contamination 
of the environment outside the patient’s room. Isolation gowns should be removed in a 
manner that prevents contamination of clothing or skin (Figure). The outer, 
“contaminated”, side of the gown is turned inward and rolled into a bundle, and then 
discarded into a designated container for waste or linen to contain contamination. 
II.E.3. Face protection: masks, goggles, face shields. 
II.E.3.a. Masks. Masks are used for three primary purposes in healthcare settings:  
1. placed on healthcare personnel to protect them from contact with infectious material 
from patients e.g., respiratory secretions and sprays of blood or body fluids, consistent 
with Standard Precautions and Droplet Precautions;  
2. placed on healthcare personnel when engaged in procedures requiring sterile 
technique to protect patients from exposure to infectious agents carried in a 
healthcare worker’s mouth or nose, and  
3. placed on coughing patients to limit potential dissemination of infectious respiratory 
secretions from the patient to others (i.e., Respiratory Hygiene/Cough Etiquette).  
Masks may be used in combination with goggles to protect the mouth, nose and eyes, or 
a face shield may be used instead of a mask and goggles, to provide more complete 
protection for the face, as discussed below. Masks should not be confused with 
particulate respirators that are used to prevent inhalation of small particles that 
may contain infectious agents transmitted via the airborne route as described 
below.  
The mucous membranes of the mouth, nose, and eyes are susceptible portals of entry for 
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infectious agents, as can be other skin surfaces if skin integrity is compromised (e.g., by 
acne, dermatitis) 66, 751-754. Therefore, use of PPE to protect these body sites is an 
important component of Standard Precautions. The protective effect of masks for 
exposed healthcare personnel has been demonstrated 93, 113, 755, 756. Procedures that 
generate splashes or sprays of blood, body fluids, secretions, or excretions (e.g., 
endotracheal suctioning, bronchoscopy, invasive vascular procedures) require either a 
face shield (disposable or reusable) or mask and goggles 93-95, 96, 113, 115, 262, 739, 757.The 
wearing of masks, eye protection, and face shields in specified circumstances when blood 
or body fluid exposures are likely to occur is mandated by the OSHA Bloodborne 
Pathogens Standard 739. Appropriate PPE should be selected based on the anticipated 
level of exposure. 
Two mask types are available for use in healthcare settings: surgical masks that are 
cleared by the FDA and required to have fluid-resistant properties, and procedure or 
isolation masks 758 #2688. No studies have been published that compare mask types to 
determine whether one mask type provides better protection than another. Since 
procedure/isolation masks are not regulated by the FDA, there may be more variability in 
quality and performance than with surgical masks. Masks come in various shapes (e.g., 
molded and non-molded), sizes, filtration efficiency, and method of attachment (e.g., ties, 
elastic, ear loops). Healthcare facilities may find that different types of masks are needed 
to meet individual healthcare personnel needs. 
II.E.3.b. Goggles, face shields. Guidance on eye protection for infection control has 
been published 759. The eye protection chosen for specific work situations (e.g., goggles 
or face shield) depends upon the circumstances of exposure, other PPE used, and 
personal vision needs. Personal eyeglasses and contact lenses are NOT considered 
adequate eye protection (NIOSH Eye Protection for Infection Control 
(https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/eye/eye-infectious.html) [Current version of this 
document may differ from original.]). NIOSH states that, eye protection must be 
comfortable, allow for sufficient peripheral vision, and must be adjustable to ensure a 
secure fit. It may be necessary to provide several different types, styles, and sizes of 
protective equipment. Indirectly-vented goggles with a manufacturer’s anti-fog coating 
may provide the most reliable practical eye protection from splashes, sprays, and 
respiratory droplets from multiple angles. Newer styles of goggles may provide better 
indirect airflow properties to reduce fogging, as well as better peripheral vision and more 
size options for fitting goggles to different workers. Many styles of goggles fit adequately 
over prescription glasses with minimal gaps. While effective as eye protection, goggles 
do not provide splash or spray protection to other parts of the face.  
The role of goggles, in addition to a mask, in preventing exposure to infectious agents 
transmitted via respiratory droplets has been studied only for RSV. Reports published 
in the mid-1980s demonstrated that eye protection reduced occupational transmission 
of RSV 760, 761. Whether this was due to preventing hand-eye contact or respiratory 
droplet-eye contact has not been determined. However, subsequent studies 
demonstrated that RSV transmission is effectively prevented by adherence to 
Standard plus Contact Precations and that for this virus routine use of goggles is not 
necessary 24, 116, 117, 684, 762. It is important to remind healthcare personnel that even if 
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Droplet Precautions are not recommended for a specific respiratory tract pathogen, 
protection for the eyes, nose and mouth by using a mask and goggles, or face shield 
alone, is necessary when it is likely that there will be a splash or spray of any 
respiratory secretions or other body fluids as defined in Standard Precautions.  
Disposable or non-disposable face shields may be used as an alternative to goggles 
759. As compared with goggles, a face shield can provide protection to other facial 
areas in addition to the eyes. Face shields extending from chin to crown provide better 
face and eye protection from splashes and sprays; face shields that wrap around the 
sides may reduce splashes around the edge of the shield.  
Removal of a face shield, goggles and mask can be performed safely after gloves 
have been removed, and hand hygiene performed. The ties, ear pieces and/or 
headband used to secure the equipment to the head are considered “clean” and 
therefore safe to touch with bare hands. The front of a mask, goggles and face shield 
are considered contaminated (Figure).  
II.E.4. Respiratory protection. The subject of respiratory protection as it applies to 
preventing transmission of airborne infectious agents, including the need for and 
frequency of fit-testing is under scientific review and was the subject of a CDC 
workshop in 2004 763. Respiratory protection currently requires the use of a respirator 
with N95 or higher filtration to prevent inhalation of infectious particles. Information 
about respirators and respiratory protection programs is summarized in the Guideline 
for Preventing Transmission of Mycobacterium tuberculosis in Health-care Settings, 
2005 (CDC.MMWR 2005; 54: RR-17 12).  
Respiratory protection is broadly regulated by OSHA under the general industry standard 
for respiratory protection (29CFR1910.134)764 which requires that U.S. employers in all 
employment settings implement a program to protect employees from inhalation of toxic 
materials. OSHA program components include medical clearance to wear a respirator; 
provision and use of appropriate respirators, including fit-tested NIOSH-certified N95 and 
higher particulate filtering respirators; education on respirator use and periodic re-
evaluation of the respiratory protection program. When selecting particulate respirators, 
models with inherently good fit characteristics (i.e., those expected to provide protection 
factors of 10 or more to 95% of wearers) are preferred and could theoretically relieve the 
need for fit testing 765, 766. Issues pertaining to respiratory protection remain the subject of 
ongoing debate. Information on various types of respirators may be found at [This link is 
no longer active: www.cdc.gov/niosh/npptl/respirators/disp_part/particlist.html. Similar 
information may be found at NIOSH Respirators 
(https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/respirators).] and in published studies 765, 767, 768. A 
user-seal check (formerly called a “fit check”) should be performed by the wearer of a 
respirator each time a respirator is donned to minimize air leakage around the facepiece 
769. The optimal frequency of fit-testng has not been determined; re-testing may be 
indicated if there is a change in facial features of the wearer, onset of a medical condition 
that would affect respiratory function in the wearer, or a change in the model or size of 
the initially assigned respirator 12. 
Guideline for Isolation Precautions: Preventing Transmission of Infectious Agents in Healthcare Settings (2007) 
Last update: Feburary 15, 2017  Page 52 of 209 
 
Respiratory protection was first recommended for protection of preventing U.S. 
healthcare personnel from exposure to M. tuberculosis in 1989. That recommendation 
has been maintained in two successive revisions of the Guidelines for Prevention of 
Transmission of Tuberculosis in Hospitals and other Healthcare Settings 12, 126. The 
incremental benefit from respirator use, in addition to administrative and engineering 
controls (i.e., AIIRs, early recognition of patients likely to have tuberculosis and prompt 
placement in an AIIR, and maintenance of a patient with suspected tuberculosis in an 
AIIR until no longer infectious), for preventing transmission of airborne infectious agents 
(e.g., M. tuberculosis) is undetermined. Although some studies have demonstrated 
effective prevention of M. tuberculosis transmission in hospitals where surgical masks, 
instead of respirators, were used in conjunction with other administrative and 
engineering controls 637, 770, 771, CDC currently recommends N95 or higher level 
respirators for personnel exposed to patients with suspected or confirmed tuberculosis. 
Currently this is also true for other diseases that could be transmitted through the 
airborne route, including SARS 262 and smallpox 108, 129, 772, until inhalational transmission 
is better defined or healthcare-specific protective equipment more suitable for for 
preventing infection are developed. Respirators are also currently recommended to be 
worn during the performance of aerosol-generating procedures (e.g., intubation, 
bronchoscopy, suctioning) on patients withSARS Co-V infection, avian influenza and 
pandemic influenza (See Appendix A).  
Although Airborne Precautions are recommended for preventing airborne transmission of 
measles and varicella-zoster viruses, there are no data upon which to base a 
recommendation for respiratory protection to protect susceptible personnel against these 
two infections; transmission of varicella-zoster virus has been prevented among pediatric 
patients using negative pressure isolation alone 773. Whether respiratory protection (i.e., 
wearing a particulate respirator) would enhance protection from these viruses has not 
been studied. Since the majority of healthcare personnel have natural or acquired 
immunity to these viruses, only immune personnel generally care for patients with these 
infections 774-777. Although there is no evidence to suggest that masks are not adequate 
to protect healthcare personnel in these settings, for purposes of consistency and 
simplicity, or because of difficulties in ascertaining immunity, some facilities may require 
the use of respirators for entry into all AIIRs, regardless of the specific infectious agent.  
Procedures for safe removal of respirators are provided (Figure). In some healthcare 
settings, particulate respirators used to provide care for patients with M. tuberculosis are 
reused by the same HCW. This is an acceptable practice providing the respirator is not 
damaged or soiled, the fit is not compromised by change in shape, and the respirator 
has not been contaminated with blood or body fluids. There are no data on which to 
base a recommendation for the length of time a respirator may be reused. 
II.F. control nurse per 250 beds, were associated with a 32%re to 
Bloodborne Pathogens 
II.F.1. Prevention of needlesticks and other sharps-related injuries. Injuries due to 
needles and other sharps have been associated with transmission of HBV, HCV and 
HIV to healthcare personnel 778, 779. The prevention of sharps injuries has always been 
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an essential element of Universal and now Standard Precautions 1, 780. These include 
measures to handle needles and other sharp devices in a manner that will prevent injury 
to the user and to others who may encounter the device during or after a procedure. 
These measures apply to routine patient care and do not address the prevention of 
sharps injuries and other blood exposures during surgical and other invasive 
procedures that are addressed elsewhere 781-785.  
Since 1991, when OSHA first issued its Bloodborne Pathogens Standard to protect 
healthcare personnel from blood exposure, the focus of regulatory and legislative activity 
has been on implementing a hierarchy of control measures. This has included focusing 
attention on removing sharps hazards through the development and use of engineering 
controls. The federal Needlestick Safety and Prevention Act signed into law in 
November, 2000 authorized OSHA's revision of its Bloodborne Pathogens Standard to 
more explicitly require the use of safety-engineered sharp devices 786. CDC has provided 
guidance on sharps injury prevention 787, 788, including for the design, implementation and 
evaluation of a comprehensive sharps injury prevention program 789. 
II.F.2. Prevention of mucous membrane contact. Exposure of mucous membranes of 
the eyes, nose and mouth to blood and body fluids has been associated with the 
transmission of bloodborne viruses and other infectious agents to healthcare personnel 
66, 752, 754, 779. The prevention of mucous membrane exposures has always been an 
element of Universal and now Standard Precautions for routine patient care 1, 753 and is 
subject to OSHA bloodborne pathogen regulations. Safe work practices, in addition to 
wearing PPE, are used to protect mucous membranes and non-intact skin from contact 
with potentially infectious material. These include keeping gloved and ungloved hands 
that are contaminated from touching the mouth, nose, eyes, or face; and positioning 
patients to direct sprays and splatter away from the face of the caregiver. Careful 
placement of PPE before patient contact will help avoid the need to make PPE 
adjustments and possible face or mucous membrane contamination during use.  
In areas where the need for resuscitation is unpredictable, mouthpieces, pocket 
resuscitation masks with one-way valves, and other ventilation devices provide an 
alternative to mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, preventing exposure of the caregiver’s nose 
and mouth to oral and respiratory fluids during the procedure. 
II.F.2.a. Precautions during aerosol-generating procedures. The performance of 
procedures that can generate small particle aerosols (aerosol-generating procedures), 
such as bronchoscopy, endotracheal intubation, and open suctioning of the respiratory 
tract, have been associated with transmission of infectious agents to healthcare 
personnel, including M. tuberculosis 790, SARS-CoV 93, 94, 98 and N. meningitidis 95. 
Protection of the eyes, nose and mouth, in addition to gown and gloves, is 
recommended during performance of these procedures in accordance with Standard 
Precautions. Use of a particulate respirator is recommended during aerosol-generating 
procedures when the aerosol is likely to contain M. tuberculosis, SARS-CoV, or avian or 
pandemic influenza viruses. 
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II.G. Patient Placement  
II.G.1. Hospitals and long-term care settings. Options for patient placement include 
single patient rooms, two patient rooms, and multi-bed wards. Of these, single patient 
rooms are prefered when there is a concern about transmission of an infectious agent. 
Although some studies have failed to demonstrate the efficacy of single patient rooms to 
prevent HAIs 791, other published studies, including one commissioned by the American 
Institute of Architects and the Facility Guidelines Institute, have documented a beneficial 
relationship between private rooms and reduction in infectious and noninfectious 
adverse patient outcomes 792, 793. The AIA notes that private rooms are the trend in 
hospital planning and design. However, most hospitals and long-term care facilities 
have multi-bed rooms and must consider many competing priorities when determining 
the appropriate room placement for patients (e.g., reason for admission; patient 
characteristics, such as age, gender, mental status; staffing needs; family requests; 
psychosocial factors; reimbursement concerns). In the absence of obvious infectious 
diseases that require specified airborne infection isolation rooms (e.g., tuberculosis, 
SARS, chickenpox), the risk of transmission of infectious agents is not always 
considered when making placement decisions.  
When there are only a limited number of single-patient rooms, it is prudent to prioritize 
them for those patients who have conditions that facilitate transmission of infectious 
material to other patients (e.g., draining wounds, stool incontinence, uncontained 
secretions) and for those who are at increased risk of acquisition and adverse outcomes 
resulting from HAI (e.g., immunosuppression, open wounds, indwelling catheters, 
anticipated prolonged length of stay, total dependence on HCWs for activities of daily 
living) 15, 24, 43, 430, 794, 795.  
Single-patient rooms are always indicated for patients placed on Airborne Precautions 
and in a Protective Environment and are preferred for patients who require Contact or 
Droplet Precautions 23, 24, 410, 435, 796, 797. During a suspected or proven outbreak caused by 
a pathogen whose reservoir is the gastrointestinal tract, use of single patient rooms with 
private bathrooms limits opportunities for transmission, especially when the colonized or 
infected patient has poor personal hygiene habits, fecal incontinence, or cannot be 
expected to assist in maintaining procedures that prevent transmission of microorganisms 
(e.g., infants, children, and patients with altered mental status or developmental delay). In 
the absence of continued transmission, it is not necessary to provide a private bathroom 
for patients colonized or infected with enteric pathogens as long as personal hygiene 
practices and Standard Precautions, especially hand hygiene and appropriate 
environmental cleaning, are maintained. Assignment of a dedicated commode to a 
patient,and cleaning and disinfecting fixtures and equipment that may have fecal 
contamination (e.g., bathrooms, commodes 798, scales used for weighing diapers) and the 
adjacent surfaces with appropriate agents may be especially important when a single-
patient room can not be used since environmental contamination with intestinal tract 
pathogens is likely from both continent and incontinent patients 54, 799. Results of several 
studies to determine the benefit of a single-patient room to prevent transmission of 
Clostridium difficile are inconclusive 167, 800-802. Some studies have shown that being in the 
same room with a colonized or infected patient is not necessarily a risk factor for 
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transmission 791, 803-805. However, for children, the risk of healthcare-associated diarrhea is 
increased with the increased number of patients per room 806. Thus, patient factors are 
important determinants of infection transmission risks, and the need for a single-patient 
room and/or private bathroom for any patient is best determined on a case-by-case basis. 
Cohorting is the practice of grouping together patients who are colonized or infected 
with the same organism to confine their care to one area and prevent contact with other 
patients. Cohorts are created based on clinical diagnosis, microbiologic confirmation 
when available, epidemiology, and mode of transmission of the infectious agent. It is 
generally preferred not to place severely immunosuppressed patients in rooms with 
other patients. Cohorting has been used extensively for managing outbreaks of MDROs 
including MRSA 22, 807, VRE 638, 808, 809, MDR-ESBLs 810; Pseudomonas aeruginosa 29; 
methicillin-susceptible Staphylococcus aureus 811; RSV 812, 813; adenovirus 
keratoconjunctivitis 814; rotavirus 815; and SARS 816. Modeling studies provide additional 
support for cohorting patients to control outbreaks Talon 817-819. However, cohorting 
often is implemented only after routine infection control measures have failed to control 
an outbreak. 
Assigning or cohorting healthcare personnel to care only for patients infected or 
colonized with a single target pathogen limits further transmission of the target pathogen 
to uninfected patients 740, 819 but is difficult to achieve in the face of current staffing 
shortages in hospitals 583 and residential healthcare sites 820-822. However, when 
continued transmission is occurring after implementing routine infection control 
measures and creating patient cohorts, cohorting of healthcare personnel may be 
beneficial. 
During the seasons when RSV, human metapneumovirus 823, parainfluenza, influenza, 
other respiratory viruses 824, and rotavirus are circulating in the community, cohorting 
based on the presenting clinical syndrome is often a priority in facilities that care for 
infants and young children 825. For example, during the respiratory virus season, infants 
may be cohorted based soley on the clinical diagnosis of bronchiolitis due to the 
logistical difficulties and costs associated with requiring microbiologic confirmation prior 
to room placement, and the predominance of RSV during most of the season. However, 
when available, single patient rooms are always preferred since a common clinical 
presentation (e.g., bronchiolitis), can be caused by more than one infectious agent 823, 
824, 826. Furthermore, the inability of infants and children to contain body fluids, and the 
close physical contact that occurs during their care, increases infection transmission 
risks for patients and personnel in this setting 24, 795. 
II.G.2. Ambulatory settings. Patients actively infected with or incubating transmissible 
infectious diseases are seen frequently in ambulatory settings (e.g., outpatient clinics, 
physicians’ offices, emergency departments) and potentially expose healthcare 
personnel and other patients, family members and visitors 21, 34, 127, 135, 142, 827. In 
response to the global outbreak of SARS in 2003 and in preparation for pandemic 
influenza, healthcare providers working in outpatient settings are urged to implement 
source containment measures (e.g., asking couging patients to wear a surgical mask or 
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cover their coughs with tissues) to prevent transmission of respiratory infections, 
beginning at the point of initial patient encounter 9, 262, 828 as described below in section 
III.A.1.a. Signs can be posted at the entrance to facilities or at the reception or 
registration desk requesting that the patient or individuals accompanying the patient 
promptly inform the receptionist if there are symptoms of a respiratory infection (e.g., 
cough, flu-like illness, increased production of respiratory secretions). The presence of 
diarrhea, skin rash, or known or suspected exposure to a transmissible disease (e.g., 
measles, pertussis, chickenpox, tuberculosis) also could be added. Placement of 
potentially infectious patients without delay in an examination room limits the number of 
exposed individuals, e.g., in the common waiting area. 
In waiting areas, maintaining a distance between symptomatic and non-symptomatic 
patients (e.g., >3 feet), in addition to source control measures, may limit exposures. 
However, infections transmitted via the airborne route (e.g., M tuberculosis, measles, 
chickenpox) require additional precautions 12, 125, 829. Patients suspected of having such 
an infection can wear a surgical mask for source containment, if tolerated, and should be 
placed in an examination room, preferably an AIIR, as soon as possible. If this is not 
possible, having the patient wear a mask and segregate him/herself from other patients 
in the waiting area will reduce opportunities to expose others. Since the person(s) 
accompanying the patient also may be infectious, application of the same infection 
control precautions may need to be extended to these persons if they are symptomatic 
21, 252, 830. For example, family members accompanying children admitted with suspected 
M. tuberculosis have been found to have unsuspected pulmonary tuberculosis with 
cavitary lesions, even when asymptomatic 42, 831.  
Patients with underlying conditions that increase their susceptibility to infection (e.g., 
those who are immunocompromised 43, 44 or have cystic fibrosis 20) require special efforts 
to protect them from exposures to infected patients in common waiting areas. By 
informing the receptionist of their infection risk upon arrival, appropriate steps may be 
taken to further protect them from infection. In some cystic fibrosis clinics, in order to 
avoid exposure to other patients who could be colonized with B. cepacia, patients have 
been given beepers upon registration so that they may leave the area and receive 
notification to return when an examination room becomes available 832.  
II.G.3. Home care. In home care, the patient placement concerns focus on protecting 
others in the home from exposure to an infectious household member. For individuals 
who are especially vulnerable to adverse outcomes associated with certain infections, it 
may be beneficial to either remove them from the home or segregate them within the 
home. Persons who are not part of the household may need to be prohibited from visiting 
during the period of infectivity. For example, if a patient with pulmonary tuberculosis is 
contagious and being cared for at home, very young children (<4 years of age) 833 and 
immunocompromised persons who have not yet been infected should be removed or 
excluded from the household. During the SARS outbreak of 2003, segregation of 
infected persons during the communicable phase of the illness was beneficial in 
preventing household transmission 249, 834. 
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II.H. Transport of Patients 
Several principles are used to guide transport of patients requiring Transmission-Based 
Precautions. In the inpatient and residential settings these include  
1. limiting transport of such patients to essential purposes, such as diagnostic and 
therapeutic procedures that cannot be performed in the patient’s room;  
2. when transport is necessary, using appropriate barriers on the patient (e.g., mask, 
gown, wrapping in sheets or use of impervious dressings to cover the affected 
area(s) when infectious skin lesions or drainage are present, consistent with the route 
and risk of transmission;  
3. notifying healthcare personnel in the receiving area of the impending arrival of the 
patient and of the precautions necessary to prevent transmission; and  
4. for patients being transported outside the facility, informing the receiving facility and 
the medi-van or emergency vehicle personnel in advance about the type of 
Transmission-Based Precautions being used.  
For tuberculosis, additional precautions may be needed in a small shared air space 
such as in an ambulance 12. 
II.I. Environmental Measures  
Cleaning and disinfecting non-critical surfaces in patient-care areas are part of Standard 
Precautions. In general, these procedures do not need to be changed for patients on 
Transmission-Based Precautions. The cleaning and disinfection of all patient-care areas 
is important for frequently touched surfaces, especially those closest to the patient, that 
are most likely to be contaminated (e.g., bedrails, bedside tables, commodes, 
doorknobs, sinks, surfaces and equipment in close proximity to the patient) 11, 72, 73, 835. 
The frequency or intensity of cleaning may need to change based on the patient’s level 
of hygiene and the degree of environmental contamination and for certain for infectious 
agents whose reservoir is the intestinal tract 54. This may be especially true in LTCFs 
and pediatric facilities where patients with stool and urine incontinence are encountered 
more frequently. Also, increased frequency of cleaning may be needed in a Protective 
Environment to minimize dust accumulation 11. Special recommendations for cleaning 
and disinfecting environmental surfaces in dialysis centers have been published 18. In all 
healthcare settings, administrative, staffing and scheduling activities should prioritize the 
proper cleaning and disinfection of surfaces that could be implicated in transmission. 
During a suspected or proven outbreak where an environmental reservoir is suspected, 
routine cleaning procedures should be reviewed, and the need for additional trained 
cleaning staff should be assessed. Adherence should be monitored and reinforced to 
promote consistent and correct cleaning is performed.  
EPA-registered disinfectants or detergents/disinfectants that best meet the overall 
needs of the healthcare facility for routine cleaning and disinfection should be selected 
11, 836. In general, use of the existing facility detergent/disinfectant according to the 
manufacturer’s recommendations for amount, dilution, and contact time is sufficient to 
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remove pathogens from surfaces of rooms where colonized or infected individuals were 
housed. This includes those pathogens that are resistant to multiple classes of 
antimicrobial agents (e.g., C. difficile, VRE, MRSA, MDR-GNB 11, 24, 88, 435, 746, 796, 837). 
Most often, environmental reservoirs of pathogens during outbreaks are related to a 
failure to follow recommended procedures for cleaning and disinfection rather than the 
specific cleaning and disinfectant agents used838-841.  
Certain pathogens (e.g., rotavirus, noroviruses, C. difficile) may be resistant to some 
routinely used hospital disinfectants 275, 292, 842-847.The role of specific disinfectants in 
limiting transmission of rotavirus has been demonstrated experimentally 842. Also, since 
C. difficile may display increased levels of spore production when exposed to non-
chlorine-based cleaning agents, and the spores are more resistant than vegetative cells 
to commonly used surface disinfectants, some investigators have recommended the use 
of a 1:10 dilution of 5.25% sodium hypochlorite (household bleach) and water for routine 
environmental disinfection of rooms of patients with C. difficile when there is continued 
transmission 844, 848. In one study, the use of a hypochlorite solution was associated with 
a decrease in rates of C. difficile infections 847. The need to change disinfectants based 
on the presence of these organisms can be determined in consultation with the infection 
control committee 11, 847, 848.  
Detailed recommendations for disinfection and sterilization of surfaces and medical 
equipment that have been in contact with prion-containing tissue or high risk body fluids, 
and for cleaning of blood and body substance spills, are available in the Guidelines for 
Environmental Infection Control in Health-Care Facilities 11 and in the Guideline for 
Disinfection and Sterilization 848.  
II.J. Patient Care Equipment and Instruments/Devices  
Medical equipment and instruments/devices must be cleaned and maintained according 
to the manufacturers’ instructions to prevent patient-to-patient transmission of infectious 
agents 86, 87, 325, 849. Cleaning to remove organic material must always precede high level 
disinfection and sterilization of critical and semi-critical instruments and devices because 
residual proteinacous material reduces the effectiveness of the disinfection and 
sterilization processes 836, 848. Noncritical equipment, such as commodes, intravenous 
pumps, and ventilators, must be thoroughly cleaned and disinfected before use on 
another patient. All such equipment and devices should be handled in a manner that will 
prevent HCW and environmental contact with potentially infectious material. It is 
important to include computers and personal digital assistants (PDAs) used in patient 
care in policies for cleaning and disinfection of non-critical items. The literature on 
contamination of computers with pathogens has been summarized 850 and two reports 
have linked computer contamination to colonization and infections in patients 851, 852. 
Although keyboard covers and washable keyboards that can be easily disinfected are in 
use, the infection control benefit of those items and optimal management have not been 
determined. 
In all healthcare settings, providing patients who are on Transmission-Based Precautions 
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with dedicated noncritical medical equipment (e.g., stethoscope, blood pressure cuff, 
electronic thermometer) has been beneficial for preventing transmission 74, 89, 740, 853, 854. 
When this is not possible, disinfection after use is recommended. Consult other 
guidelines for detailed guidance in developing specific protocols for cleaning and 
reprocessing medical equipment and patient care items in both routine and special 
circumstances 11, 14, 18, 20, 740, 836, 848. 
In home care, it is preferable to remove visible blood or body fluids from durable medical 
equipment before it leaves the home. Equipment can be cleaned on-site using a 
detergent/disinfectant and, when possible, should be placed in a single plastic bag for 
transport to the reprocessing location 20, 739.  
II.K. Textiles and Laundry 
Soiled textiles, including bedding, towels, and patient or resident clothing may be 
contaminated with pathogenic microorganisms. However, the risk of disease 
transmission is negligible if they are handled, transported, and laundered in a safe 
manner 11, 855, 856. Key principles for handling soiled laundry are  
1. not shaking the items or handling them in any way that may aerosolize infectious 
agents;  
2. avoiding contact of one’s body and personal clothing with the soiled items being 
handled; and  
3. containing soiled items in a laundry bag or designated bin. When laundry chutes are 
used, they must be maintained to minimize dispersion of aerosols from contaminated 
items 11.  
The methods for handling, transporting, and laundering soiled textiles are determined by 
organizational policy and any applicable regulations 739; guidance is provided in the 
Guidelines for Environmental Infection Control 11. Rather than rigid rules and regulations, 
hygienic and common sense storage and processing of clean textiles is recommended 11, 
857. When laundering occurs outside of a healthcare facility, the clean items must be 
packaged or completely covered and placed in an enclosed space during transport to 
prevent contamination with outside air or construction dust that could contain infectious 
fungal spores that are a risk for immunocompromised patients 11. 
Institutions are required to launder garments used as personal protective equipment and 
uniforms visibly soiled with blood or infective material 739. There are few data to determine 
the safety of home laundering of HCW uniforms, but no increase in infection rates was 
observed in the one published study 858 and no pathogens were recovered from home- or 
hospital-laundered scrubs in another study 859. In the home, textiles and laundry from 
patients with potentially transmissible infectious pathogens do not require special handling 
or separate laundering, and may be washed with warm water and detergent 11, 858, 859. 
II.L. Solid Waste  
The management of solid waste emanating from the healthcare environment is subject to 
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federal and state regulations for medical and non-medical waste 860, 861. No additional 
precautions are needed for non-medical solid waste that is being removed from rooms of 
patients on Transmission-Based Precautions. Solid waste may be contained in a single 
bag (as compared to using two bags) of sufficient strength. 862 
II.M. Dishware and Eating Utensils 
The combination of hot water and detergents used in dishwashers is sufficient to 
decontaminate dishware and eating utensils. Therefore, no special precautions are 
needed for dishware (e.g., dishes, glasses, cups) or eating utensils; reusable dishware 
and utensils may be used for patients requiring Transmission-Based Precautions. In the 
home and other communal settings, eating utensils and drinking vessels that are being 
used should not be shared, consistent with principles of good personal hygiene and for 
the purpose of preventing transmission of respiratory viruses, Herpes simplex virus, and 
infectious agents that infect the gastrointestinal tract and are transmitted by the fecal/oral 
route (e.g., hepatitis A virus, noroviruses). If adequate resources for cleaning utensils and 
dishes are not available, disposable products may be used.  
II.N. Adjunctive Measures 
Important adjunctive measures that are not considered primary components of 
programs to prevent transmission of infectious agents, but improve the effectiveness of 
such programs, include  
1. antimicrobial management programs;  
2. postexposure chemoprophylaxis with antiviral or antibacterial agents;  
3. vaccines used both for pre and postexposure prevention; and  
4. screening and restricting visitors with signs of transmissible infections.  
Detailed discussion of judicious use of antimicrobial agents is beyond the scope of this 
document; however the topic is addressed in the Management of Multidrug- Resistant 
Organisms in Healthcare Settings 2006 
(https://www.cdc.gov/infectioncontrol/guidelines/mdro/). 
II.N.1. Chemoprophylaxis. Antimicrobial agents and topical antiseptics may be used to 
prevent infection and potential outbreaks of selected agents. Infections for which 
postexposure chemoprophylaxis is recommended under defined conditions include B. 
pertussis 17, 863, N. meningitidis 864, B. anthracis after environmental exposure to 
aeosolizable material865, influenza virus611, HIV 866, and group A streptococcus 160. Orally 
administered antimicrobials may also be used under defined circumstances for MRSA 
decolonization of patients or healthcare personnel 867. 
Another form of chemoprophylaxis is the use of topical antiseptic agents. For example, 
triple dye is used routinely on the umbilical cords of term newborns to reduce the risk of 
colonization, skin infections, and omphalitis caused by S. aureus, including MRSA, and 
group A streptococcus 868, 869. Extension of the use of triple dye to low birth weight 
infants in the NICU was one component of a program that controlled one longstanding 
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MRSA outbreak 22. Topical antiseptics are also used for decolonization of healthcare 
personnel or selected patients colonized with MRSA, using mupirocin as discussed in 
the MDRO guideline870 867, 871-873. 
II.N.2. Immunoprophylaxis. Certain immunizations recommended for susceptible 
healthcare personnel have decreased the risk of infection and the potential for 
transmission in healthcare facilities 17, 874. The OSHA mandate that requires employers to 
offer hepatitis B vaccination to HCWs played a substantial role in the sharp decline in 
incidence of occupational HBV infection 778, 875. The use of varicella vaccine in healthcare 
personnel has decreased the need to place susceptible HCWs on administrative leave 
following exposure to patients with varicella 775. Also, reports of healthcare-associated 
transmission of rubella in obstetrical clinics 33, 876 and measles in acute care settings 34 
demonstrate the importance of immunization of susceptible healthcare personnel against 
childhood diseases. Many states have requirements for HCW vaccination for measles 
and rubella in the absence of evidence of immunity. Annual influenza vaccine campaigns 
targeted to patients and healthcare personnel in LTCFs and acute-care settings have 
been instrumental in preventing or limiting institutional outbreaks and increasing attention 
is being directed toward improving influenza vaccination rates in healthcare personnel 35, 
611, 690, 877, 878, 879.  
Transmission of B. pertussis in healthcare facilities has been associated with large and 
costly outbreaks that include both healthcare personnel and patients 17, 36, 41, 100, 683, 827, 
880, 881. HCWs who have close contact with infants with pertussis are at particularly high 
risk because of waning immunity and, until 2005, the absence of a vaccine that could be 
used in adults. However, two acellular pertussis vaccines were licensed in the United 
States in 2005, one for use in individuals aged 11-18 and one for use in ages 10-64 
years 882. Provisional ACIP recommendations at the time of publication of this document 
include adolescents and adults, especially those with contact with infants < 12 months of 
age and healthcare personnel with direct patient contact 883 884. 
Immunization of children and adults will help prevent the introduction of vaccine-
preventable diseases into healthcare settings. The recommended immunization 
schedule for children is published annually in the January issues of the Morbidity 
Mortality Weekly Report with interim updates as needed 885, 886. An adult immunization 
schedule also is available for healthy adults and those with special immunization needs 
due to high risk medical conditions 887.  
Some vaccines are also used for postexposure prophylaxis of susceptible individuals, 
including varicella 888, influenza 611, hepatitis B 778, and smallpox 225 vaccines 17, 874. In 
the future, administration of a newly developed S. aureus conjugate vaccine (still under 
investigation) to selected patients may provide a novel method of preventing healthcare-
associated S. aureus, including MRSA, infections in high-risk groups (e.g., hemodialysis 
patients and candidates for selected surgical procedures) 889, 890.  
Immune globulin preparations also are used for postexposure prophylaxis of certain 
infectious agents under specified circumstances (e.g., varicella-zoster virus [VZIG], 
hepatitis B virus [HBIG], rabies [RIG], measles and hepatitis A virus [IG] 17, 833, 874). The 
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RSV monoclonal antibody preparation, Palivizumab, may have contributed to controlling 
a nosocomial outbreak of RSV in one NICU, but there is insufficient evidence to support 
a routine recommendation for its use in this setting 891. 
II.N. 3. Management of visitors. 
II.N.3.a. Visitors as sources of infection. Visitors have been identified as the source of 
several types of HAIs (e.g., pertussis 40, 41, M. tuberculosis 42, 892, influenza, and other 
respiratory viruses 24, 43, 44, 373 and SARS 21, 252-254). However, effective methods for visitor 
screening in healthcare settings have not been studied. Visitor screening is especially 
important during community outbreaks of infectious diseases and for high risk patient 
units. Sibling visits are often encouraged in birthing centers, post partum rooms and in 
pediatric inpatient units, ICUs, and in residential settings for children; in hospital settings, 
a child visitor should visit only his or her own sibling. Screening of visiting siblings and 
other children before they are allowed into clinical areas is necessary to prevent the 
introduction of childhood illnesses and common respiratory infections. Screening may be 
passive through the use of signs to alert family members and visitors with signs and 
symptoms of communicable diseases not to enter clinical areas. More active screening 
may include the completion of a screening tool or questionnaire which elicits information 
related to recent exposures or current symptoms. That information is reviewed by the 
facility staff and the visitor is either permitted to visit or is excluded 833. 
Family and household members visiting pediatric patients with pertussis and 
tuberculosis may need to be screened for a history of exposure as well as signs and 
symptoms of current infection. Potentially infectious visitors are excluded until they 
receive appropriate medical screening, diagnosis, or treatment. If exclusion is not 
considered to be in the best interest of the patient or family (i.e., primary family 
members of critically or terminally ill patients), then the symptomatic visitor must wear a 
mask while in the healthcare facility and remain in the patient’s room, avoiding exposure 
to others, especially in public waiting areas and the cafeteria.  
Visitor screening is used consistently on HSCT units 15, 43. However, considering the 
experience during the 2003 SARS outbreaks and the potential for pandemic influenza, 
developing effective visitor screening systems will be beneficial 9. Education concerning 
Respiratory Hygiene/Cough Etiquette is a useful adjunct to visitor screening. 
II.N.3.b. Use of barrier precautions by visitors. The use of gowns, gloves, or masks 
by visitors in healthcare settings has not been addressed specifically in the scientific 
literature. Some studies included the use of gowns and gloves by visitors in the control 
of MDRO’s, but did not perform a separate analysis to determine whether their use by 
visitors had a measurable impact 893-895. Family members or visitors who are providing 
care or having very close patient contact (e.g., feeding, holding) may have contact with 
other patients and could contribute to transmission if barrier precautions are not used 
correctly. Specific recommendations may vary by facility or by unit and should be 
determined by the level of interaction.  
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Part III:  
Precautions to Prevent Transmission of Infectious Agents 
There are two tiers of HICPAC/CDC precautions to prevent transmission of infectious 
agents, Standard Precautions and Transmission-Based Precautions. Standard 
Precautions are intended to be applied to the care of all patients in all healthcare 
settings, regardless of the suspected or confirmed presence of an infectious agent. 
Implementation of Standard Precautions constitutes the primary strategy for the 
prevention of healthcare-associated transmission of infectious agents among 
patients and healthcare personnel. Transmission-Based Precautions are for patients 
who are known or suspected to be infected or colonized with infectious agents, including 
certain epidemiologically important pathogens, which require additional control measures 
to effectively prevent transmission. Since the infecting agent often is not known at the 
time of admission to a healthcare facility, Transmission-Based Precautions are used 
empirically, according to the clinical syndrome and the likely etiologic agents at the time, 
and then modified when the pathogen is identified or a transmissible infectious etiology is 
ruled out. Examples of this syndromic approach are presented in Table 2. The 
HICPAC/CDC Guidelines also include recommendations for creating a Protective 
Environment for allogeneic HSCT patients. 
The specific elements of Standard and Transmission-Based Precautions are discussed in 
Part II of this guideline. In Part III, the circumstances in which Standard Precautions, 
Transmission-Based Precautions, and a Protective Environment are applied are 
discussed. See Tables 4 and 5 for summaries of the key elements of these sets of 
precautions  
III.A. Standard Precautions Standard Precautions combine the major features of 
Universal Precautions (UP) 780, 896 and Body Substance Isolation (BSI) 640 and are based 
on the principle that all blood, body fluids, secretions, excretions except sweat, nonintact 
skin, and mucous membranes may contain transmissible infectious agents. Standard 
Precautions include a group of infection prevention practices that apply to all patients, 
regardless of suspected or confirmed infection status, in any setting in which healthcare 
is delivered (Table 4). These include: hand hygiene; use of gloves, gown, mask, eye 
protection, or face shield, depending on the anticipated exposure; and safe injection 
practices. Also, equipment or items in the patient environment likely to have been 
contaminated with infectious body fluids must be handled in a manner to prevent 
transmission of infectious agents (e.g., wear gloves for direct contact, contain heavily 
soiled equipment, properly clean and disinfect or sterilize reusable equipment before use 
on another patient).  
The application of Standard Precautions during patient care is determined by the nature 
of the HCW-patient interaction and the extent of anticipated blood, body fluid, or 
pathogen exposure. For some interactions (e.g., performing venipuncture), only gloves 
may be needed; during other interactions (e.g., intubation), use of gloves, gown, and face 
shield or mask and goggles is necessary. Education and training on the principles and 
rationale for recommended practices are critical elements of Standard Precautions 
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because they facilitate appropriate decision-making and promote adherence when HCWs 
are faced with new circumstances 655, 681-686. An example of the importance of the use of 
Standard Precautions is intubation, especially under emergency circumstances when 
infectious agents may not be suspected, but later are identified (e.g., SARS-CoV, N. 
meningitides). The application of Standard Precautions is described below and 
summarized in Table 4. Guidance on donning and removing gloves, gowns and other 
PPE is presented in the Figure. 
Standard Precautions are also intended to protect patients by ensuring that healthcare 
personnel do not carry infectious agents to patients on their hands or via equipment 
used during patient care.  
III.A.1. New elements of standard precautions. Infection control problems that are 
identified in the course of outbreak investigations often indicate the need for new 
recommendations or reinforcement of existing infection control recommendations to 
protect patients. Because such recommendations are considered a standard of care 
and may not be included in other guidelines, they are added here to Standard 
Precautions. Three such areas of practice that have been added are: Respiratory 
Hygiene/Cough Etiquette, safe injection practices, and use of masks for insertion of 
catheters or injection of material into spinal or epidural spaces via lumbar puncture 
procedures (e.g., myelogram, spinal or epidural anesthesia). While most elements of 
Standard Precautions evolved from Universal Precautions that were developed for 
protection of healthcare personnel, these new elements of Standard Precautions focus 
on protection of patients. 
III.A.1.a. Respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette. The transmission of SARS-CoV in 
emergency departments by patients and their family members during the widespread 
SARS outbreaks in 2003 highlighted the need for vigilance and prompt implementation 
of infection control measures at the first point of encounter within a healthcare setting 
(e.g., reception and triage areas in emergency departments, outpatient clinics, and 
physician offices) 21, 254, 897. The strategy proposed has been termed Respiratory 
Hygiene/Cough Etiquette 9, 828 and is intended to be incorporated into infection control 
practices as a new component of Standard Precautions. The strategy is targeted at 
patients and accompanying family members and friends with undiagnosed transmissible 
respiratory infections, and applies to any person with signs of illness including cough, 
congestion, rhinorrhea, or increased production of respiratory secretions when entering 
a healthcare facility 40, 41, 43. The term cough etiquette is derived from recommended 
source control measures for M. tuberculosis 12, 126. 
The elements of Respiratory Hygiene/Cough Etiquette include  
1. education of healthcare facility staff, patients, and visitors;  
2. posted signs, in language(s) appropriate to the population served, with instructions 
to patients and accompanying family members or friends;  
3. source control measures (e.g., covering the mouth/nose with a tissue when 
coughing and prompt disposal of used tissues, using surgical masks on the 
coughing person when tolerated and appropriate);  
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4. hand hygiene after contact with respiratory secretions; and  
5. spatial separation, ideally >3 feet, of persons with respiratory infections in common 
waiting areas when possible.  
Covering sneezes and coughs and placing masks on coughing patients are proven means 
of source containment that prevent infected persons from dispersing respiratory 
secretions into the air 107, 145, 898, 899. Masking may be difficult in some settings, (e.g., 
pediatrics, in which case, the emphasis by necessity may be on cough etiquette 900. 
Physical proximity of <3 feet has been associated with an increased risk for transmission 
of infections via the droplet route (e.g., N. meningitidis 103 and group A streptococcus 114 
and therefore supports the practice of distancing infected persons from others who are not 
infected. The effectiveness of good hygiene practices, especially hand hygiene, in 
preventing transmission of viruses and reducing the incidence of respiratory infections 
both within and outside 901-903 healthcare settings is summarized in several reviews 559, 717, 
904.  
These measures should be effective in decreasing the risk of transmission of pathogens 
contained in large respiratory droplets (e.g., influenza virus 23, adenovirus 111, B. pertussis 
827 and Mycoplasma pneumoniae 112. Although fever will be present in many respiratory 
infections, patients with pertussis and mild upper respiratory tract infections are often 
afebrile. Therefore, the absence of fever does not always exclude a respiratory infection. 
Patients who have asthma, allergic rhinitis, or chronic obstructive lung disease also may 
be coughing and sneezing. While these patients often are not infectious, cough etiquette 
measures are prudent. 
Healthcare personnel are advised to observe Droplet Precautions (i.e., wear a mask) and 
hand hygiene when examining and caring for patients with signs and symptoms of a 
respiratory infection. Healthcare personnel who have a respiratory infection are advised to 
avoid direct patient contact, especially with high risk patients. If this is not possible, then a 
mask should be worn while providing patient care. 
III.A.1.b. Safe injection practices. The investigation of four large outbreaks of HBV and 
HCV among patients in ambulatory care facilities in the United States identified a need to 
define and reinforce safe injection practices 453. The four outbreaks occurred in a private 
medical practice, a pain clinic, an endoscopy clinic, and a hematology/oncology clinic. The 
primary breaches in infection control practice that contributed to these outbreaks were  
1. reinsertion of used needles into a multiple-dose vial or solution container (e.g., saline 
bag) and  
2. use of a single needle/syringe to administer intravenous medication to multiple 
patients.  
In one of these outbreaks, preparation of medications in the same workspace where 
used needle/syringes were dismantled also may have been a contributing factor. These 
and other outbreaks of viral hepatitis could have been prevented by adherence to basic 
principles of aseptic technique for the preparation and administration of parenteral 
medications 453, 454. These include the use of a sterile, single-use, disposable needle and 
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syringe for each injection given and prevention of contamination of injection equipment 
and medication. Whenever possible, use of single-dose vials is preferred over multiple-
dose vials, especially when medications will be administered to multiple patients.  
Outbreaks related to unsafe injection practices indicate that some healthcare personnel are 
unaware of, do not understand, or do not adhere to basic principles of infection control and 
aseptic technique. A survey of US healthcare workers who provide medication through 
injection found that 1% to 3% reused the same needle and/or syringe on multiple patients 
905. Among the deficiencies identified in recent outbreaks were a lack of oversight of 
personnel and failure to follow-up on reported breaches in infection control practices in 
ambulatory settings. Therefore, to ensure that all healthcare workers understand and adhere 
to recommended practices, principles of infection control and aseptic technique need to be 
reinforced in training programs and incorporated into institutional polices that are monitored 
for adherence 454. 
III.A.1.c. Infection Control Practices for Special Lumbar Puncture Procedures. In 
2004, CDC investigated eight cases of post-myelography meningitis that either were 
reported to CDC or identified through a survey of the Emerging Infections Network of the 
Infectious Disease Society of America. Blood and/or cerebrospinal fluid of all eight cases 
yielded streptococcal species consistent with oropharyngeal flora and there were changes 
in the CSF indices and clinical status indicative of bacterial meningitis. Equipment and 
products used during these procedures (e.g., contrast media) were excluded as probable 
sources of contamination. Procedural details available for seven cases determined that 
antiseptic skin preparations and sterile gloves had been used. However, none of the 
clinicians wore a face mask, giving rise to the speculation that droplet transmission of 
oralpharyngeal flora was the most likely explanation for these infections. Bacterial 
meningitis following myelogram and other spinal procedures (e.g., lumbar puncture, spinal 
and epidural anesthesia, intrathecal chemotherapy) has been reported previously 906-915. 
As a result, the question of whether face masks should be worn to prevent droplet spread 
of oral flora during spinal procedures (e.g., myelogram, lumbar puncture, spinal 
anesthesia) has been debated 916, 917. Face masks are effective in limiting the dispersal of 
oropharyngeal droplets 918 and are recommended for the placement of central venous 
catheters 919. In October 2005, the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory 
Committee (HICPAC) reviewed the evidence and concluded that there is sufficient 
experience to warrant the additional protection of a face mask for the individual placing a 
catheter or injecting material into the spinal or epidural space. 
III.B. Transmission-Based Precautions There are three categories of Transmission-
Based Precautions: Contact Precautions, Droplet Precautions, and Airborne Precautions. 
Transmission-Based Precautions are used when the route(s) of transmission is (are) not 
completely interrupted using Standard Precautions alone. For some diseases that have 
multiple routes of transmission (e.g., SARS), more than one Transmission-Based 
Precautions category may be used. When used either singly or in combination, they are 
always used in addition to Standard Precautions. See Appendix A for recommended 
precautions for specific infections. When Transmission-Based Precautions are indicated, 
efforts must be made to counteract possible adverse effects on patients (i.e., anxiety, 
depression and other mood disturbances 920-922, perceptions of stigma 923, reduced 
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contact with clinical staff 924-926, and increases in preventable adverse events 565 in order 
to improve acceptance by the patients and adherence by HCWs. 
III.B.1. Contact precautions. Contact Precautions are intended to prevent transmission 
of infectious agents, including epidemiologically important microorganisms, which are 
spread by direct or indirect contact with the patient or the patient’s environment as 
described in I.B.3.a. The specific agents and circumstance for which Contact 
Precautions are indicated are found in Appendix A. The application of Contact 
Precautions for patients infected or colonized with MDROs is described in the 2006 
HICPAC/CDC MDRO guideline 927. Contact Precautions also apply where the presence 
of excessive wound drainage, fecal incontinence, or other discharges from the body 
suggest an increased potential for extensive environmental contamination and risk of 
transmission. A single-patient room is preferred for patients who require Contact 
Precautions. When a single-patient room is not available, consultation with infection 
control personnel is recommended to assess the various risks associated with other 
patient placement options (e.g., cohorting, keeping the patient with an existing 
roommate). In multi-patient rooms, ≥3 feet spatial separation between beds is advised 
to reduce the opportunities for inadvertent sharing of items between the 
infected/colonized patient and other patients. Healthcare personnel caring for patients 
on Contact Precautions wear a gown and gloves for all interactions that may involve 
contact with the patient or potentially contaminated areas in the patient’s environment. 
Donning PPE upon room entry and discarding before exiting the patient room is done to 
contain pathogens, especially those that have been implicated in transmission through 
environmental contamination (e.g., VRE, C. difficile, noroviruses and other intestinal 
tract pathogens; RSV) 54, 72, 73, 78, 274, 275, 740.  
III.B.2. Droplet precautions. Droplet Precautions are intended to prevent transmission 
of pathogens spread through close respiratory or mucous membrane contact with 
respiratory secretions as described in I.B.3.b. Because these pathogens do not remain 
infectious over long distances in a healthcare facility, special air handling and ventilation 
are not required to prevent droplet transmission. Infectious agents for which Droplet 
Precautions are indicated are found in Appendix A and include B. pertussis, influenza 
virus, adenovirus, rhinovirus, N. meningitides, and group A streptococcus (for the first 
24 hours of antimicrobial therapy). A single patient room is preferred for patients who 
require Droplet Precautions. When a single-patient room is not available, consultation 
with infection control personnel is recommended to assess the various risks associated 
with other patient placement options (e.g., cohorting, keeping the patient with an 
existing roommate). Spatial separation of ≥3 feet and drawing the curtain between 
patient beds is especially important for patients in multi-bed rooms with infections 
transmitted by the droplet route. Healthcare personnel wear a mask (a respirator is not 
necessary) for close contact with infectious patient; the mask is generally donned upon 
room entry. Patients on Droplet Precautions who must be transported outside of the 
room should wear a mask if tolerated and follow Respiratory Hygiene/Cough Etiquette. 
III.B.3. Airborne precautions. Airborne Precautions prevent transmission of infectious 
agents that remain infectious over long distances when suspended in the air (e.g., 
rubeola virus [measles], varicella virus [chickenpox], M. tuberculosis, and possibly 
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SARS-CoV) as described in I.B.3.c and Appendix A. The preferred placement for 
patients who require Airborne Precautions is in an airborne infection isolation room 
(AIIR). An AIIR is a single-patient room that is equipped with special air handling and 
ventilation capacity that meet the American Institute of Architects/Facility Guidelines 
Institute (AIA/FGI) standards for AIIRs (i.e., monitored negative pressure relative to the 
surrounding area, 12 air exchanges per hour for new construction and renovation and 6 
air exchanges per hour for existing facilities, air exhausted directly to the outside or 
recirculated through HEPA filtration before return) 12, 13. Some states require the 
availability of such rooms in hospitals, emergency departments, and nursing homes that 
care for patients with M. tuberculosis. A respiratory protection program that includes 
education about use of respirators, fit-testing, and user seal checks is required in any 
facility with AIIRs. In settings where Airborne Precautions cannot be implemented due 
to limited engineering resources (e.g., physician offices), masking the patient, placing 
the patient in a private room (e.g., office examination room) with the door closed, and 
providing N95 or higher level respirators or masks if respirators are not available for 
healthcare personnel will reduce the likelihood of airborne transmission until the patient 
is either transferred to a facility with an AIIR or returned to the home environment, as 
deemed medically appropriate. Healthcare personnel caring for patients on Airborne 
Precautions wear a mask or respirator, depending on the disease-specific 
recommendations (Respiratory Protection II.E.4, Table 2, and Appendix A), that is 
donned prior to room entry. Whenever possible, non-immune HCWs should not care for 
patients with vaccine-preventable airborne diseases (e.g., measles, chickenpox, and 
smallpox). 
III.C. Syndromic and Empiric Applications of Transmission-Based Precautions 
Diagnosis of many infections requires laboratory confirmation. Since laboratory tests, 
especially those that depend on culture techniques, often require two or more days for 
completion, Transmission-Based Precautions must be implemented while test results 
are pending based on the clinical presentation and likely pathogens. Use of appropriate 
Transmission-Based Precautions at the time a patient develops symptoms or signs of 
transmissible infection, or arrives at a healthcare facility for care, reduces transmission 
opportunities. While it is not possible to identify prospectively all patients needing 
Transmission-Based Precautions, certain clinical syndromes and conditions carry a 
sufficiently high risk to warrant their use empirically while confirmatory tests are pending 
(Table 2). Infection control professionals are encouraged to modify or adapt this table 
according to local conditions. 
III.D. Discontinuation of Transmission-Based Precautions Transmission-Based 
Precautions remain in effect for limited periods of time (i.e., while the risk for transmission 
of the infectious agent persists or for the duration of the illness (Appendix A). For most 
infectious diseases, this duration reflects known patterns of persistence and shedding of 
infectious agents associated with the natural history of the infectious process and its 
treatment. For some diseases (e.g., pharyngeal or cutaneous diphtheria, RSV), 
Transmission-Based Precautions remain in effect until culture or antigen-detection test 
results document eradication of the pathogen and, for RSV, symptomatic disease is 
resolved. For other diseases, (e.g., M. tuberculosis) state laws and regulations, and 
healthcare facility policies, may dictate the duration of precautions12). In 
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immunocompromised patients, viral shedding can persist for prolonged periods of time 
(many weeks to months) and transmission to others may occur during that time; 
therefore, the duration of contact and/or droplet precautions may be prolonged for many 
weeks 500, 928-933. 
The duration of Contact Precautions for patients who are colonized or infected with 
MDROs remains undefined. MRSA is the only MDRO for which effective decolonization 
regimens are available 867. However, carriers of MRSA who have negative nasal cultures 
after a course of systemic or topical therapy may resume shedding MRSA in the weeks 
that follow therapy 934, 935. Although early guidelines for VRE suggested discontinuation of 
Contact Precautions after three stool cultures obtained at weekly intervals proved 
negative 740, subsequent experiences have indicated that such screening may fail to 
detect colonization that can persist for >1 year 27, 936-938. Likewise, available data indicate 
that colonization with VRE, MRSA 939, and possibly MDR-GNB, can persist for many 
months, especially in the presence of severe underlying disease, invasive devices, and 
recurrent courses of antimicrobial agents. 
It may be prudent to assume that MDRO carriers are colonized permanently and manage 
them accordingly. Alternatively, an interval free of hospitalizations, antimicrobial therapy, 
and invasive devices (e.g., 6 or 12 months) before reculturing patients to document 
clearance of carriage may be used. Determination of the best strategy awaits the results 
of additional studies. See the 2006 HICPAC/CDC MDRO guideline 927 for discussion of 
possible criteria to discontinue Contact Precautions for patients colonized or infected with 
MDROs. 
III.E. Application of Transmission-Based Precautions in Ambulatory and Home 
Care Settings Although Transmission-Based Precautions generally apply in all 
healthcare settings, exceptions exist. For example, in home care, AIIRs are not available. 
Furthermore, family members already exposed to diseases such as varicella and 
tuberculosis would not use masks or respiratory protection, but visiting HCWs would need 
to use such protection. Similarly, management of patients colonized or infected with 
MDROs may necessitate Contact Precautions in acute care hospitals and in some LTCFs 
when there is continued transmission, but the risk of transmission in ambulatory care and 
home care, has not been defined. Consistent use of Standard Precautions may suffice in 
these settings, but more information is needed. 
III.F. Protective EnvironmentA Protective Environment is designed for allogeneic HSCT 
patients to minimize fungal spore counts in the air and reduce the risk of invasive 
environmental fungal infections (see Table 5 for specifications) 11, 13-15. The need for such 
controls has been demonstrated in studies of aspergillus outbreaks associated with 
construction 11, 14, 15, 157, 158. As defined by the American Insitute of Architecture 13 and 
presented in detail in the Guideline for Environmental Infection Control 2003 11, 861, air 
quality for HSCT patients is improved through a combination of environmental controls 
that include  
1. HEPA filtration of incoming air;  
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2. directed room air flow;  
3. positive room air pressure relative to the corridor;  
4. well-sealed rooms (including sealed walls, floors, ceilings, windows, electrical outlets) 
to prevent flow of air from the outside;  
5. ventilation to provide >12 air changes per hour;  
6. strategies to minimize dust (e.g., scrubbable surfaces rather than upholstery 940 and 
carpet 941, and routinely cleaning crevices and sprinkler heads); and  
7. prohibiting dried and fresh flowers and potted plants in the rooms of HSCT patients.  
The latter is based on molecular typing studies that have found indistinguishable strains 
of Aspergillus terreus in patients with hematologic malignancies and in potted plants in 
the vicinity of the patients 942-944. The desired quality of air may be achieved without 
incurring the inconvenience or expense of laminar airflow 15, 157. To prevent inhalation of 
fungal spores during periods when construction, renovation, or other dust-generating 
activities that may be ongoing in and around the health-care facility, it has been advised 
that severely immunocompromised patients wear a high-efficiency respiratory-protection 
device (e.g., an N95 respirator) when they leave the Protective Environment 11, 14, 945). 
The use of masks or respirators by HSCT patients when they are outside of the 
Protective Environment for prevention of environmental fungal infections in the absence 
of construction has not been evaluated. A Protective Environment does not include the 
use of barrier precautions beyond those indicated for Standard and Transmission-Based 
Precautions. No published reports support the benefit of placing solid organ transplants or 
other immunocompromised patients in a Protective Environment. 
Guideline for Isolation Precautions: Preventing Transmission of Infectious Agents in Healthcare Settings (2007) 
Last update: Feburary 15, 2017  Page 71 of 209 
 
Part IV:  
Recommendations 
These recommendations are designed to prevent transmission of infectious agents 
among patients and healthcare personnel in all settings where healthcare is delivered. 
As in other CDC/HICPAC guidelines, each recommendation is categorized on the basis 
of existing scientific data, theoretical rationale, applicability, and when possible, 
economic impact. The CDC/HICPAC system for categorizing recommendations is as 
follows: 
Category IA Strongly recommended for implementation and strongly supported by well-
designed experimental, clinical, or epidemiologic studies. 
Category IB Strongly recommended for implementation and supported by some 
experimental, clinical, or epidemiologic studies and a strong theoretical rationale. 
Category IC Required for implementation, as mandated by federal and/or state 
regulation or standard. 
Category II Suggested for implementation and supported by suggestive clinical or 
epidemiologic studies or a theoretical rationale. 
No recommendation; unresolved issue. Practices for which insufficient evidence or no 
consensus regarding efficacy exists. 
I. Administrative Responsibilities 
Healthcare organization administrators should ensure the implementation of 
recommendations in this section. 
I.A. Incorporate preventing transmission of infectious agents into the objectives of the 
organization’s patient and occupational safety programs 543-546, 561, 620, 626, 946. 
Category IB/IC 
I.B. Make preventing transmission of infectious agents a priority for the healthcare 
organization. Provide administrative support, including fiscal and human 
resources for maintaining infection control programs 434, 548, 549, 559, 561, 566, 662 552, 
562-564, 946. Category IB/IC 
I.B.1. Assure that individuals with training in infection control are employed by or are 
available by contract to all healthcare facilities so that the infection control 
program is managed by one or more qualified individuals 552, 566 316, 575, 947 573, 
576, 946. Category IB/IC 
I.B.1.a. Determine the specific infection control full-time equivalents (FTEs) 
according to the scope of the infection control program, the 
complexity of the healthcare facility or system, the characteristics of 
the patient population, the unique or urgent needs of the facility and 
community, and proposed staffing levels based on survey results 
and recommendations from professional organizations 434, 549 552, 566 
316, 569, 573, 575 948 949. Category IB 
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I.B.2. Include prevention of healthcare-associated infections (HAI) as one determinant 
of bedside nurse staffing levels and composition, especially in high-risk units 
585-589 590 592 593 551, 594, 595 418, 596, 597 583. Category IB 
I.B.3. Delegate authority to infection control personnel or their designees (e.g., patient 
care unit charge nurses) for making infection control decisions concerning 
patient placement and assignment of Transmission-Based Precautions 549 
434, 857, 946. Category IC 
I.B.4. Involve infection control personnel in decisions on facility construction and 
design, determination of AIIR and Protective Environment capacity needs 
and environmental assessments 11, 13, 950 951 12. Category IB/IC 
I.B.4.a. Provide ventilation systems required for a sufficient number of 
AIIRs (as determined by a risk assessment) and Protective 
Environments in healthcare facilities that provide care to patients 
for whom such rooms are indicated, according to published 
recommendations 11-13, 15. Category IB/IC 
I.B.5. Involve infection control personnel in the selection and post-implementation 
evaluation of medical equipment and supplies and changes in practice that 
could affect the risk of HAI 952, 953. Category IC 
I.B.6. Ensure availability of human and fiscal resources to provide clinical 
microbiology laboratory support, including a sufficient number of medical 
technologists trained in microbiology, appropriate to the healthcare setting, 
for monitoring transmission of microorganisms, planning and conducting 
epidemiologic investigations, and detecting emerging pathogens. Identify 
resources for performing surveillance cultures, rapid diagnostic testing for 
viral and other selected pathogens, preparation of antimicrobial susceptibility 
summary reports, trend analysis, and molecular typing of clustered isolates 
(performed either on-site or in a reference laboratory) and use these 
resources according to facility-specific epidemiologic needs, in consultation 
with clinical microbiologists 553, 609, 610, 612, 617, 954 614 603, 615, 616 605 599 554 598, 606, 
607. Category IB 
I.B.7. Provide human and fiscal resources to meet occupational health needs related 
to infection control (e.g., healthcare personnel immunization, post-exposure 
evaluation and care, evaluation and management of healthcare personnel 
with communicable infections 739 12 17, 879-881, 955 134 690. Category IB/IC 
I.B.8. In all areas where healthcare is delivered, provide supplies and equipment 
necessary for the consistent observance of Standard Precautions, including 
hand hygiene products and personal protective equipment (e.g., gloves, 
gowns, face and eye protection) 739 559 946. Category IB/IC 
I.B.9. Develop and implement policies and procedures to ensure that reusable patient 
care equipment is cleaned and reprocessed appropriately before use on 
another patient 11, 956 957, 958 959 836 87 11, 960 961. Category IA/IC 
I.C. Develop and implement processes to ensure oversight of infection control 
activities appropriate to the healthcare setting and assign responsibility for 
oversight of infection control activities to an individual or group within the 
healthcare organization that is knowledgeable about infection control 434, 549, 566. 
Category II 
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I.D. Develop and implement systems for early detection and management (e.g., use 
of appropriate infection control measures, including isolation precautions, PPE) 
of potentially infectious persons at initial points of patient encounter in outpatient 
settings (e.g., triage areas, emergency departments, outpatient clinics, physician 
offices) and at the time of admission to hospitals and long-term care facilities 
(LTCF) 9, 122, 134, 253, 827. Category IB 
I.E. Develop and implement policies and procedures to limit patient visitation by persons 
with signs or symptoms of a communicable infection. Screen visitors to high-risk 
patient care areas (e.g., oncology units, hematopoietic stem cell transplant [HSCT] 
units, intensive care units, other severely immunocompromised patients) for 
possible infection 43 24, 41, 962, 963.Category IB 
I.F. Identify performance indicators of the effectiveness of organization-specific 
measures to prevent transmission of infectious agents (Standard and 
Transmission-Based Precautions), establish processes to monitor adherence to 
those performance measures and provide feedback to staff members 704 739 705 
708 666, 964 667 668 555. Category IB 
II. Education and Training 
II.A. Provide job- or task-specific education and training on preventing transmission of 
infectious agents associated with healthcare during orientation to the healthcare 
facility; update information periodically during ongoing education programs. 
Target all healthcare personnel for education and training, including but not 
limited to medical, nursing, clinical technicians, laboratory staff; property service 
(housekeeping), laundry, maintenance and dietary workers; students, contract 
staff and volunteers. Document competency initially and repeatedly, as 
appropriate, for the specific staff positions. Develop a system to ensure that 
healthcare personnel employed by outside agencies meet these education and 
training requirements through programs offered by the agencies or by 
participation in the healthcare facility’s program designed for full-time personnel 
126, 559, 561, 562, 655, 681-684, 686, 688, 689, 702, 893, 919, 965. Category IB 
II.A.1. Include in education and training programs, information concerning use of 
vaccines as an adjunctive infection control measure 17, 611, 690, 874. Category 
IB 
II.A.2. Enhance education and training by applying principles of adult learning, 
using reading level and language appropriate material for the target 
audience, and using online educational tools available to the institution 658, 
694, 695, 697, 698, 700, 966. Category IB 
II.B. Provide instructional materials for patients and visitors on recommended hand 
hygiene and Respiratory Hygiene/Cough Etiquette practices and the application 
of Transmission-Based Precautions 9, 709, 710, 963. Category II 
III. Surveillance 
III.A. Monitor the incidence of epidemiologically-important organisms and targeted 
HAIs that have substantial impact on outcome and for which effective preventive 
interventions are available; use information collected through surveillance of 
high-risk populations, procedures, devices and highly transmissible infectious 
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agents to detect transmission of infectious agents in the healthcare facility 566, 671, 
672, 675, 687, 919, 967, 968 673 969 970. Category IA 
III.B. Apply the following epidemiologic principles of infection surveillance 671, 967 673 969 
663 664. Category IB  
 Use standardized definitions of infection 
 Use laboratory-based data (when available) 
 Collect epidemiologically-important variables (e.g., patient locations and/or 
clinical service in hospitals and other large multi-unit facilities, population-
specific risk factors [e.g., low birth-weight neonates], underlying conditions 
that predispose to serious adverse outcomes) 
 Analyze data to identify trends that may indicated increased rates of 
transmission 
 Feedback information on trends in the incidence and prevalence of HAIs, 
probable risk factors, and prevention strategies and their impact to the 
appropriate healthcare providers, organization administrators, and as required 
by local and state health authorities 
III.C. Develop and implement strategies to reduce risks for transmission and evaluate 
effectiveness 566, 673, 684, 970 963 971. Category IB 
III.D. When transmission of epidemiologically-important organisms continues despite 
implementation and documented adherence to infection prevention and control 
strategies, obtain consultation from persons knowledgeable in infection control 
and healthcare epidemiology to review the situation and recommend additional 
measures for control 566 247 687. Category IB 
III.E. Review periodically information on community or regional trends in the incidence 
and prevalence of epidemiologically-important organisms (e.g., influenza, RSV, 
pertussis, invasive group A streptococcal disease, MRSA, VRE) (including in 
other healthcare facilities) that may impact transmission of organisms within the 
facility 398, 687, 972, 973 974. Category II 
IV. Standard Precautions 
Assume that every person is potentially infected or colonized with an organism that 
could be transmitted in the healthcare setting and apply the following infection control 
practices during the delivery of health care. 
IV.A. Hand Hygiene 
IV.A.1. During the delivery of healthcare, avoid unnecessary touching of surfaces in 
close proximity to the patient to prevent both contamination of clean hands 
from environmental surfaces and transmission of pathogens from 
contaminated hands to surfaces72, 73 739, 800, 975{CDC, 2001 #970. Category IB/IC 
IV.A.2. When hands are visibly dirty, contaminated with proteinaceous material, or 
visibly soiled with blood or body fluids, wash hands with either a 
nonantimicrobial soap and water or an antimicrobial soap and water 559. 
Category IA 
IV.A.3. If hands are not visibly soiled, or after removing visible material with 
nonantimicrobial soap and water, decontaminate hands in the clinical 
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situations described in IV.A.3.a-f. The preferred method of hand 
decontamination is with an alcohol-based hand rub562, 978. Alternatively, 
hands may be washed with an antimicrobial soap and water. Frequent use of 
alcohol-based hand rub immediately following handwashing with 
nonantimicrobial soap may increase the frequency of dermatitis559. Category 
IB 
 Edits [February 2017]: An § indicates text that was edited for clarity. 
The edit does not constitute change to the intent of the 
recommendations. 
Perform hand hygiene § in the following clinical situations: 
IV.A.3.a. Before having direct contact with patients 664, 979. Category IB 
IV.A.3.b. After contact with blood, body fluids or excretions, mucous 
membranes, nonintact skin, or wound dressings 664. Category IA 
IV.A.3.c. After contact with a patient’s intact skin (e.g., when taking a pulse 
or blood pressure or lifting a patient) 167, 976, 979, 980. Category IB 
IV.A.3.d. If hands will be moving from a contaminated-body site to a clean-
body site during patient care. Category II 
IV.A.3.e. After contact with inanimate objects (including medical equipment) 
in the immediate vicinity of the patient 72, 73, 88, 800, 981 982. Category II 
IV.A.3.f. After removing gloves 728, 741, 742. Category IB 
IV.A.4. Wash hands with non-antimicrobial soap and water or with antimicrobial 
soap and water if contact with spores (e.g., C. difficile or Bacillus anthracis) 
is likely to have occurred. The physical action of washing and rinsing hands 
under such circumstances is recommended because alcohols, chlorhexidine, 
iodophors, and other antiseptic agents have poor activity against spores 559, 
956, 983. Category II 
IV.A.5. Do not wear artificial fingernails or extenders if duties include direct contact 
with patients at high risk for infection and associated adverse outcomes 
(e.g., those in ICUs or operating rooms) 30, 31, 559, 722-724. Category IA 
IV.A.5.a. Develop an organizational policy on the wearing of non-natural 
nails by healthcare personnel who have direct contact with patients 
outside of the groups specified above 984. Category II 
IV.B. Personal protective equipment (PPE) (see Figure)  
IV.B.1. Observe the following principles of use: 
IV.B.1.a. Wear PPE, as described in IV.B.2-4,when the nature of the 
anticipated patient interaction indicates that contact with blood or 
body fluids may occur 739, 780, 896. Category IB/IC 
IV.B.1.b. Prevent contamination of clothing and skin during the process of 
removing PPE (see Figure). Category II 
IV.B.1.c. Before leaving the patient’s room or cubicle, remove and discard 
PPE 18, 739. Category IB/IC 
IV.B.2. Gloves 
IV.B.2.a. Wear gloves when it can be reasonably anticipated that contact 
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with blood or other potentially infectious materials, mucous 
membranes, nonintact skin, or potentially contaminated intact skin 
(e.g., of a patient incontinent of stool or urine) could occur 18, 728, 739, 
741, 780, 985. Category IB/IC 
IV.B.2.b. Wear gloves with fit and durability appropriate to the task 559, 731, 732, 
739, 986, 987. Category IB 
IV.B.2.b.i. Wear disposable medical examination gloves for 
providing direct patient care. 
IV.B.2.b.ii. Wear disposable medical examination gloves or 
reusable utility gloves for cleaning the environment or 
medical equipment. 
IV.B.2.c. Remove gloves after contact with a patient and/or the surrounding 
environment (including medical equipment) using proper technique 
to prevent hand contamination (see Figure). Do not wear the same 
pair of gloves for the care of more than one patient. Do not wash 
gloves for the purpose of reuse since this practice has been 
associated with transmission of pathogens 559, 728, 741-743, 988. 
Category IB 
IV.B.2.d. Change gloves during patient care if the hands will move from a 
contaminated body-site (e.g., perineal area) to a clean body-site 
(e.g., face). Category II 
IV.B.3. Gowns 
IV.B.3.a. Wear a gown, that is appropriate to the task, to protect skin and 
prevent soiling or contamination of clothing during procedures and 
patient-care activities when contact with blood, body fluids, 
secretions, or excretions is anticipated 739, 780, 896. Category IB/IC 
IV.B.3.a.i. Wear a gown for direct patient contact if the patient has 
uncontained secretions or excretions 24, 88, 89, 739, 744 
Category IB/IC 
IV.B.3.a.ii. Remove gown and perform hand hygiene before 
leaving the patient’s environment 24, 88, 89, 739, 744 
Category IB/IC 
IV.B.3.b. Do not reuse gowns, even for repeated contacts with the same 
patient. Category II 
IV.B.3.c. Routine donning of gowns upon entrance into a high risk unit (e.g., 
ICU, NICU, HSCT unit) is not indicated 365, 747-750. Category IB 
IV.B.4. Mouth, nose, eye protection 
IV.B.4.a. Use PPE to protect the mucous membranes of the eyes, nose and 
mouth during procedures and patient-care activities that are likely to 
generate splashes or sprays of blood, body fluids, secretions and 
excretions. Select masks, goggles, face shields, and combinations of 
each according to the need anticipated by the task performed 113, 739, 
780, 896. Category IB/IC 
IV.B.5. During aerosol-generating procedures (e.g., bronchoscopy, suctioning of the 
respiratory tract [if not using in-line suction catheters], endotracheal 
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intubation) in patients who are not suspected of being infected with an agent 
for which respiratory protection is otherwise recommended (e.g., M. 
tuberculosis, SARS or hemorrhagic fever viruses), wear one of the following: 
a face shield that fully covers the front and sides of the face, a mask with 
attached shield, or a mask and goggles (in addition to gloves and gown) 95, 96, 
113, 126 93 94, 134. Category IB 
 Ebola Virus Disease for Healthcare Workers [Updated 2014]:  
 Updated recommendations for healthcare workers can be found at  
 Ebola: U.S. Healthcare Workers and Settings  
 (https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/). 
IV.C. Respiratory Hygiene/Cough Etiquette 
IV.C.1. Educate healthcare personnel on the importance of source control measures 
to contain respiratory secretions to prevent droplet and fomite transmission 
of respiratory pathogens, especially during seasonal outbreaks of viral 
respiratory tract infections (e.g., influenza, RSV, adenovirus, parainfluenza 
virus) in communities 14, 24, 684 10, 262. Category IB 
IV.C.2. Implement the following measures to contain respiratory secretions in 
patients and accompanying individuals who have signs and symptoms of a 
respiratory infection, beginning at the point of initial encounter in a healthcare 
setting (e.g., triage, reception and waiting areas in emergency departments, 
outpatient clinics and physician offices) 20, 24, 145, 902, 989. 
IV.C.2.a. Post signs at entrances and in strategic places (e.g., elevators, 
cafeterias) within ambulatory and inpatient settings with instructions 
to patients and other persons with symptoms of a respiratory 
infection to cover their mouths/noses when coughing or sneezing, 
use and dispose of tissues, and perform hand hygiene after hands 
have been in contact with respiratory secretions. Category II 
IV.C.2.b. Provide tissues and no-touch receptacles (e.g.,foot-pedal-operated 
lid or open, plastic-lined waste basket) for disposal of tissues 20. 
Category II 
IV.C.2.c. Provide resources and instructions for performing hand hygiene in 
or near waiting areas in ambulatory and inpatient settings; provide 
conveniently-located dispensers of alcohol-based hand rubs and, 
where sinks are available, supplies for handwashing 559, 903. 
Category IB 
IV.C.2.d. During periods of increased prevalence of respiratory infections in 
the community (e.g., as indicated by increased school 
absenteeism, increased number of patients seeking care for a 
respiratory infection), offer masks to coughing patients and other 
symptomatic persons (e.g., persons who accompany ill patients) 
upon entry into the facility or medical office 126, 899 898 and 
encourage them to maintain special separation, ideally a distance 
of at least 3 feet, from others in common waiting areas 23, 103, 111, 114 
20, 134. Category IB 
IV.C.2.d.i. Some facilities may find it logistically easier to institute 
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this recommendation year-round as a standard of 
practice. Category II 
IV.D. Patient Placement 
IV.D.1. Include the potential for transmission of infectious agents in patient-
placement decisions. Place patients who pose a risk for transmission to 
others (e.g., uncontained secretions, excretions or wound drainage; infants 
with suspected viral respiratory or gastrointestinal infections) in a single-
patient room when available 24, 430, 435, 796, 797, 806, 990 410, 793. Category IB 
IV.D.2. Determine patient placement based on the following principles:  
 Route(s) of transmission of the known or suspected infectious agent 
 Risk factors for transmission in the infected patient 
 Risk factors for adverse outcomes resulting from an HAI in other patients 
in the area or room being considered for patient-placement 
 Availability of single-patient rooms 
 Patient options for room-sharing (e.g., cohorting patients with the same 
infection) Category II 
IV.E. Patient-care Equipment and Instruments/devices 956 
IV.E.1. Establish policies and procedures for containing, transporting, and handling 
patient-care equipment and instruments/devices that may be contaminated 
with blood or body fluids 18, 739, 975. Category IB/IC 
IV.E.2. Remove organic material from critical and semi-critical instrument/devices, 
using recommended cleaning agents before high level disinfection and 
sterilization to enable effective disinfection and sterilization processes 836 991, 
992. Category IA 
IV.E.3. Wear PPE (e.g., gloves, gown), according to the level of anticipated 
contamination, when handling patient-care equipment and 
instruments/devices that is visibly soiled or may have been in contact with 
blood or body fluids 18, 739, 975. Category IB/IC 
IV.F. Care of the Environment 11 
 Edit [February 2017]: An * indicates recommendations that were renumbered for 
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IV.F.1. Establish policies and procedures for routine and targeted cleaning of 
environmental surfaces as indicated by the level of patient contact and 
degree of soiling 11. Category II 
IV.F.2. Clean and disinfect surfaces that are likely to be contaminated with 
pathogens, including those that are in close proximity to the patient (e.g., bed 
rails, over bed tables) and frequently-touched surfaces in the patient care 
environment (e.g., door knobs, surfaces in and surrounding toilets in 
patients’ rooms) on a more frequent schedule compared to that for other 
surfaces (e.g., horizontal surfaces in waiting rooms) 11 73, 740, 746, 993, 994 72, 800, 
835 995. Category IB 
IV.F.3. Use EPA-registered disinfectants that have microbiocidal (i.e., killing) activity 
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against the pathogens most likely to contaminate the patient-care 
environment. Use in accordance with manufacturer’s instructions 842-844, 956, 
996. Category IB/IC 
IV.F.3.a. Review the efficacy of in-use disinfectants when evidence of 
continuing transmission of an infectious agent (e.g., rotavirus, C. 
difficile, norovirus) may indicate resistance to the in-use product 
and change to a more effective disinfectant as indicated 275, 842, 847. 
Category II 
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IV.F.4. In facilities that provide health care to pediatric patients or have waiting 
areas with child play toys (e.g., obstetric/gynecology offices and clinics), 
establish policies and procedures for cleaning and disinfecting toys at regular 
intervals 379 80. Category IB 
IV.F.4.a. * Use the following principles in developing this policy and 
procedures: Category II 
• Select play toys that can be easily cleaned and disinfected 
• Do not permit use of stuffed furry toys if they will be shared 
• Clean and disinfect large stationary toys (e.g., climbing 
quipment) at least weekly and whenever visibly soiled 
• If toys are likely to be mouthed, rinse with water after 
disinfection; alternatively wash in a dishwasher 
• When a toy requires cleaning and disinfection, do so 
immediately or store in a designated labeled container separate 
from toys that are clean and ready for use 
IV.F.5. Include multi-use electronic equipment in policies and procedures for 
preventing contamination and for cleaning and disinfection, especially those 
items that are used by patients, those used during delivery of patient care, 
and mobile devices that are moved in and out of patient rooms frequently 
(e.g., daily) 850 851, 852, 997. Category IB 
IV.F.5.a. No recommendation for use of removable protective covers or 
washable keyboards. Unresolved issue 
IV.G. Textiles and Laundry 
IV.G.1. Handle used textiles and fabrics with minimum agitation to avoid 
contamination of air, surfaces and persons 739, 998, 999. Category IB/IC 
IV.G.2. If laundry chutes are used, ensure that they are properly designed, 
maintained, and used in a manner to minimize dispersion of aerosols from 
contaminated laundry 11, 13, 1000, 1001. Category IB/IC 
IV.H. Safe Injection Practices  
The following recommendations apply to the use of needles, cannulas that replace 
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needles, and, where applicable, intravenous delivery systems 454 
IV.H.1. Use aseptic technique to avoid contamination of sterile injection equipment 
1002, 1003. Category IA 
IV.H.2. Do not administer medications from a syringe to multiple patients, even if the 
needle or cannula on the syringe is changed. Needles, cannulae and 
syringes are sterile, single-use items; they should not be reused for another 
patient nor to access a medication or solution that might be used for a 
subsequent patient 453, 919, 1004, 1005. Category IA 
IV.H.3. Use fluid infusion and administration sets (i.e., intravenous bags, tubing and 
connectors) for one patient only and dispose appropriately after use. 
Consider a syringe or needle/cannula contaminated once it has been used to 
enter or connect to a patient’s intravenous infusion bag or administration set 
453. Category IB 
IV.H.4. Use single-dose vials for parenteral medications whenever possible 453. 
Category IA 
IV.H.5. Do not administer medications from single-dose vials or ampules to multiple 
patients or combine leftover contents for later use 369 453, 1005. Category IA 
IV.H.6. If multidose vials must be used, both the needle or cannula and syringe used 
to access the multidose vial must be sterile 453, 1002. Category IA 
IV.H.7. Do not keep multidose vials in the immediate patient treatment area and 
store in accordance with the manufacturer’s recommendations; discard if 
sterility is compromised or questionable 453, 1003. Category IA 
IV.H.8. Do not use bags or bottles of intravenous solution as a common source of 
supply for multiple patients 453, 1006. Category IB 
IV.I. Infection control practices for special lumbar puncture procedures 
Wear a surgical mask when placing a catheter or injecting material into the spinal 
canal or subdural space (i.e., during myelograms, lumbar puncture and spinal or 
epidural anesthesia).906 907-909 910, 911 912-914, 918 1007 Category IB 
IV.J. Worker safety 
Adhere to federal and state requirements for protection of healthcare personnel 
from exposure to bloodborne pathogens 739. Category IC  
V. Transmission-Based Precautions 
V.A. General Principles 
V.A.1. In addition to Standard Precautions, use Transmission-Based Precautions 
for patients with documented or suspected infection or colonization with 
highly transmissible or epidemiologically-important pathogens for which 
additional precautions are needed to prevent transmission (see Appendix A) 
24, 93, 126, 141, 306, 806, 1008. Category IA 
V.A.2. Extend duration of Transmission-Based Precautions, (e.g., Droplet, Contact) 
for immunosuppressed patients with viral infections due to prolonged 
shedding of viral agents that may be transmitted to others 928, 931-933, 1009-1011. 
Category IA  
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V.B. Contact Precautions 
 
V.B.1. Use Contact Precautions as recommended in Appendix A for patients with 
known or suspected infections or evidence of syndromes that represent an 
increased risk for contact transmission. For specific recommendations for 
use of Contact Precautions for colonization or infection with MDROs, go to 
Management of Multidrug- Resistant Organisms in Healthcare Settings 2006 
(https://www.cdc.gov/infectioncontrol/guidelines/mdro/) 870. 
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V.B.2. Patient placement 
V.B.2.a. In acute care hospitals, place patients who require Contact 
Precautions in a single-patient room when available 24, 687, 793, 796, 797, 
806, 837, 893, 1012, 1013 Category IB 
When single-patient rooms are in short supply, apply the following 
principles for making decisions on patient placement: 
 * V.B.2.a.i. Prioritize patients with conditions that may facilitate 
transmission (e.g., uncontained drainage, stool incontinence) for 
single-patient room placement. Category II 
 * V.B.2.a.ii.Place together in the same room (cohort) patients 
who are infected or colonized with the same pathogen and are 
suitable roommates 29, 638, 808, 811-813, 815, 818, 819 Category IB 
If it becomes necessary to place a patient who requires Contact 
Precautions in a room with a patient who is not infected or colonized 
with the same infectious agent: 
 * V.B.2.a.iii. Avoid placing patients on Contact Precautions in 
the same room with patients who have conditions that may 
increase the risk of adverse outcome from infection or that may 
facilitate transmission (e.g., those who are 
immunocompromised, have open wounds, or have anticipated 
prolonged lengths of stay). Category II 
 * V.B.2.a.iv. Ensure that patients are physically separated (i.e., 
>3 feet apart) from each other. Draw the privacy curtain 
between beds to minimize opportunities for direct contact.) 
Category II 
 * V.B.2.a.v. Change protective attire and perform hand hygiene 
between contact with patients in the same room, regardless of 
whether one or both patients are on Contact Precautions 728, 741, 
742, 988, 1014, 1015. Category IB 
V.B.2.b. In long-term care and other residential settings, make decisions 
regarding patient placement on a case-by-case basis, balancing 
infection risks to other patients in the room, the presence of risk 
factors that increase the likelihood of transmission, and the 
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potential adverse psychological impact on the infected or colonized 
patient 920, 921. Category II 
V.B.2.c. In ambulatory settings, place patients who require Contact 
Precautions in an examination room or cubicle as soon as possible 
20. Category II 
V.B.3. Use of personal protective equipment 
V.B.3.a. Gloves 
Wear gloves whenever touching the patient’s intact skin 24, 89, 134, 559, 
746, 837 or surfaces and articles in close proximity to the patient (e.g., 
medical equipment, bed rails) 72, 73, 88, 837. Don gloves upon entry 
into the room or cubicle. Category IB  
V.B.3.b. Gowns 
V.B.3.b.i. Wear a gown whenever anticipating that clothing will 
have direct contact with the patient or potentially 
contaminated environmental surfaces or equipment in 
close proximity to the patient. Don gown upon entry into 
the room or cubicle. Remove gown and observe hand 
hygiene before leaving the patient-care environment 24, 88, 
134, 745, 837. Category IB 
V.B.3.b.ii. After gown removal, ensure that clothing and skin do not 
contact potentially contaminated environmental surfaces 
that could result in possible transfer of microorganism to 
other patients or environmental surfaces 72, 73. Category II 
V.B.4. Patient transport 
V.B.4.a. In acute care hospitals and long-term care and other residential 
settings, limit transport and movement of patients outside of the 
room to medically-necessary purposes. Category II 
V.B.4.b. When transport or movement in any healthcare setting is 
necessary, ensure that infected or colonized areas of the patient’s 
body are contained and covered. Category II 
V.B.4.c. Remove and dispose of contaminated PPE and perform hand 
hygiene prior to transporting patients on Contact Precautions. 
Category II 
V.B.4.d. Don clean PPE to handle the patient at the transport destination. 
Category II 
V.B.5. Patient-care equipment and instruments/devices 
V.B.5.a. Handle patient-care equipment and instruments/devices according 
to Standard Precautions 739, 836. Category IB/IC 
V.B.5.b. In acute care hospitals and long-term care and other residential 
settings, use disposable noncritical patient-care equipment (e.g., 
blood pressure cuffs) or implement patient-dedicated use of such 
equipment. If common use of equipment for multiple patients is 
unavoidable, clean and disinfect such equipment before use on 
another patient 24, 88, 796, 836, 837, 854, 1016. Category IB 
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V.B.5.c. In home care settings 
V.B.5.c.i. Limit the amount of non-disposable patient-care 
equipment brought into the home of patients on Contact 
Precautions. Whenever possible, leave patient-care 
equipment in the home until discharge from home care 
services. Category II 
V.B.5.c.ii. If noncritical patient-care equipment (e.g., stethoscope) 
cannot remain in the home, clean and disinfect items 
before taking them from the home using a low- to 
intermediate-level disinfectant. Alternatively, place 
contaminated reusable items in a plastic bag for 
transport and subsequent cleaning and disinfection. 
Category II 
V.B.5.d. In ambulatory settings, place contaminated reusable noncritical 
patient-care equipment in a plastic bag for transport to a soiled 
utility area for reprocessing. Category II 
V.B.6. Environmental measures 
Ensure that rooms of patients on Contact Precautions are prioritized for 
frequent cleaning and disinfection (e.g., at least daily) with a focus on 
frequently-touched surfaces (e.g., bed rails, overbed table, bedside 
commode, lavatory surfaces in patient bathrooms, doorknobs) and 
equipment in the immediate vicinity of the patient 11, 24, 88, 746, 837. Category IB 
V.B.7. Discontinue Contact Precautions after signs and symptoms of the infection 
have resolved or according to pathogen-specific recommendations in 
Appendix A. Category IB 
V.C. Droplet Precautions 
Use Droplet Precautions as recommended in Appendix A for patients known or suspected 
to be infected with pathogens transmitted by respiratory droplets (i.e., large-particle 
droplets >5µ in size) that are generated by a patient who is coughing, sneezing or talking 14, 
23, Steinberg, 1969 #1708, 41, 95, 103, 111, 112, 755, 756, 989, 1017. Category IB 
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V.C.1. Patient placement 
V.C.1.a. In acute care hospitals, place patients who require Droplet 
Precautions in a single-patient room when available Category II 
When single-patient rooms are in short supply, apply the following 
principles for making decisions on patient placement: 
 * V.C.2.a.i. Prioritize patients who have excessive cough and 
sputum production for single-patient room placement Category 
II 
 * V.C.2.a.ii. Place together in the same room (cohort) patients 
who are infected the same pathogen and are suitable 
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roommates 814 816. Category IB 
If it becomes necessary to place patients who require Droplet 
Precautions in a room with a patient who does not have the same 
infection: 
 * V.C.2.a.iii. Avoid placing patients on Droplet Precautions in the 
same room with patients who have conditions that may increase 
the risk of adverse outcome from infection or that may facilitate 
transmission (e.g., those who are immunocompromised, have or 
have anticipated prolonged lengths of stay). Category II 
 * V.C.2.a.iv. Ensure that patients are physically separated (i.e., 
>3 feet apart) from each other. Draw the privacy curtain 
between beds to minimize opportunities for close contact 103, 104 
410. Category IB 
 * V.C.2.a.v. Change protective attire and perform hand hygiene 
between contact with patients in the same room, regardless of 
whether one patient or both patients are on Droplet Precautions 
741-743, 988, 1014, 1015. Category IB 
V.C.1.b. In long-term care and other residential settings, make decisions 
regarding patient placement on a case-by-case basis after 
considering infection risks to other patients in the room and 
available alternatives 410. Category II 
V.C.1.c. In ambulatory settings, place patients who require Droplet 
Precautions in an examination room or cubicle as soon as possible. 
Instruct patients to follow recommendations for Respiratory 
Hygiene/Cough Etiquette 447, 448 9, 828. Category II 
V.C.2. Use of personal protective equipment 
V.C.2.a. Don a mask upon entry into the patient room or cubicle 14, 23, 41, 103, 
111, 113, 115, 827. Category IB 
V.C.2.b. No recommendation for routinely wearing eye protection (e.g., 
goggle or face shield), in addition to a mask, for close contact with 
patients who require Droplet Precautions. Unresolved issue 
V.C.2.c. For patients with suspected or proven SARS, avian influenza or 
pandemic influenza, refer to the following websites for the most 
recommendations ([This link is no longer active: 
www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars. Similar information may be found at 
CDC Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 
(https://www.cdc.gov/sars/index.html); CDC Information on Avian 
Influenza (https://www.cdc.gov/flu/avianflu/) Current version of this 
document may differ from original; Flu.gov Pandemic Awareness 
(https://www.cdc.gov/flu/) Current version of this document may 
differ from original. Accessed November 3, 2016]) 134, 1018, 1019  
V.C.3. Patient transport 
V.C.3.a. In acute care hospitals and long-term care and other residential 
settings, limit transport and movement of patients outside of the 
room to medically-necessary purposes. Category II 
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V.C.3.b. If transport or movement in any healthcare setting is necessary, 
instruct patient to wear a mask and follow CDC’s Respiratory 
Hygiene/Cough Etiquette in Healthcare Settings 
(https://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/infectioncontrol/resphygiene.
htm) [Current version of this document may differ from original.]. 
Category IB 
V.C.3.c. No mask is required for persons transporting patients on Droplet 
Precautions. Category II 
V.C.3.d. Discontinue Droplet Precautions after signs and symptoms have 
resolved or according to pathogen-specific recommendations in 
Appendix A. Category IB 
V.D. Airborne Precautions 
V.D.1. Use Airborne Precautions as recommended in Appendix A for patients 
known or suspected to be infected with infectious agents transmitted person-
to-person by the airborne route (e.g., M tuberculosis 12, measles 34, 122, 1020, 
chickenpox 123, 773, 1021, disseminated herpes zoster 1022. Category IA/IC 
V.D.2. Patient placement 
V.D.2.a. In acute care hospitals and long-term care settings, place patients 
who require Airborne Precautions in an AIIR that has been 
constructed in accordance with current guidelines 11-13. Category 
IA/IC 
V.D.2.a.i. Provide at least six (existing facility) or 12 (new 
construction/renovation) air changes per hour. 
V.D.2.a.ii. Direct exhaust of air to the outside. If it is not possible 
to exhaust air from an AIIR directly to the outside, the 
air may be returned to the air-handling system or 
adjacent spaces if all air is directed through HEPA 
filters. 
V.D.2.a.iii. Whenever an AIIR is in use for a patient on Airborne 
Precautions, monitor air pressure daily with visual 
indicators (e.g., smoke tubes, flutter strips), regardless 
of the presence of differential pressure sensing devices 
(e.g., manometers) 11, 12, 1023, 1024. 
V.D.2.a.iv. Keep the AIIR door closed when not required for entry 
and exit. 
V.D.2.b. When an AIIR is not available, transfer the patient to a facility that 
has an available AIIR 12. Category II 
V.D.2.c. In the event of an outbreak or exposure involving large numbers of 
patients who require Airborne Precautions: 
 Consult infection control professionals before patient 
placement to determine the safety of alternative room that do 
not meet engineering requirements for an AIIR. 
 Place together (cohort) patients who are presumed to have the 
same infection( based on clinical presentation and diagnosis 
Guideline for Isolation Precautions: Preventing Transmission of Infectious Agents in Healthcare Settings (2007) 
Last update: Feburary 15, 2017  Page 86 of 209 
 
when known) in areas of the facility that are away from other 
patients, especially patients who are at increased risk for 
infection (e.g., immunocompromised patients).  
 Use temporary portable solutions (e.g., exhaust fan) to create a 
negative pressure environment in the converted area of the 
facility. Discharge air directly to the outside,away from people 
and air intakes, or direct all the air through HEPA filters before 
it is introduced to other air spaces 12 Category II 
V.D.2.d. In ambulatory settings: 
V.D.2.d.i. Develop systems (e.g., triage, signage) to identify 
patients with known or suspected infections that require 
Airborne Precautions upon entry into ambulatory 
settings 9, 12, 34, 127, 134. Category IA  
V.D.2.d.ii. Place the patient in an AIIR as soon as possible. If an 
AIIR is not available, place a surgical mask on the 
patient and place him/her in an examination room. 
Once the patient leaves, the room should remain 
vacant for the appropriate time, generally one hour, to 
allow for a full exchange of air 11, 12, 122. Category IB/IC 
V.D.2.d.iii. Instruct patients with a known or suspected airborne 
infection to wear a surgical mask and observe 
Respiratory Hygiene/Cough Etiquette. Once in an AIIR, 
the mask may be removed; the mask should remain on 
if the patient is not in an AIIR 12, 107, 145, 899. Category 
IB/IC 
V.D.3. Personnel restrictions 
Restrict susceptible healthcare personnel from entering the rooms of patients 
known or suspected to have measles (rubeola), varicella (chickenpox), 
disseminated zoster, or smallpox if other immune healthcare personnel are 
available 17, 775. Category IB 
V.D.4. Use of PPE 
 
 Edit [February 2017]: These recommendations contain minor edits in order to 
clarify the meaning. The edits do not constitute any change to the intent of the 
recommendations. 
* Indicates a change to the numbering system. 
§ Indicates a text change. 
 
V.D.4.a. Wear a fit-tested NIOSH-approved N95 or higher level respirator for 
respiratory protection when entering the room or home of a patient 
when the following diseases are suspected or confirmed: 
 * V.D.4.a.i. Infectious pulmonary or laryngeal tuberculosis or 
when infectious tuberculosis skin lesions are present and 
procedures that would aerosolize viable organisms (e.g., 
irrigation, incision and drainage, whirlpool treatments) are 
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performed 12, 1025, 1026. Category IB 
 * V.D.4.a.ii. Smallpox (vaccinated and unvaccinated). 
Respiratory protection is recommended for all healthcare 
personnel, including those with a documented “take” after 
smallpox vaccination due to the risk of a genetically engineered 
virus against which the vaccine may not provide protection, or 
of exposure to a very large viral load (e.g., from high-risk 
aerosol-generating procedures, immunocompromised patients, 
hemorrhagic or flat smallpox 108, 129. Category II 
V.D.4.b. § Suspected measles, chickenpox or disseminated zoster. No 
recommendation is made regarding the use of PPE by healthcare 
personnel who are presumed to be immune to measles (rubeola) or 
varicella-zoster based on history of disease, vaccine, or serologic 
testing when caring for an individual with known or suspected 
measles, chickenpox or disseminated zoster, due to difficulties in 
establishing definite immunity 1027, 1028. Unresolved issue 
V.D.4.c. § Suspected measles, chickenpox or disseminated zoster. No 
recommendation is made regarding the type of personal protective 
equipment (i.e., surgical mask or respiratory protection with a N95 
or higher respirator) to be worn by susceptible healthcare personnel 
who must have contact with patients with known or suspected 
measles, chickenpox or disseminated herpes zoster. Unresolved 
issue 
V.D.5. Patient transport 
V.D.5.a. In acute care hospitals and long-term care and other residential 
settings, limit transport and movement of patients outside of the 
room to medically-necessary purposes. Category II 
V.D.5.b. If transport or movement outside an AIIR is necessary, instruct 
patients to wear a surgical mask, if possible, and observe 
Respiratory Hygiene/Cough Etiquette 12. Category II 
V.D.5.c. For patients with skin lesions associated with varicella or smallpox 
or draining skin lesions caused by M. tuberculosis, cover the 
affected areas to prevent aerosolization or contact with the 
infectious agent in skin lesions 108, 1025, 1026, 1029-1031. Category IB 
V.D.5.d. Healthcare personnel transporting patients who are on Airborne 
Precautions do not need to wear a mask or respirator during 
transport if the patient is wearing a mask and infectious skin lesions 
are covered. Category II 
V.D.6. Exposure management 
Immunize or provide the appropriate immune globulin to susceptible persons 
as soon as possible following unprotected contact (i.e., exposed) to a patient 
with measles, varicella or smallpox: Category IA 
 Administer measles vaccine to exposed susceptible persons within 72 
hours after the exposure or administer immune globulin within six days of 
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the exposure event for high-risk persons in whom vaccine is 
contraindicated 17, 1032-1035. 
 Administer varicella vaccine to exposed susceptible persons within 120 
hours after the exposure or administer varicella immune globulin (VZIG or 
alternative product), when available, within 96 hours for high-risk persons 
in whom vaccine is contraindicated (e.g., immunocompromised patients, 
pregnant women, newborns whose mother’s varicella onset was <5 days 
before or within 48 hours after delivery 888, 1035-1037). 
 Administer smallpox vaccine to exposed susceptible persons within 4 
days after exposure 108, 1038-1040. 
V.D.7. Discontinue Airborne Precautions according to pathogen-specific 
recommendations in Appendix A. Category IB 
V.D.8. Consult CDC’s “Guidelines for Preventing the Transmission of Mycobacterium 
tuberculosis in Health-Care Settings, 2005” 
(https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5417a1.htm) 12 and the 
“Guideline for Environmental Infection Control in Health-Care Facilities” 
(https://www.cdc.gov/infectioncontrol/guidelines/environmental/index.html)11 for 
additional guidance on environment strategies for preventing transmission of 
tuberculosis in healthcare settings. The environmental recommendations in 
these guidelines may be applied to patients with other infections that require 
Airborne Precautions. 
VI. Protective Environment (Table 4) 
VI.A. Place allogeneic hematopoietic stem cell transplant (HSCT) patients in a Protective 
Environment as described in the “Guideline to Prevent Opportunistic Infections in 
HSCT Patients” (https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr4910a1.htm) 15, 
the “Guideline for Environmental Infection Control in Health-Care Facilities” 
(https://www.cdc.gov/infectioncontrol/guidelines/environmental/index.html), 11 and 
the “Guidelines for Preventing Health-Care-Associated Pneumonia, 2003” 
(https://www.cdc.gov/infectioncontrol/guidelines/pneumonia/index.html) 14 to reduce 
exposure to environmental fungi (e.g., Aspergillus sp) 157, 158. Category IB 
VI.B. No recommendation for placing patients with other medical conditions that are 
associated with increased risk for environmental fungal infections (e.g., 
aspergillosis) in a Protective Environment 11. Unresolved issue 
VI.C. For patients who require a Protective Environment, implement the following (see 
Table 5) 11, 15 
 
 Edit [February 2017]: An § indicates text that was edited for clarity. The edit does 
not constitute change to the intent of the recommendations. 
 
VI.C.1. Environmental controls 
VI.C.1.a. § Filter incoming air using central or point-of-use high efficiency 
particulate (HEPA) filters capable of removing 99.97% of particles 
≥0.3 µm in diameter 13. Category IB 
VI.C.1.b. § Direct room airflow with the air supply on one side of the room that 
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moves air across the patient bed and out through an exhaust on the 
opposite side of the room 13. Category IB 
VI.C.1.c. § Ensure positive air pressure in room relative to the corridor 
(pressure differential of ≥12.5 Pa [0.01-in water gauge]) 13. Category 
IB 
VI.C.1.c.i. Monitor air pressure daily with visual indicators (e.g., smoke 
tubes, flutter strips) 11, 1024. Category IA 
VI.C.1.d. § Ensure well-sealed rooms that prevent infiltration of outside air 13. 
Category IB 
VI.C.1.e. § Ensure at least 12 air changes per hour 13. Category IB 
VI.C.2. Lower dust levels by using smooth, nonporous surfaces and finishes that can 
be scrubbed, rather than textured material (e.g., upholstery). Wet dust 
horizontal surfaces whenever dust detected and routinely clean crevices and 
sprinkler heads where dust may accumulate 940, 941. Category II 
VI.C.3. Avoid carpeting in hallways and patient rooms in areas 941. Category IB 
VI.C.4. Prohibit dried and fresh flowers and potted plants 942-944. Category II 
VI.D. Minimize the length of time that patients who require a Protective Environment are 
outside their rooms for diagnostic procedures and other activities 11, 158, 945. 
Category IB 
VI.E. During periods of construction, to prevent inhalation of respirable particles that 
could contain infectious spores, provide respiratory protection (e.g., N95 respirator) 
to patients who are medically fit to tolerate a respirator when they are required to 
leave the Protective Environment 945 158. Category II 
VI.E.1.a. No recommendation for fit-testing of patients who are using respirators. 
Unresolved issue 
VI.E.1.b. No recommendation for use of particulate respirators when leaving the 
Protective Environment in the absence of construction. Unresolved issue 
VI.F. Use of Standard and Transmission-Based Precautions in a Protective 
Environment. 
VI.F.1. Use Standard Precautions as recommended for all patient interactions. 
Category IA 
VI.F.2. Implement Droplet and Contact Precautions as recommended for diseases 
listed in Appendix A. Transmission-Based precautions for viral infections may 
need to be prolonged because of the patient’s immunocompromised state and 
prolonged shedding of viruses 930 1010 928, 932 1011. Category IB 
VI.F.3. Barrier precautions, (e.g., masks, gowns, gloves) are not required for 
healthcare personnel in the absence of suspected or confirmed infection in the 
patient or if they are not indicated according to Standard Precautions 15. 
Category II  
VI.F.4. Implement Airborne Precautions for patients who require a Protective 
Environment room and who also have an airborne infectious disease (e.g., 
pulmonary or laryngeal tuberculosis, acute varicella-zoster). Category IA 
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VI.F.4.a. Ensure that the Protective Environment is designed to maintain 
positive pressure 13. Category IB 
VI.F.4.b. Use an anteroom to further support the appropriate air-balance 
relative to the corridor and the Protective Environment; provide 
independent exhaust of contaminated air to the outside or place a 
HEPA filter in the exhaust duct if the return air must be recirculated 13, 
1041. Category IB 
VI.F.4.c. If an anteroom is not available, place the patient in an AIIR and use 
portable, industrial-grade HEPA filters in the room to enhance 
filtration of spores 1042. Category II
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Appendix A: 
Preamble The mode(s) and risk of transmission for each specific disease agent included in 
Appendix A were reviewed. Principle sources consulted for the development of disease-specific 
recommendations for Appendix A included infectious disease manuals and textbooks [833, 1043, 
1044]. The published literature was searched for evidence of person-to-person transmission in 
healthcare and non-healthcare settings with a focus on reported outbreaks that would assist in 
developing recommendations for all settings where healthcare is delivered. Criteria used to assign 
Transmission-Based Precautions categories follow: 
• A Transmission-Based Precautions category was assigned if there was strong evidence for 
person-to-person transmission via droplet, contact, or airborne routes in healthcare or non-
healthcare settings and/or if patient factors (e.g., diapered infants, diarrhea, draining wounds) 
increased the risk of transmission  
• Transmission-Based Precautions category assignments reflect the predominant mode(s) of 
transmission  
• If there was no evidence for person-to-person transmission by droplet, contact or airborne 
routes, Standard Precautions were assigned  
• If there was a low risk for person-to-person transmission and no evidence of healthcare-
associated transmission, Standard Precautions were assigned 
• Standard Precautions were assigned for bloodborne pathogens (e.g., hepatitis B and C viruses, 
human immunodeficiency virus) as per CDC recommendations for Universal Precautions 
issued in 1988 [780]. Subsequent experience has confirmed the efficacy of Standard 
Precautions to prevent exposure to infected blood and body fluid [778, 779, 866].  
Additional information relevant to use of precautions was added in the comments column to assist 
the caregiver in decision-making. Citations were added as needed to support a change in or 
provide additional evidence for recommendations for a specific disease and for new infectious 
agents (e.g., SARS-CoV, avian influenza) that have been added to Appendix A. The reader may 
refer to more detailed discussion concerning modes of transmission and emerging pathogens in 
the background text and for MDRO control in Appendix B (Management of Multidrug-Resistant 
Organisms in Healthcare Settings (https://www.cdc.gov/infectioncontrol/guidelines/mdro/)). 
















No dressing or containment of drainage; until drainage 
stops or can be contained by dressing 
Abscess 
 Draining, minor or limited 
Standard  Dressing covers and contains drainage 
Acquired human immunodeficiency 
syndrome (HIV) 
Standard  Post-exposure chemoprophylaxis for some blood 
exposures [866]. 
Actinomycosis Standard  Not transmitted from person to person 
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Adenovirus infection (see agent-
specific guidance under gastroenteritis, 
conjunctivitis, pneumonia) 
   
Amebiasis Standard  Person to person transmission is rare. Transmission in 
settings for the mentally challenged and in a family 
group has been reported [1045]. Use care when 
handling diapered infants and mentally challenged 
persons [1046]. 




Standard  Transmission through non-intact skin contact with 
draining lesions possible, therefore use Contact 
Precautions if large amount of uncontained drainage. 
Handwashing with soap and water preferable to use of 
waterless alcohol based antiseptics since alcohol does 
not have sporicidal activity [983]. 
Anthrax 
 Pulmonary 
Standard  Not transmitted from person to person 
Anthrax 
 Environmental: aerosolizable 






Until decontamination of environment complete [203]. 
Wear respirator (N95 mask or PAPRs), protective 
clothing; decontaminate persons with powder on them 
(Occupational Health Guidelines for Remediation 
Workers at Bacillus anthracis-Contaminated Sites --- 




Hand hygiene: Handwashing for 30-60 seconds with 
soap and water or 2% chlorhexidene gluconate after 
spore contact (alcohol handrubs inactive against spores 
[983]. 
 
Post-exposure prophylaxis following environmental 
exposure: 60 days of antimicrobials (either doxycycline, 
ciprofloxacin, or levofloxacin) and post-exposure 
vaccine under IND 
Antibiotic-associated colitis (see 
Clostridium difficile) 
   
Arthropod-borne 
• viral encephalitides (eastern, 
western, Venezuelan equine 
encephalomyelitis; St Louis, 
California encephalitis; West Nile 
Virus) and 
• viral fevers (dengue, yellow fever, 
Colorado tick fever) 
Standard  Not transmitted from person to person except rarely by 
transfusion, and for West Nile virus by organ transplant, 
breastmilk or transplacentally [530, 1047]. Install 
screens in windows and doors in endemic areas. 
Use DEET-containing mosquito repellants and clothing 
to cover extremities. 
Ascariasis Standard  Not transmitted from person to person 
Aspergillosis Standard  Contact Precautions and Airborne if massive soft tissue 
infection with copious drainage and repeated irrigations 
required [154]. 
Avian influenza (see influenza, avian 
below) 
   
Babesiosis Standard  Not transmitted from person to person except rarely by 
transfusion. 
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Blastomycosis, North American, 
cutaneous or pulmonary 
Standard  Not transmitted from person to person 
Botulism Standard   Not transmitted from person to person 
Bronchiolitis (see respiratory infections 





Use mask according to Standard Precautions. 
Brucellosis (undulant, Malta, 
Mediterranean fever) 
Standard   Not transmitted from person to person except rarely via 
banked spermatozoa and sexual contact [1048, 1049]. 
Provide antimicrobial prophylaxis following laboratory 
exposure [1050]. 
Campylobacter gastroenteritis (see 
gastroenteritis) 
    
Candidiasis, all forms including 
mucocutaneous 
Standard    
Cat-scratch fever (benign inoculation 
lymphoreticulosis) 
Standard   Not transmitted from person to person 
Cellulitis Standard    
Chancroid (soft chancre) (H. ducreyi) Standard   Transmitted sexually from person to person 
Chickenpox (see >varicella)      
Chlamydia trachomatis 
 Conjunctivitis 
Standard     
Chlamydia trachomatis 
 Genital (lymphogranuloma 
venereum) 
Standard     
Chlamydia trachomatis 
 Pneumonia (infants ≤3 mos. of 
age) 
Standard     
Chlamydia pneumoniae Standard   Outbreaks in institutionalized populations reported, 
rarely [1051, 1052]. 
Cholera (see gastroenteritis)      
Closed-cavity infection 
 Open drain in place; limited or 
minor drainage 
Standard   Contact Precautions if there is copious uncontained 
drainage 
Closed-cavity infection 
 No drain or closed drainage 
system in place 
Standard     
Clostridium botulinum Standard   Not transmitted from person to person 





illness   
  
Clostridium perfringens 
 Food poisoning 
Standard   Not transmitted from person to person 
Clostridium perfringens 
 Gas gangrene 
Standard   Transmission from person to person rare; one outbreak 
in a surgical setting reported [1053]. Use Contact 
Precautions if wound drainage is extensive. 
Coccidioidomycosis (valley fever) 
 Draining lesions 
Standard   Not transmitted from person to person except under 
extraordinary circumstances because the infectious 
arthroconidial form of Coccidioides immitis is not 
produced in humans [1054]. 
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Coccidioidomycosis (valley fever) 
 Pneumonia 
Standard   Not transmitted from person to person except under 
extraordinary circumstances, (e.g., inhalation of 
aerosolized tissue phase endospores during necropsy, 
transplantation of infected lung) because the infectious 
arthroconidial form of Coccidioides immitis is not 
produced in humans [1054, 1055]. 
Colorado tick fever Standard   Not transmitted from person to person 
Congenital rubella Contact + 
Standard 
Until 1 yr of age Standard Precautions if nasopharyngeal and urine 
cultures repeatedly neg. after 3 mos. of age 
Conjunctivitis 
 Acute bacterial 
Standard    
Conjunctivitis 
 Acute bacterial 
 Chlamydia 
Standard    
Conjunctivitis 
 Acute bacterial 
 Gonococcal 
Standard    
Conjunctivitis 




illness   
Adenovirus most common; enterovirus 70 [1056], 
Coxsackie virus A24 [1057] also associated with 
community outbreaks. Highly contagious; outbreaks in 
eye clinics, pediatric and neonatal settings, institutional 
settings reported. Eye clinics should follow Standard 
Precautions when handling patients with conjunctivitis. 
Routine use of infection control measures in the 
handling of instruments and equipment will prevent the 
occurrence of outbreaks in this and other settings. [460, 
814, 1058, 1059 461, 1060]. 
Corona virus associated with SARS 
(SARS-CoV) (see severe acute 
respiratory syndrome) 
    
Coxsackie virus disease (see 
enteroviral infection) 
    
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD, vCJD) Standard  Use disposable instruments or special 
sterilization/disinfection for surfaces, objects 
contaminated with neural tissue if CJD or vCJD 
suspected and has not been R/O; No special burial 
procedures [1061] 
Croup (see respiratory infections in 
infants and young children) 
    
Crimean-Congo Fever (see Viral 
Hemorrhagic Fever) 
Standard    
Cryptococcosis Standard  Not transmitted from person to person, except rarely via 
tissue and corneal transplant [1062, 1063] 
Cryptosporidiosis (see gastroenteritis)     
Cysticercosis Standard  Not transmitted from person to person 
Cytomegalovirus infection, including in 
neonates and immunosuppressed 
patients 
Standard  No additional precautions for pregnant HCWs 
Decubitus ulcer (see Pressure ulcer)     
Dengue fever Standard  Not transmitted from person to person 
Diarrhea, acute-infective etiology 
suspected (see gastroenteritis) 
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Until 2 cultures taken 24 hours apart negative 
Ebola virus (see viral hemorrhagic 
fevers) 
   Ebola Virus Disease for Healthcare Workers 
[2014]: Update: Updated recommendations for 
healthcare workers can be found at Ebola: U.S. 
Healthcare Workers and Settings 
(https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/). 
Echinococcosis (hydatidosis) Standard  Not transmitted from person to person 
Echovirus (see enteroviral infection)    
Encephalitis or encephalomyelitis (see 
specific etiologic agents) 
   
Endometritis (endomyometritis) Standard   
Enterobiasis (pinworm disease, 
oxyuriasis) 
Standard   
Enterococcus species (see multidrug-
resistant organisms if epidemiologically 
significant or vancomycin resistant) 
   
Enterocolitis, C. difficile (see C. 
difficile, gastroenteritis) 
   
Enteroviral infections (i.e., Group A 
and B Coxsackie viruses and Echo 
viruses) (excludes polio virus) 
Standard  Use Contact Precautions for diapered or incontinent 
children for duration of illness and to control institutional 
outbreaks 
Epiglottitis, due to Haemophilus 
influenzae type b 
Droplet + 
Standard 
Until 24 hours 
after initiation of 
effective 
therapy 
See specific disease agents for epiglottitis due to other 
etiologies) 
Epstein-Barr virus infection, including 
infectious mononucleosis 
Standard   
Erythema infectiosum (also see 
Parvovirus B19) 
   
Escherichia coli gastroenteritis (see 
gastroenteritis) 
   
Food poisoning 
 Botulism 
Standard  Not transmitted from person to person 
Food poisoning 
 C. perfringens or welchii 
Standard  Not transmitted from person to person 
Food poisoning 
 Staphylococcal 
Standard  Not transmitted from person to person 
Furunculosis, staphylococcal Standard  Contact if drainage not controlled. Follow institutional 
policies if MRSA 
Furunculosis, staphylococcal 









Gangrene (gas gangrene) Standard  Not transmitted from person to person 
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Gastroenteritis Standard  Use Contact Precautions for diapered or incontinent 
persons for the duration of illness or to control 
institutional outbreaks for gastroenteritis caused by all of 
the agents below 
Gastroenteritis 
 Adenovirus 
Standard  Use Contact Precautions for diapered or incontinent 
persons for the duration of illness or to control 
institutional outbreaks 
Gastroenteritis 
 Campylobacter species 
Standard  Use Contact Precautions for diapered or incontinent 
persons for the duration of illness or to control 
institutional outbreaks 
Gastroenteritis 
 Cholera (Vibrio cholerae) 
Standard  Use Contact Precautions for diapered or incontinent 
persons for the duration of illness or to control 
institutional outbreaks 
Gastroenteritis 




illness   
Discontinue antibiotics if appropriate. Do not share 
electronic thermometers [853], 854; ensure consistent 
environmental cleaning and disinfection. Hypochlorite 
solutions may be required for cleaning if transmission 
continues [847]. Handwashing with soap and water 
preferred because of the absence of sporicidal activity 
of alcohol in waterless antiseptic handrubs [983]. 
Gastroenteritis 
 Cryptosporidium species 
Standard  Use Contact Precautions for diapered or incontinent 
persons for the duration of illness or to control 
institutional outbreaks 
Gastroenteritis 
 E. coli 
Enteropathogenic O157:H7 
and other shiga toxin-
producing strains 
Standard  Use Contact Precautions for diapered or incontinent 
persons for the duration of illness or to control 
institutional outbreaks 
Gastroenteritis 
 E. coli 
Other species 
Standard  Use Contact Precautions for diapered or incontinent 
persons for the duration of illness or to control 
institutional outbreaks 
Gastroenteritis 
 Giardia lamblia 
Standard  Use Contact Precautions for diapered or incontinent 




Standard  Use Contact Precautions for diapered or incontinent 
persons for the duration of illness or to control 
institutional outbreaks. Persons who clean areas heavily 
contaminated with feces or vomitus may benefit from 
wearing masks since virus can be aerosolized from 
these body substances [142, 147 148]; ensure 
consistent environmental cleaning and disinfection with 
focus on restrooms even when apparently unsoiled 
[273, 1064]). Hypochlorite solutions may be required 
when there is continued transmission [290-292]. Alcohol 
is less active, but there is no evidence that alcohol 
antiseptic handrubs are not effective for hand 
decontamination [294]. Cohorting of affected patients to 
separate airspaces and toilet facilities may help interrupt 






illness   
Ensure consistent environmental cleaning and 
disinfection and frequent removal of soiled diapers. 
Prolonged shedding may occur in both 
immunocompetent and immunocompromised children 
and the elderly [932, 933]. 
Guideline for Isolation Precautions: Preventing Transmission of Infectious Agents in Healthcare Settings 
 








 Salmonella species (including S. 
typhi) 
Standard  Use Contact Precautions for diapered or incontinent 
persons for the duration of illness or to control 
institutional outbreaks 
Gastroenteritis 
 Shigella species (Bacillary 
dysentery) 
Standard  Use Contact Precautions for diapered or incontinent 
persons for the duration of illness or to control 
institutional outbreaks 
Gastroenteritis 
 Vibrio parahaemolyticus 
Standard  Use Contact Precautions for diapered or incontinent 
persons for the duration of illness or to control 
institutional outbreaks 
Gastroenteritis 
 Viral (if not covered elsewhere) 
Standard  Use Contact Precautions for diapered or incontinent 
persons for the duration of illness or to control 
institutional outbreaks 
Gastroenteritis 
 Yersinia enterocolitica 
Standard  Use Contact Precautions for diapered or incontinent 
persons for the duration of illness or to control 
institutional outbreaks 
German measles (see rubella; see 
congenital rubella) 
   
Giardiasis (see gastroenteritis)    
Gonococcal ophthalmia neonatorum 
(gonorrheal ophthalmia, acute 
conjunctivitis of newborn) 
Standard   
Gonorrhea Standard   
Granuloma inguinale (Donovanosis, 
granuloma venereum) 
Standard   
Guillain-Barre' syndrome Standard  Not an infectious condition 
Haemophilus influenzae (see disease-
specific recommendations) 
   
Hand, foot, and mouth disease (see 
enteroviral infection) 
   
Hansen's Disease (see Leprosy)    
Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome Standard  Not transmitted from person to person 
Helicobacter pylori Standard   
Hepatitis, viral 
 Type A 
Standard  Provide hepatitis A vaccine post-exposure as 
recommended [1065] 
Hepatitis, viral 




 Maintain Contact Precautions in infants and children <3 
years of age for duration of hospitalization; for children 
3-14 yrs. of age for 2 weeks after onset of symptoms; 
>14 yrs. of age for 1 week after onset of symptoms 
[833, 1066, 1067]. 
Hepatitis, viral 
 Type B-HBsAg positive; acute or 
chronic 
Standard  See specific recommendations for care of patients in 
hemodialysis centers 778 
Hepatitis, viral 
 Type C and other unspecified 
non-A, non-B 
Standard  See specific recommendations for care of patients in 
hemodialysis centers [778] 
Hepatitis, viral 
 Type D (seen only with hepatitis 
B) 
Standard   
Hepatitis, viral 
 Type E 
Standard  Use Contact Precautions for diapered or incontinent 
individuals for the duration of illness [1068] 
Hepatitis, viral 
 Type G 
Standard   
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Herpangina (see enteroviral infection)    
Hookworm Standard   
Herpes simplex (Herpesvirus hominis) 
 Encephalitis 
Standard   
Herpes simplex (Herpesvirus hominis) 




Until lesions dry 
and crusted 
 
Herpes simplex (Herpesvirus hominis) 
 Mucocutaneous, recurrent (skin, 
oral, genital) 
Standard    




Until lesions dry 
and crusted 
Also, for asymptomatic, exposed infants delivered 
vaginally or by C-section and if mother has active 
infection and membranes have been ruptured for more 
than 4 to 6 hours until infant surface cultures obtained at 
24-36 hours. of age negative after 48 hours incubation 
[1069, 1070] 
Herpes zoster (varicella-zoster) 
(shingles) 
 Disseminated disease in any 
patient 
Localized disease in 
immunocompromised 
patient until disseminated 





illness   
Susceptible HCWs should not enter room if immune 
caregivers are available; no recommendation for 
protection of immune HCWs; no recommendation for 
type of protection, i.e. surgical mask or respirator; for 
susceptible HCWs. 
Herpes zoster (varicella-zoster) 
(shingles) 
 Localized in patient with intact 
immune system with lesions that 
can be contained/covered 





Susceptible HCWs should not provide direct patient 
care when other immune caregivers are available. 
Histoplasmosis Standard  Not transmitted from person to person 
Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) Standard  Post-exposure chemoprophylaxis for some blood 
exposures [866]. 







HAI reported [1071], but route of transmission not 
established [823]. Assumed to be Contact transmission 
as for RSV since the viruses are closely related and 
have similar clinical manifestations and epidemiology. 
Wear masks according to Standard Precautions. 
Impetigo Contact + 
Standard 
Until 24 hours 




Infectious mononucleosis Standard   
Influenza 
 Human (seasonal Influenza) 
-  See Prevention Strategies for Seasonal Influenza in 
Healthcare Settings 
(https://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/infectioncontrol/h
ealthcaresettings.htm) for current seasonal influenza 
guidance.  
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 Avian (e.g., H5N1, H7, H9 
strains) 
-  See [This link is no longer active: 
www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/professional/infect-control.htm. 
Similar information may be found at Interim Guidance 
for Infection Control Within Healthcare Settings When 
Caring for Confirmed Cases, Probable Cases, and 
Cases Under Investigation for Infection with Novel 
Influenza A Viruses Associated with Severe Disease 
(https://www.cdc.gov/flu/avianflu/novel-flu-infection-
control.htm), accessed May 2016.] for current avian 
Influenza guidance. 
Influenza 
 Pandemic Influenza (also a 
human Influenza virus) 
Droplet  See [This link is no longer active: 
http://www.pandemicflu.gov. Similar information may be 
found at Interim Guidance for Infection Control Within 
Healthcare Settings When Caring for Confirmed Cases, 
Probable Cases, and Cases Under Investigation for 
Infection with Novel Influenza A Viruses Associated 
with Severe Disease 
(https://www.cdc.gov/flu/avianflu/novel-flu-infection-
control.htm), accessed May 2016.] for current 
pandemic Influenza guidance. 
Kawasaki syndrome Standard  Not an infectious condition 
Lassa fever (see viral hemorrhagic 
fevers) 
-   
Legionnaires' disease Standard  Not transmitted from person to person 
Leprosy Standard   
Leptospirosis Standard  Not transmitted from person to person 
Lice 
 Head (pediculosis) 
Contact + 
Standard 
Until 24 hours 
after initiation of 
effective 
therapy 
See [This link is no longer active: http://www.cdc.gov/ 
ncidod/dpd/parasites/lice/default.htm. Similar 
information may be found at CDC’s Parasites - Lice 
(https://www.cdc.gov/parasites/lice/index.html), 
accessed May 2016.] 
Lice 
 Body 
Standard  Transmitted person to person through infested clothing. 
Wear gown and gloves when removing clothing; bag 
and wash clothes according to CDC guidance [This link 
is no longer active: http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dpd/ 
parasites/lice/default.htm. Similar information may be 
found at CDC’s Parasites - Lice 
(https://www.cdc.gov/parasites/lice/index.html), 
accessed May 2016.] 
Lice 
 Pubic 
Standard  Transmitted person to person through sexual contact. 
See CDC’s [This link is no longer active: 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dpd/parasites/lice/default.ht
m. Similar information may be found at CDC’s 
Parasites - Lice 
(https://www.cdc.gov/parasites/lice/index.html), 
accessed May 2016.] 
Listeriosis (listeria monocytogenes) Standard  Person-to-person transmission rare; cross-transmission 
in neonatal settings reported [1072, 1073 1074, 1075] 
Lyme disease Standard  Not transmitted from person to person 
Lymphocytic choriomeningitis Standard  Not transmitted from person to person 
Lymphogranuloma venereum Standard   
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Malaria Standard  Not transmitted from person to person except through 
transfusion rarely and through a failure to follow 
Standard Precautions during patient care 1076-1079. 
Install screens in windows and doors in endemic areas. 
Use DEET-containing mosquito repellants and clothing 
to cover extremities. 
Marburg virus disease (see viral 
hemorrhagic fevers) 
-   
Measles (rubeola) Airborne + 
Standard 
4 days after 





stop draining) in 
immune 
compromised 
 Measles Update [November 2011]: Updated 
recommendations can be found at Immunization 
of Healthcare Personnel: Recommendations of 
the Advisory Committee on Immunization 
Practices (ACIP) 
(https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/rr/rr6007.pdf). 
Susceptible HCWs should not enter room if immune 
care providers are available; no recommendation for 
face protection for immune HCW; no recommendation 
for type of face protection for susceptible HCWs, i.e., 
mask or respirator [1027, 1028]. For exposed 
susceptibles, post-exposure vaccine within 72 hours or 
immune globulin within 6 days when available [17, 
1032, 1034]. Place exposed susceptible patients on 
Airborne Precautions and exclude susceptible 
healthcare personnel.  
Melioidosis, all forms Standard  Not transmitted from person to person. 
Meningitis 
 Aseptic (nonbacterial or viral; 
also see enteroviral infections) 
Standard  Contact for infants and young children. 
Meningitis 
 Bacterial, gram-negative enteric, 
in neonates 
Standard   
Meningitis 
 Fungal 
Standard   
Meningitis 
 Haemophilus Influenzae, type b 
known or suspected 
Droplet + 
Standard 
Until 24 hours 





 Listeria monocytogenes (See 
Listeriosis) 
Standard    
Meningitis 
 Neisseria meningitidis 




Until 24 hours 
after initiation of 
effective 
therapy 
See meningococcal disease below. 
Meningitis 
 Streptococcus pneumoniae 
Standard   
Meningitis 
 M. tuberculosis 
Standard  Concurrent, active pulmonary disease or draining 
cutaneous lesions may necessitate addition of Contact 
and/or Airborne; For children, Airborne Precautions until 
active tuberculosis ruled out in visiting family members 
(see tuberculosis below) 42 
Meningitis 
 Other diagnosed bacterial 
Standard   
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Until 24 hours 
after initiation of 
effective 
therapy 
Postexposure chemoprophylaxis for household 
contacts, HCWs exposed to respiratory secretions; 
postexposure vaccine only to control outbreaks 15, 17. 
Molluscum contagiosum Standard   










See CDC’s Monkeypox website 
(https://www.cdc.gov/poxvirus/monkeypox/) [Current 
version of this document may differ from original.] for 
most current recommendations. Transmission in 
hospital settings unlikely [269]. Pre- and post-exposure 
smallpox vaccine recommended for exposed HCWs 
Mucormycosis Standard   
Multidrug-resistant organisms 
(MDROs), infection or colonization 
(e.g., MRSA, VRE, VISA/VRSA, 
ESBLs, resistant S. pneumoniae) 
Contact + 
Standard 
 MDROs judged by the infection control program, based 
on local, state, regional, or national recommendations, 
to be of clinical and epidemiologic significance. Contact 
Precautions recommended in settings with evidence of 
ongoing transmission, acute care settings with 
increased risk for transmission or wounds that cannot 
be contained by dressings. See recommendations for 
management options in Management of Multidrug-
Resistant Organisms In Healthcare Settings, 2006 
(https://www.cdc.gov/infectioncontrol/guidelines/mdro/) 
[870]. Contact state health department for guidance 
regarding new or emerging MDRO. 
Mumps (infectious parotitis) Droplet + 
Standard 
Until 9 days After onset of swelling; susceptible HCWs should not 
provide care if immune caregivers are available. 
Note: (Recent assessment of outbreaks in healthy 18-
24 year olds has indicated that salivary viral shedding 
occurred early in the course of illness and that 5 days of 
isolation after onset of parotitis may be appropriate in 
community settings; however the implications for 
healthcare personnel and high-risk patient populations 
remain to be clarified.) 
Mycobacteria, nontuberculosis 
(atypical) 








Standard   





Necrotizing enterocolitis Standard  Contact Precautions when cases clustered temporally 
[1080-1083]. 
Nocardiosis, draining lesions, or other 
presentations 
Standard  Not transmitted person-to-person 
Norovirus (see gastroenteritis)    
Norwalk agent Gastroenteritis (see 
gastroenteritis) 
   
Orf Standard   
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Parainfluenza virus infection, 






Viral shedding may be prolonged in immunosuppressed 
patients [1009, 1010]. Reliability of antigentesting to 
determine when to remove patients with prolonged 
hospitalizations from Contact Precautions uncertain. 
Parvovirus B19 (Erythema infectiosum) Droplet + 
Standard 
  Maintain precautions for duration of hospitalization 
when chronic disease occurs in an 
immunocompromised patient. For patients with transient 
aplastic crisis or red-cell crisis, maintain precautions for 
7 days. Duration of precautions for immunosuppressed 
patients with persistently positive PCR not defined, but 
transmission has occurred [929]. 
Pediculosis (Lice) Contact + 
Standard 
Until 24 hours 





Pertussis (whooping cough) Droplet + 
Standard 
Until 5 days Single patient room preferred. Cohorting an option. 
Post-exposure chemoprophylaxis for household 
contacts and HCWs with prolonged exposure to 
respiratory secretions [863]. Recommendations for 
Tdap vaccine in adults under development. 
  Tdap Vaccine Recommendations [2011] 
Update: Current recommendations can be found 
at Tdap / Td ACIP Vaccine Recommendations 
(www.cdc.gov/vaccines/hcp/acip-recs/vacc-
specific/tdap-td.html). 
Pinworm infection (Enterobiasis) Standard    
Plague (Yersinia pestis) 
 Bubonic 
Standard    











illness   
Outbreaks in pediatric and institutional settings reported 
[376, 1084-1086]. In immunocompromised hosts, 
extend duration of Droplet and Contact Precautions due 
to prolonged shedding of virus [931] 
Pneumonia 
 Bacterial not listed elsewhere 
(including gram-negative 
bacterial) 
Standard    
Pneumonia 
 B. cepacia in patients with CF, 




Unknown Avoid exposure to other persons with CF; private room 
preferred. Criteria for D/C precautions not established. 
See CF Foundation guideline [20] 
Pneumonia 
 B. cepacia in patients without CF 
(see multidrug-resistant 
organisms) 
   
Pneumonia 
 Chlamydia 
Standard   
Pneumonia 
 Fungal 
Standard   
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 Haemophilus influenzae, type b 
Adults 
Standard   
Pneumonia 
 Haemophilus influenzae, type b 
Infants and children 
Droplet + 
Standard 
Until 24 hours 





 Legionella spp. 





Until 24 hours 
after initiation of 
effective 
therapy 
See meningococcal disease above 
Pneumonia 
 Multidrug-resistant bacterial (see 
multidrug-resistant organisms) 
    
Pneumonia 
 Mycoplasma (primary atypical 
Pneumonia) 




 Pneumococcal pneumonia 
Standard   Use Droplet Precautions if evidence of transmission 
within a patient care unit or facility [196-198, 1087] 
Pneumonia 
 Pneumocystis jiroveci 
(Pneumocystis carinii) 
Standard   Avoid placement in the same room with an 
immunocompromised patient. 
Pneumonia 
 Staphylococcus aureus 
Standard   For MRSA, see MDROs 
Pneumonia 




Until 24 hours 
after initiation of 
effective 
therapy 
See streptococcal disease (group A streptococcus) 
below 
Contact precautions if skin lesions present 
Pneumonia 
 Streptococcus, group A 
Infants and young children 
Droplet + 
Standard 
Until 24 hours 
after initiation of 
effective 
therapy 
Contact Precautions if skin lesions present 
Pneumonia 
 Varicella-zoster (See Varicella-
Zoster) 




Standard   
Pneumonia 
 Viral 
Infants and young children 
(see respiratory infectious 
disease, acute, or specific 
viral agent) 
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Pressure ulcer (decubitus ulcer, 









If no dressing or containment of drainage; until drainage 
stops or can be contained by dressing 
Pressure ulcer (decubitus ulcer, 
pressure sore) infected 
 Minor or limited 
Standard   If dressing covers and contains drainage 
Prion disease (See Creutzfeld-Jacob 
Disease) 
    
Psittacosis (ornithosis) (Chlamydia 
psittaci) 
Standard   Not transmitted from person to person 
Q fever Standard    
Rabies Standard   Person to person transmission rare; transmission via 
corneal, tissue and organ transplants has been reported 
[539, 1088]. If patient has bitten another individual or 
saliva has contaminated an open wound or mucous 
membrane, wash exposed area thoroughly and 
administer postexposure prophylaxis. [1089] 
Rat-bite fever (Streptobacillus 
moniliformis disease, Spirillum minus 
disease) 
Standard   Not transmitted from person to person 
Relapsing fever Standard   Not transmitted from person to person 
Resistant bacterial infection or 
colonization (see multidrug-resistant 
organisms) 
    
Respiratory infectious disease, acute 
(if not covered elsewhere) 
 Adults 
Standard    
Respiratory infectious disease, acute 
(if not covered elsewhere) 








Also see syndromes or conditions listed in Table 2 
Respiratory syncytial virus infection, in 









Wear mask according to Standard Precautions [24] CB 
[116, 117]. In immunocompromised patients, extend the 
duration of Contact Precautions due to prolonged 
shedding [928]). Reliability of antigen testing to 
determine when to remove patients with prolonged 
hospitalizations from Contact Precautions uncertain. 
Reye's syndrome Standard   Not an infectious condition 
Rheumatic fever Standard   Not an infectious condition 







Droplet most important route of transmission [104 
1090]. Outbreaks have occurred in NICUs and LTCFs 
[413, 1091, 1092]. Add Contact Precautions if copious 
moist secretions and close contact likely to occur (e.g., 
young infants) [111, 833]. 
Rickettsial fevers, tickborne (Rocky 
Mountain spotted fever, tickborne 
Typhus fever) 
Standard   Not transmitted from person to person except through 
transfusion, rarely 
Rickettsialpox (vesicular rickettsiosis) Standard   Not transmitted from person to person 
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Standard   Rarely, outbreaks have occurred in healthcare settings, 
(e.g., NICU [1093], rehabilitation hospital [1094]. Use 
Contact Precautions for outbreak. 
Ritter's disease (staphylococcal 








See staphylococcal disease, scalded skin syndrome 
below 
Rocky Mountain spotted fever Standard  Not transmitted from person to person except through 
transfusion,  
rarely  
Roseola infantum (exanthem subitum; 
caused by HHV-6) 
Standard   
Rotavirus infection (see gastroenteritis)    




Until 7 days 
after onset of 
rash 
Susceptible HCWs should not enter room if immune 
caregivers are available. No recommendation for 
wearing face protection (e.g., a surgical mask) if 
immune. Pregnant women who are not immune should 
not care for these patients [17, 33]. Administer vaccine 
within three days of exposure to non-pregnant 
susceptible individuals. Place exposed susceptible 
patients on Droplet Precautions; exclude susceptible 
healthcare personnel from duty from day 5 after first 
exposure to day 21 after last exposure, regardless of 
post-exposure vaccine. 
Rubeola (see measles)    
Salmonellosis (see gastroenteritis)    
Scabies Contact Until 24  
Scalded skin syndrome, 
staphylococcal 





See staphylococcal disease, scalded skin syndrome 
below) 
Schistosomiasis (bilharziasis) Standard     



















Airborne preferred; D if AIIR unavailable. N95 or higher 
respiratory protection; surgical mask if N95 unavailable; 
eye protection (goggles, face shield); aerosol-
generating procedures and "supershedders" highest 
risk for transmission via small droplet nuclei and large 
droplets [93, 94, 96]. Vigilant environmental disinfection 
(see [This link is no longer active: 
www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars. Similar information may be 
found at CDC Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS) (https://www.cdc.gov/sars/index.html), 
accessed May 2016.]) 
Shigellosis (see gastroenteritis)    
Smallpox (variola; see Vaccinia for 









Until all scabs have crusted and separated (3-4 weeks). 
Non-vaccinated HCWs should not provide care when 
immune HCWs are available; N95 or higher respiratory 
protection for susceptible and successfully vaccinated 
individuals; postexposure vaccine within 4 days of 
exposure protective [108, 129, 1038-1040]. 
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Sporotrichosis Standard   
Spirillum minor disease (rat-bite fever) Standard   Not transmitted from person to person 
Staphylococcal disease (S aureus) 
 Skin, wound, or burn 
Major 





No dressing or dressing does not contain drainage 
adequately 
Staphylococcal disease (S aureus) 
 Skin, wound, or burn 
Minor or limited 
Standard   Dressing covers and contains drainage adequately 
Staphylococcal disease (S aureus) 
 Enterocolitis 
Standard   Use Contact Precautions for diapered or incontinent 
children for duration of illness 
Staphylococcal disease (S aureus) 
 Multidrug-resistant (see 
multidrug-resistant organisms) 
   
Staphylococcal disease (S aureus) 
 Pneumonia 
Standard   
Staphylococcal disease (S aureus) 
 Scalded skin syndrome 





Consider healthcare personnel as potential source of 
nursery, NICU outbreak [1095]. 
Staphylococcal disease (S aureus) 
 Toxic shock syndrome 
Standard   
Streptobacillus moniliformis disease 
(rat-bite fever) 
Standard  Not transmitted from person to person 
Streptococcal disease (group A 
streptococcus) 





Until 24 hours 
after initiation of 
effective 
therapy 
No dressing or dressing does not contain drainage 
adequately 
Streptococcal disease (group A 
streptococcus) 
 Skin, wound, or burn 
Minor or limited 
Standard  Dressing covers and contains drainage adequately 
Streptococcal disease (group A 
streptococcus) 
 Endometritis (puerperal sepsis) 
Standard   
Streptococcal disease (group A 
streptococcus) 
 Pharyngitis in infants and young 
children 
Droplet Until 24 hours 




Streptococcal disease (group A 
streptococcus) 
 Pneumonia 
Droplet Until 24 hours 




Streptococcal disease (group A 
streptococcus) 
 Scarlet fever in infants and young 
children 
Droplet Until 24 hours 
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Streptococcal disease (group A 
streptococcus) 
 Serious invasive disease 
Droplet Until 24 hours 
after initiation of 
effective 
therapy 
Outbreaks of serious invasive disease have occurred 
secondary to transmission among patients and 
healthcare personnel [162, 972, 1096-1098] 
Contact Precautions for draining wound as above; 
follow rec. for antimicrobial prophylaxis in selected 
conditions [160]. 
Streptococcal disease (group B 
streptococcus), neonatal 
Standard   
Streptococcal disease (not group A or 
B) unless covered elsewhere 
 Multidrug-resistant (see 
multidrug-resistant organisms) 
   
Strongyloidiasis Standard   
Syphilis 
 Latent (tertiary) and seropositivity 
without lesions 
Standard   
Syphilis 
 Skin and mucous membrane, 
including congenital, primary, 
secondary 
Standard   
Tapeworm disease 
 Hymenolepis nana 
Standard  Not transmitted from person to person 
Tapeworm disease 
 Taenia solium (pork) 
Standard   
Tapeworm disease 
 Other 
Standard   
Tetanus Standard  Not transmitted from person to person 
Tinea (e.g., dermatophytosis, 
dermatomycosis, ringworm) 
Standard  Rare episodes of person-to-person transmission 
Toxoplasmosis Standard  Transmission from person to person is rare; vertical 
transmission from mother to child, transmission through 
organs and blood transfusion rare 
Toxic shock syndrome (staphylococcal 
disease, streptococcal disease) 
Standard  Droplet Precautions for the first 24 hours after 
implementation of antibiotic therapy if Group A 
streptococcus is a likely etiology 
Trachoma, acute Standard   
Transmissible spongiform 
encephalopathy (see Creutzfeld-Jacob 
disease, CJD, vCJD) 
   
Trench mouth (Vincent's angina) Standard   
Trichinosis Standard   
Trichomoniasis Standard   
Trichuriasis (whipworm disease) Standard   
Tuberculosis (M. tuberculosis) 




 Discontinue precautions only when patient is improving 
clinically, and drainage has ceased or there are three 
consecutive negative cultures of continued drainage 
[1025, 1026]. Examine for evidence of active pulmonary 
tuberculosis. 
Tuberculosis (M. tuberculosis) 
 Extrapulmonary, no draining 
lesion, Meningitis 
Standard  Examine for evidence of pulmonary tuberculosis. For 
infants and children, use Airborne until active pulmonary 
tuberculosis in visiting family members ruled out [42] 
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Tuberculosis (M. tuberculosis) 
 Pulmonary or laryngeal disease, 
confirmed 
Airborne  Discontinue precautions only when patient on effective 
therapy is improving clinically and has three 
consecutive sputum smears negative for acid-fast 
bacilli collected on separate days (MMWR 2005; 54: 
RR-17 Guidelines for Preventing the Transmission of 




Tuberculosis (M. tuberculosis) 
 Pulmonary or laryngeal disease, 
suspected 
Airborne  Discontinue precautions only when the likelihood of 
infectious TB disease is deemed negligible, and either  
1. there is another diagnosis that explains the clinical 
syndrome or  
2. the results of three sputum smears for AFB are 
negative. Each of the three sputum specimens 
should be collected 8-24 hours apart, and at least 
one should be an early morning specimen  
Tuberculosis (M. tuberculosis) 
 Skin-test positive with no 
evidence of current active 
disease 
Standard   
Tularemia 
 Draining lesion 
Standard  Not transmitted from person to person 
Tularemia 
 Pulmonary 
Standard  Not transmitted from person to person 
Typhoid (Salmonella typhi) fever (see 
gastroenteritis) 
   
Typhus 
 Rickettsia prowazekii (Epidemic 
or Louse-borne Typhus) 
Standard  Transmitted from person to person through close 
personal or clothing contact 
Typhus 
 Rickettsia typhi 
Standard  Not transmitted from person to person 
Urinary tract infection (including 
pyelonephritis), with or without urinary 
catheter 
Standard   
Vaccinia   Only vaccinated HCWs have contact with active 
vaccination sites and care for persons with adverse 
vaccinia events; if unvaccinated, only HCWs without 
contraindications to vaccine may provide care.  
Vaccinia 
 Vaccination site care (including 
autoinoculated areas) 
Standard  Vaccination recommended for vaccinators; for newly 
vaccinated HCWs: semi-permeable dressing over 
gauze until scab separates, with dressing change as 
fluid accumulates, ~3-5 days; gloves, hand hygiene for 
dressing change; vaccinated HCW or HCW without 
contraindication to vaccine for dressing changes [205, 
221, 225]. 
Vaccinia (adverse events following 
vaccination) 
 Eczema vaccinatum 




For contact with virus-containing lesions and exudative 
material 
Vaccinia (adverse events following 
vaccination) 
 Fetal vaccinia 




For contact with virus-containing lesions and exudative 
material 
Guideline for Isolation Precautions: Preventing Transmission of Infectious Agents in Healthcare Settings 
 







Vaccinia (adverse events following 
vaccination) 
 Generalized vaccinia 




For contact with virus-containing lesions and exudative 
material 
Vaccinia (adverse events following 
vaccination) 
 Progressive vaccinia 
Contact  For contact with virus-containing lesions and exudative 
material 
Vaccinia (adverse events following 
vaccination) 
 PostVaccinia encephalitis 
Standard   
Vaccinia (adverse events following 
vaccination) 
 Blepharitis or conjunctivitis 
Contact + 
Standard 
 Use Contact Precautions if there is copious drainage 
Vaccinia (adverse events following 
vaccination) 
 Iritis or keratitis 
Standard   
Vaccinia (adverse events following 
vaccination) 
 Vaccinia-associated erythema 
multiforme (Stevens Johnson 
Syndrome) 
Standard  Not an infectious condition 
Vaccinia  (adverse events following 
vaccination) 
 Secondary bacterial infection 




 Follow organism-specific (strep, staph most frequent) 
recommendations and consider magnitude of drainage 
Varicella Zoster Airborne + 
Contact + 
Standard 
Until lesions dry 
and crusted 
Susceptible HCWs should not enter room if immune 
caregivers are available; no recommendation for face 
protection of immune HCWs; no recommendation for 
type of protection, i.e., surgical mask or respirator for 
susceptible HCWs. In immunocompromised host with 
varicella Pneumonia, prolong duration of precautions for 
duration of illness. Post-exposure prophylaxis: provide 
post-exposure vaccine ASAP but within 120 hours; for 
susceptible exposed persons for whom vaccine is 
contraindicated (immunocompromised persons, 
pregnant women, newborns whose mother's varicella 
onset is <5days before delivery or within 48 hours after 
delivery) provide VZIG, when available, within 96 hours; 
if unavailable, use IVIG, Use Airborne for exposed 
susceptible persons and exclude exposed susceptible 
healthcare workers beginning 8 days after first exposure 
until 21 days after last exposure or 28 if received VZIG, 
regardless of postexposure vaccination. [1036]. 
Variola (see smallpox)    
Vibrio parahaemolyticus (see 
gastroenteritis) 
   
Vincent's angina (trench mouth) Standard   
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Viral hemorrhagic fevers due to Lassa, 










 Ebola Virus Disease Update [2014]: Updated 
recommendations for healthcare workers can be 




Single-patient room preferred. Emphasize:  
1. use of sharps safety devices and safe work 
practices,  
2. hand hygiene;  
3. barrier protection against blood and body fluids 
upon entry into room (single gloves and fluid-
resistant or impermeable gown, face/eye protection 
with masks, goggles or face shields); and  
4. appropriate waste handling.  
Use N95 or higher respirators when performing 
aerosol-generating procedures. Largest viral load in 
final stages of illness when hemorrhage may occur; 
additional PPE, including double gloves, leg and shoe 
coverings may be used, especially in resource-limited 
settings where options for cleaning and laundry are 
limited. Notify public health officials immediately if 
Ebola is suspected [212, 314, 740, 772]. Also see 
Table 3 for Ebola as a bioterrorism agent. 
Viral respiratory diseases (not covered 
elsewhere) 
 Adults 
Standard   
Viral respiratory diseases (not covered 
elsewhere) 
 Infants and young children (see 
respiratory infectious disease, 
acute) 
   










No dressing or dressing does not contain drainage 
adequately 
Wound infections 
 Minor or limited 
Standard  Dressing covers and contains drainage adequately 
Yersinia enterocolitica Gastroenteritis 
(see gastroenteritis) 
   
Zoster (varicella-zoster) (see herpes 
zoster) 
   
Zygomycosis (phycomycosis, 
mucormycosis) 
Standard  Not transmitted person-to-person 
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Table 1. History of Guidelines for Isolation Precautions in Hospitals*  
Year (Ref) Document Issued Comment 
1970 
1099 
Isolation Techniques for 
Use in Hospitals, 1st ed.  
• Introduced seven isolation precaution categories with 
color-coded cards: Strict, Respiratory, Protective, 
Enteric, Wound and Skin, Discharge, and Blood  
• No user decision-making required  




Isolation Techniques for 
Use in Hospitals, 2nd ed.  
• Same conceptual framework as 1st edition  
1983 
1101 
CDC Guideline for Isolation 
Precautions in Hospitals  
• Provided two systems for isolation: category-specific 
and disease- specific  
• Protective Isolation eliminated; Blood Precautions 
expanded to include Body Fluids  
• Categories included Strict, Contact, Respiratory, AFB, 
Enteric, Drainage/Secretion, Blood and Body Fluids  
• Emphasized decision-making by users  
1985-88 
780, 896 
Universal Precautions  • Developed in response to HIV/AIDS epidemic  
• Dictated application of Blood and Body Fluid 
precautions to all patients, regardless of infection status  
• Did not apply to feces, nasal secretions, sputum, sweat, 
tears, urine, or vomitus unless contaminated by visible 
blood  
• Added personal protective equipment to protect HCWs 
from mucous membrane exposures  
• Handwashing recommended immediately after glove 
removal  
• Added specific recommendations for handling needles 
and other sharp devices; concept became integral to 
OSHA’s 1991 rule on occupational exposure to blood-
borne pathogens in healthcare settings  
1987  
1102  
Body Substance Isolation  • Emphasized avoiding contact with all moist and 
potentially infectious body substances except sweat 
even if blood not present  
• Shared some features with Universal Precautions  
• Weak on infections transmitted by large droplets or by 
contact with dry surfaces  
• Did not emphasize need for special ventilation to 
contain airborne infections  
• Handwashing after glove removal not specified in the 
absence of visible soiling  
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Guideline for Isolation 
Precautions in Hospitals  
• Prepared by the Healthcare Infection Control Practices 
Advisory Committee (HICPAC)  
• Melded major features of Universal Precautions and 
Body Substance Isolation into Standard Precautions to 
be used with all patients at all times  
• Included three transmission-based precaution 
categories: airborne, droplet, and contact  
• Listed clinical syndromes that should dictate use of 
empiric isolation until an etiological diagnosis is 
established  
 
* Derived from Garner ICHE 1996 
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Table 2. Clinical Syndromes or Conditions Warranting Empiric Transmission-
Based Precautions in Addition to Standard Precautions.  
 Format Change [February 2017]: The format of this section was changed to improve readability 
and accessibility. The content is unchanged. 
 
Disease 




Empiric Precautions (Always Includes 
Standard Precautions) 
Diarrhea Acute diarrhea with a 
likely infectious cause 
in an incontinent or 
diapered patient  
Enteric 
pathogens§  
Contact Precautions (pediatrics and adult)  
Meningitis Meningitis Neisseria 
meningitidis  
Droplet Precautions for first 24 hours of 
antimicrobial therapy; mask and face 
protection for intubation  
Meningitis Meningitis Enteroviruses Contact Precautions for infants and 
children 
Meningitis Meningitis M. tuberculosis Airborne Precautions if pulmonary infiltrate  
Airborne Precautions plus Contact 
Precautions if potentially infectious 







with fever (general)  
Neisseria 
meningitides  
Droplet Precautions for first 24 hours of 







with fever (general)  
- If positive history of 
travel to an area with 
an ongoing outbreak 
of VHF in the 10 days 
before onset of fever 
Ebola, Lassa, 
Marburg viruses 
Droplet Precautions plus Contact 
Precautions, with face/eye protection, 
emphasizing safety sharps and barrier 
precautions when blood exposure likely. 
Use N95 or higher respiratory protection 
when aerosol-generating procedure 
performed. 
 Ebola Virus Disease Update [2014]: 
Updated recommendations for 
healthcare workers can be found at 













vaccinia viruses  
Airborne plus Contact Precautions;  
 
Contact Precautions only if Herpes 
simplex, localized zoster in an 
immunocompetent host or vaccinia 
viruses most likely 
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Disease 












cough, coryza and 
fever  
Rubeola 
(measles) virus  





infiltrate in an HIV-
negative patient or a 
patient at low risk for 
human 
immunodeficiency virus 





aureus (MSSA or 
MRSA)  





infiltrate in any lung 
location in an HIV-
infected patient or a 
patient at high risk for 





aureus (MSSA or 
MRSA)  
Airborne Precautions plus Contact 
Precautions  
Use eye/face protection if aerosol-
generating procedure performed or 
contact with respiratory secretions 
anticipated.  
If tuberculosis is unlikely and there are no 
AIIRs and/or respirators available, use 
Droplet Precautions instead of Airborne 
Precautions  
Tuberculosis more likely in HIV-infected 
individual than in  




infiltrate in any lung 
location in a patient 
with a history of recent 
travel (10-21 days) to 
countries with active 
outbreaks of SARS, 






avian influenza  
Airborne plus Contact Precautions plus 
eye protection.  
If SARS and tuberculosis unlikely, use 






and pneumonia, in 









Contact plus Droplet Precautions; Droplet 
Precautions may be discontinued when 





Abscess or draining 
wound that cannot be 
covered  
Staphylococcus 
aureus (MSSA or 
MRSA), group A 
streptococcus  
Contact Precautions  
Add Droplet Precautions for the first 24 
hours of appropriate antimicrobial therapy 
if invasive Group A streptococcal disease 
is suspected  
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*  Infection control professionals should modify or adapt this table according to local conditions. To 
ensure that appropriate empiric precautions are implemented always, hospitals must have 
systems in place to evaluate patients routinely according to these criteria as part of their 
preadmission and admission care.  
†  Patients with the syndromes or conditions listed below may present with atypical signs or 
symptoms (e.g.neonates and adults with pertussis may not have paroxysmal or severe cough). 
The clinician's index of suspicion should be guided by the prevalence of specific conditions in 
the community, as well as clinical judgment.  
‡  The organisms listed under the column "Potential Pathogens" are not intended to represent the 
complete, or even most likely, diagnoses, but rather possible etiologic agents that require 
additional precautions beyond Standard Precautions until they can be ruled out.  
§  These pathogens include enterohemorrhagic Escherichia coli O157:H7, Shigella spp, hepatitis A 
virus, noroviruses, rotavirus, C. difficile.  
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Table 3.  
Infection Control Considerations for High-Priority (CDC Category A) Diseases 
that May Result from Bioterrorist Attacks or are Considered to be Bioterrorist 
Threats   
[This link is no longer active: www.bt.cdc.gov. Similar information may be found at CDC 
Bioterrorism Agents/Diseases (https://emergency.cdc.gov/agent/agentlist.asp) Accessed May 
2016.)] 
 
 Format Change [February 2017]: The format of this section was changed to improve readability 
and accessibility. The content is unchanged. 
 
Table 3A. Anthrax 
Characteristics Infection Control Considerations 





have occurred in 
past bioterrorist 
incidents  
Cutaneous (contact with spores); 
Respiratory Tract: (inhalation of spores); 
Gastrointestinal Tract (ingestion of spores - rare)  
Comment: Spores can be inhaled into the lower respiratory tract. The infectious 
dose of B. anthracis in humans by any route is not precisely known. In primates, 
the LD50 (i.e., the dose required to kill 50% of animals) for an aerosol challenge 
with B. anthracis is estimated to be 8,000–50,000 spores; the infectious dose 
may be as low as 1-3 spores  
Incubation Period  Cutaneous: 1 to12 days;  
Respiratory Tract: Usually 1 to 7 days but up to 43 days reported;  
Gastrointestinal Tract: 15-72 hours  
Clinical  
Features  
Cutaneous: Painless, reddish papule, which develops a central vesicle or bulla 
in 1-2 days; over next 3-7 days lesion becomes pustular, and then necrotic, with 
black eschar; extensive surrounding edema.  
Respiratory Tract: initial flu-like illness for 1-3 days with headache, fever, 
malaise, cough; by day 4 severe dyspnea and shock, and is usually fatal (85%-
90% if untreated; meningitis in 50% of Respiratory Tract cases.  
Gastrointestinal Tract: if intestinal form, necrotic, ulcerated edematous lesions 
develop in intestines with fever, nausea and vomiting, progression to 
hematemesis and bloody diarrhea; 25-60% fatal  
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Characteristics Infection Control Considerations 
Diagnosis  Cutaneous: Swabs of lesion (under eschar) for immunohistochemistry, 
polymerase chain reaction and culture; punch biopsy for immunohistochemistry, 
polymerase chain reaction and culture; vesicular fluid aspirate for Gram stain 
and culture; blood culture if systemic symptoms; acute and convalescent sera 
for ELISA serology 
Respiratory Tract: Chest X-ray or CT scan demonstrating wide mediastinal 
widening and/or pleural effusion, hilar abnormalities; blood for culture and 
polymerase chain reaction; pleural effusion for culture, polymerase chain 
reaction and immunohistochemistry; cerebrospinal fluid if meningeal signs 
present for immunohistochemistry, polymerase chain reaction and culture; 
acute and convalescent sera for ELISA serology; pleural and/or bronchial 
biopsies immunohistochemistry.  
Gastrointestinal Tract: blood and ascites fluid, stool samples, rectal swabs, 
and swabs of oropharyngeal lesions if present for culture, polymerase chain 
reaction and immunohistochemistry. 
Infectivity Cutaneous: Person-to-person transmission from contact with lesion of 
untreated patient possible, but extremely rare. 
Respiratory Tract and Gastrointestinal Tract: Person-to-person transmission 
does not occur. 




Cutaneous: Standard Precautions; Contact Precautions if uncontained copious 
drainage. 
Respiratory Tract and Gastrointestinal Tract: Standard Precautions. 
Aerosolized powder, environmental exposures: Respirator (N95 mask or 
Powered Air Purifying Respirators), protective clothing; decontamination of 
persons with powder on them (Occupational Health Guidelines for Remediation 
Workers at Bacillus anthracis-Contaminated Sites --- United States, 2001--2002 
(https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5135a3.htm)). 
Hand hygiene: Handwashing for 30-60 seconds with soap and water or 2% 
chlorhexidene gluconate after spore contact (alcohol handrubs inactive against 
spores [Weber DJ JAMA 2003; 289:1274]). 
Post-exposure prophylaxis following environmental exposure: 60 days of 
antimicrobials (either doxycycline, ciprofloxacin, or levofloxacin) and post-
exposure vaccine under IND 
 
Table 3B. Botulism 
Characteristics Infection Control Considerations 
Site(s) of Infection; 
Transmission Mode 
Gastrointestinal Tract: Ingestion of toxin-containing food,  
Respiratory Tract: Inhalation of toxin containing aerosol cause disease. 
Comment: Toxin ingested or potentially delivered by aerosol in bioterrorist 
incidents. LD50 (lethal dose for 50% of experimental animals) for type A is 0.001 
μg/ml/kg. 
Incubation Period 1-5 days. 
Clinical Features Ptosis, generalized weakness, dizziness, dry mouth and throat, blurred vision, 
diplopia, dysarthria, dysphonia, and dysphagia followed by symmetrical 
descending paralysis and respiratory failure. 
Diagnosis Clinical diagnosis; identification of toxin in stool, serology unless toxin-containing 
material available for toxin neutralization bioassays. 
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Characteristics Infection Control Considerations 





Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever   
 
 Ebola Virus Disease for Healthcare Workers: Updated recommendations for healthcare 
workers can be found at Ebola: U.S. Healthcare Workers and Settings 
(https://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/healthcare-us/). 
 
Table 3C. Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever   
Characteristics Infection Control Considerations 
Site(s) of Infection; 
Transmission Mode 
As a rule infection develops after exposure of mucous membranes or respiratory 
tract, or through broken skin or percutaneous injury. 
Incubation Period 2-19 days, usually 5-10 days 
Clinical Features Febrile illnesses with malaise, myalgias, headache, vomiting and diarrhea that 
are rapidly complicated by hypotension, shock, and hemorrhagic features. 
Massive hemorrhage in < 50% pts. 
Diagnosis Etiologic diagnosis can be made using respiratory tract-polymerase chain 
reaction, serologic detection of antibody and antigen, pathologic assessment 
with immunohistochemistry and viral culture with EM confirmation of morphology, 
Infectivity Person-to-person transmission primarily occurs through unprotected contact with 
blood and body fluids; percutaneous injuries (e.g., needlestick) associated with a 
high rate of transmission; transmission in healthcare settings has been reported 
but is prevented by use of barrier precautions. 
Recommended 
Precautions 
Hemorrhagic fever specific barrier precautions: If disease is believed to be 
related to intentional release of a bioweapon, epidemiology of transmission is 
unpredictable pending observation of disease transmission. Until the nature of 
the pathogen is understood and its transmission pattern confirmed, Standard, 
Contact and Airborne Precautions should be used. Once the pathogen is 
characterized, if the epidemiology of transmission is consistent with natural 
disease, Droplet Precautions can be substituted for Airborne Precautions. 
Emphasize:  
1. use of sharps safety devices and safe work practices,  
2. hand hygiene;  
3. barrier protection against blood and body fluids upon entry into room (single 
gloves and fluid- resistant or impermeable gown, face/eye protection with 
masks, goggles or face shields); and  
4. appropriate waste handling.  
Use N95 or higher respirators when performing aerosol-generating procedures. 
In settings where AIIRs are unavailable or the large numbers of patients cannot 
be accommodated by existing AIIRs, observe Droplet Precautions (plus 
Standard Precautions and Contact Precautions) and segregate patients from 
those not suspected of VHF infection. Limit blooddraws to those essential to 
care. See text for discussion and Appendix A for recommendations for naturally 
occurring VHFs. 
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Plague 
Pneumonic plague is not as contagious as is often thought. Historical accounts and contemporary 
evidence indicate that persons with plague usually transmit the infection only when the disease is 
in the end stage. These persons cough copious amounts of bloody sputum that contains many 
plague bacteria. Patients in the early stage of primary pneumonic plague (approximately the first 
20–24 h) apparently pose little risk [1, 2]. Antibiotic medication rapidly clears the sputum of plague 
bacilli, so that a patient generally is not infective within hours after initiation of effective antibiotic 
treatment [3]. This means that in modern times many patients will never reach a stage where they 
pose a significant risk to others. Even in the end stage of disease, transmission only occurs after 
close contact. Simple protective measures, such as wearing masks, good hygiene, and avoiding 
close contact, have been effective to interrupt transmission during many pneumonic plague 
outbreaks [2]. In the United States, the last known cases of person to person transmission of 
pneumonic plague occurred in 1925 [2].  
Table 3D. Plague 
Characteristics Infection Control Considerations 
Site(s) of Infection; 
Transmission Mode 
Respiratory Tract: Inhalation of respiratory droplets. 
Comment: Pneumonic plague most likely to occur if used as a biological 
weapon, but some cases of bubonic and primary septicemia may also occur. 
Infective dose 100 to 500 bacteria 
Incubation Period 1 to 6, usually 2 to 3 days. 
Clinical Features Pneumonic: fever, chills, headache, cough, dyspnea, rapid progression of 
weakness, and in a later stage hemoptysis, circulatory collapse, and bleeding 
diathesis 
Diagnosis Presumptive diagnosis from Gram stain or Wayson stain of sputum, blood, or 
lymph node aspirate; definitive diagnosis from cultures of same material, or 
paired acute/convalescent serology. 
Infectivity Person-to-person transmission occurs via respiratory droplets risk of 
transmission is low during first 20-24 hours of illness and requires close contact. 
Respiratory secretions probably are not infectious within a few hours after 
initiation of appropriate therapy. 
Recommended 
Precautions 
Standard Precautions, Droplet Precautions until patients have received 48 hours 
of appropriate therapy. 
Chemoprophylaxis: Consider antibiotic prophylaxis for HCWs with close 
contact exposure. 
1. Wu L-T. A treatise on pneumonic plague. Geneva: League of Nations, 1926. III. Health. 
2. Kool JL. Risk of person to person transmission of pneumonic plague. Clinical Infectious 
Diseases, 2005; 40 (8): 1166-1172 
3. Butler TC. Plague and other Yersinia infections. In: Greenough WB, ed. Current topics in 
infectious disease. New York: Plenum Medical Book Company, 1983. 
 
Table 3E. Smallpox 
Characteristics Infection Control Considerations 
Site(s) of Infection; 
Transmission Mode 
Respiratory Tract Inhalation of droplet or, rarely, aerosols; and skin lesions 
(contact with virus). 
Comment: If used as a biological weapon, natural disease, which has not 
occurred since 1977, will likely result. 
Incubation Period 7 to 19 days (mean 12 days) 
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Characteristics Infection Control Considerations 
Clinical Features Fever, malaise, backache, headache, and often vomiting for 2-3 days; then 
generalized papular or maculopapular rash (more on face and extremities), 
which becomes vesicular (on day 4 or 5) and then pustular; lesions all in same 
stage. 
Diagnosis Electron microscopy of vesicular fluid or culture of vesicular fluid by WHO 
approved laboratory (CDC); detection by polymerase chain reaction available 
only in select LRN labs, CDC and USAMRID 
Infectivity Secondary attack rates up to 50% in unvaccinated persons; infected persons 
may transmit disease from time rash appears until all lesions have crusted over 
(about 3 weeks); greatest infectivity during first 10 days of rash. 
Recommended 
Precautions 
Combined use of Standard, Contact, and Airborne Precautions until all scabs 
have separated (3-4 weeks). Transmission by the airborne route is a rare event; 
Airborne Precautions is recommended when possible, but in the event of mass 
exposures, barrier precautions and containment within a designated area are 
most important. 204, 212 
Only immune HCWs to care for pts; post-exposure vaccine within 4 days. 
Vaccinia: HCWs cover vaccination site with gauze and semi-permeable 
dressing until scab separates (≥21 days). Observe hand hygiene. 
Adverse events with virus-containing lesions: Standard plus Contact 
Precautions until all lesions crusted. 
Vaccinia adverse events with lesions containing infectious virus include 
inadvertent autoinoculation, ocular lesions (blepharitis, conjunctivitis), 
generalized vaccinia, progressive vaccinia, eczema vaccinatum; bacterial 
superinfection also requires addition of contact precautions if exudates cannot be 
contained. 216, 217 
 
Table 3F. Tularemia 
Characteristics Infection Control Considerations 
Site(s) of Infection; 
Transmission Mode 
Respiratory Tract: Inhalation of aerosolized bacteria.  
Gastrointestinal Tract: Ingestion of food or drink contaminated with aerosolized 
bacteria. 
Comment: Pneumonic or typhoidal disease likely to occur after bioterrorist event 
using aerosol delivery. Infective dose 10-50 bacteria 
Incubation Period 2 to 10 days, usually 3 to 5 days 
Clinical Features Pneumonic: malaise, cough, sputum production, dyspnea; 
Typhoidal: fever, prostration, weight loss and frequently an associated 
pneumonia. 
Diagnosis Diagnosis usually made with serology on acute and convalescent serum 
specimens; bacterium can be detected by polymerase chain reaction (LRN) or 
isolated from blood and other body fluids on cysteine-enriched media or mouse 
inoculation. 
Infectivity Person-to-person spread is rare. 
Laboratory workers who encounter/handle cultures of this organism are at high 
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Table 4. 
Recommendations for Application of Standard Precautions for the Care of All 
Patients in All Healthcare Settings 
Component Recommendations 
Hand hygiene After touching blood, body fluids, secretions, excretions, 
contaminated items; immediately after removing gloves; between 
patient contacts. 
Personal protective equipment 
(PPE) 
 Gloves 
For touching blood, body fluids, secretions, excretions, 
contaminated items; for touching mucous membranes and nonintact 
skin 
Personal protective equipment 
(PPE) 
 Gown 
During procedures and patient-care activities when contact of 
clothing/exposed skin with blood/body fluids, secretions, and 
excretions is anticipated. 
Personal protective equipment 
(PPE) 
 Mask, eye protection 
(goggles), face shield  
During procedures and patient-care activities likely to generate 
splashes or sprays of blood, body fluids, secretions, especially 
suctioning, endotracheal intubation. During aerosol-generating 
procedures on patients with suspected or proven infections 
transmitted by respiratory aerosols wear a fit-tested N95 or higher 
respirator in addition to gloves, gown and face/eye protection. 
Soiled patient-care equipment Handle in a manner that prevents transfer of microorganisms to 
others and to the environment; wear gloves if visibly contaminated; 
perform hand hygiene. 
Environmental control Develop procedures for routine care, cleaning, and disinfection of 
environmental surfaces, especially frequently touched surfaces in 
patient-care areas. 
Textiles and laundry Handle in a manner that prevents transfer of microorganisms to 
others and to the environment 
Needles and other sharps Do not recap, bend, break, or hand-manipulate used needles; if 
recapping is required, use a one-handed scoop technique only; use 
safety features when available; place used sharps in puncture-
resistant container 
Patient resuscitation Use mouthpiece, resuscitation bag, other ventilation devices to 
prevent contact with mouth and oral secretions 
Patient placement Prioritize for single-patient room if patient is at increased risk of 
transmission, is likely to contaminate the environment, does not 
maintain appropriate hygiene, or is at increased risk of acquiring 
infection or developing adverse outcome following infection. 
Respiratory hygiene/cough 
etiquette (source containment 
of infectious respiratory 
secretions in symptomatic 
patients, beginning at initial 
point of encounter e.g., triage 
and reception areas in 
emergency departments and 
physician offices) 
Instruct symptomatic persons to cover mouth/nose when 
sneezing/coughing; use tissues and dispose in no-touch receptacle; 
observe hand hygiene after soiling of hands with respiratory 
secretions; wear surgical mask if tolerated or maintain spatial 
separation, >3 feet if possible. 
(See Sections II.D.-II.J. and III.A.1)  
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Table 5. 
Components of a Protective Environment  
(Adapted from MMWR 2003; 52 [RR-10]) 
 
I. Patients: allogeneic hematopoeitic stem cell transplant (HSCT) only 
• Maintain in PE room except for required diagnostic or therapeutic procedures 
that cannot be performed in the room, e.g., radiology, operating room  
• Respiratory protection e.g., N95 respirator, for the patient when leaving PE 
during periods of construction 
 
II. Standard and Expanded Precautions 
• Hand hygiene observed before and after patient contact  
• Gown, gloves, mask NOT required for HCWs or visitors for routine entry into 
the room 
• Use of gown, gloves, mask by HCWs and visitors according to Standard 
Precautions and as indicated for suspected or proven infections for which 
Transmission-Based Precautions are recommended 
 
III. Engineering 
• Central or point-of-use HEPA (99.97% efficiency) filters capable of removing 
particles 0.3 μm in diameter for supply (incoming) air 
• Well-sealed rooms 
o Proper construction of windows, doors, and intake and exhaust ports 
o Ceilings: smooth, free of fissures, open joints, crevices 
o Walls sealed above and below the ceiling 
o If leakage detected, locate source and make necessary repairs 
• Ventilation to maintain ≥12 ACH  
• Directed air flow: air supply and exhaust grills located so that clean, filtered air 
enters from one side of the room, flows across the patient’s bed, exits on 
opposite side of the room 
• Positive room air pressure in relation to the corridor  
o Pressure differential of >2.5 Pa [0.01” water gauge] 
• Monitor and document results of air flow patterns daily using visual methods 
(e.g., flutter strips, smoke tubes) or a hand held pressure gauge  
• Self-closing door on all room exits  
• Maintain back-up ventilation equipment (e.g., portable units for fans or filters) 
for emergency provision of ventilation requirements for PE areas and take 
immediate steps to restore the fixed ventilation system 
• For patients who require both a PE and Airborne Infection Isolation, use an 
anteroom to ensure proper air balance relationships and provide independent 
exhaust of contaminated air to the outside or place a HEPA filter in the 
exhaust duct. If an anteroom is not available, place patient in an AIIR and use 
Guideline for Isolation Precautions: Preventing Transmission of Infectious Agents in Healthcare Settings 
 
Last update: Feburary 15, 2017  Page 123 of 209 
 




• Daily wet-dusting of horizontal surfaces using cloths moistened with EPA-
registered hospital disinfectant/detergent  
• Avoid dusting methods that disperse dust  
• No carpeting in patient rooms or hallways 
• No upholstered furniture and furnishings  
 
V. Other 
• No flowers (fresh or dried) or potted plants in PE rooms or areas 
• Use vacuum cleaner equipped with HEPA filters when vacuum cleaning is 
necessary  
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Figure. 
Example of Safe Donning and Removal of Personal Protective 
Equipment (PPE)  
 
 For updated content see Sequence for Putting on Personal Protective 






• Fully cover torso from neck to 
knees, arms to end of wrist, 
and wrap around the back 
• Fasten in back at neck and 
waist 
 
MASK OR RESPIRATOR 
• Secure ties or elastic band at 
middle of head and neck 
• Fit flexible band to nose 
bridge 
• Fit snug to face and below 
chin 
• Fit-check respirator  
 
GOGGLES/FACE SHIELD 




• Use non-sterile for isolation  
• Select according to hand size 




Safe Work Practices 
• Keep hands away from face 
• Work from clean to dirty 
• Limit surfaces touched 
• Change when torn or heavily contaminated 
• Perform hand hygiene 
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• Outside of gloves are 
contaminated! 
• Grasp outside of glove with 
opposite gloved hand; peel off 
• Hold removed glove in gloved 
hand 
• Slide fingers of ungloved hand 
under remaining glove at wrist 
 
GOGGLES/FACE SHIELD 
• Outside of goggles or face shield 
are contaminated! 
• To remove, handle by “clean” 
head band or ear pieces 
• Place in designated receptacle for 
reprocessing or in waste container 
 
GOWN 
• Gown front and sleeves are 
contaminated! 
• Unfasten neck, then waist ties 
• Remove gown using a peeling 
motion; pull gown from each 
shoulder toward the same hand 
• Gown will turn inside out 
• Hold removed gown away from 
body, roll into a bundle and 
discard into waste or linen 
receptacle 
 
MASK OR RESPIRATOR 
• Front of mask/respirator is 
contaminated – DO NOT TOUCH! 
• Grasp ONLY bottom then top 
ties/elastics and remove 




Perform hand hygiene immediately 
after removing all PPE!  
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Airborne infection isolation room (AIIR). Formerly, negative pressure isolation 
room, an AIIR is a single-occupancy patient-care room used to isolate persons 
with a suspected or confirmed airborne infectious disease. Environmental factors 
are controlled in AIIRs to minimize the transmission of infectious agents that are 
usually transmitted from person to person by droplet nuclei associated with 
coughing or aerosolization of contaminated fluids. AIIRs should provide negative 
pressure in the room (so that air flows under the door gap into the room); and an 
air flow rate of 6-12 ACH (6 ACH for existing structures, 12 ACH for new 
construction or renovation); and direct exhaust of air from the room to the outside 
of the building or recirculation of air through a HEPA filter before retruning to 
circulation (MMWR 2003; 52 [RR-10]; MMWR 1994; 43 [RR-13]). 
American Institute of Architects (AIA). A professional organization that 
develops standards for building ventilation, The “2001Guidelines for Design and 
Construction of Hospital and Health Care Facilities”, the development of which 
was supported by the AIA, Academy of Architecture for Health, Facilities Guideline 
Institute, with assistance from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
and the National Institutes of Health, is the primary source of guidance for creating 
airborne infection isolation rooms (AIIRs) and protective environments (American 
Institute of Architects – Academy of Architecture for Health 
(https://network.aia.org/academyofarchitectureforhealth/home) [Current version of 
this document may differ from original.]) 
Ambulatory care settings. Facilities that provide health care to patients who do 
not remain overnight (e.g., hospital-based outpatient clinics, nonhospital-based 
clinics and physician offices, urgent care centers, surgicenters, free-standing 
dialysis centers, public health clinics, imaging centers, ambulatory behavioral 
health and substance abuse clinics, physical therapy and rehabilitation centers, 
and dental practices. 
Bioaerosols. An airborne dispersion of particles containing whole or parts of 
biological entities, such as bacteria, viruses, dust mites, fungal hyphae, or fungal 
spores. Such aerosols usually consist of a mixture of mono-dispersed and 
aggregate cells, spores or viruses, carried by other materials, such as respiratory 
secretions and/or inert particles. Infectious bioaerosols (i.e., those that contain 
biological agents capable of causing an infectious disease) can be generated from 
human sources (e.g., expulsion from the respiratory tract during coughing, 
sneezing, talking or singing; during suctioning or wound irrigation), wet 
environmental sources (e.g., HVAC and cooling tower water with Legionella) or dry 
sources (e.g., construction dust with spores produced by Aspergillus spp.). 
Bioaerosols include large respiratory droplets and small droplet nuclei (Cole EC. 
AJIC 1998;26: 453-64). 
Caregivers. All persons who are not employees of an organization, are not paid, and 
provide or assist in providing healthcare to a patient (e.g., family member, friend) and 
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acquire technical training as needed based on the tasks that must be performed.  
Cohorting. In the context of this guideline, this term applies to the practice of 
grouping patients infected or colonized with the same infectious agent together to 
confine their care to one area and prevent contact with susceptible patients 
(cohorting patients). During outbreaks, healthcare personnel may be assigned to a 
cohort of patients to further limit opportunities for transmission (cohorting staff). 
Colonization. Proliferation of microorganisms on or within body sites without 
detectable host immune response, cellular damage, or clinical expression. The 
presence of a microorganism within a host may occur with varying duration, but 
may become a source of potential transmission. In many instances, colonization 
and carriage are synonymous.  
Droplet nuclei. Microscopic particles < 5 µm in size that are the residue of 
evaporated droplets and are produced when a person coughs, sneezes, shouts, or 
sings. These particles can remain suspended in the air for prolonged periods of 
time and can be carried on normal air currents in a room or beyond, to adjacent 
spaces or areas receiving exhaust air. 
Engineering controls. Removal or isolation of a workplace hazard through 
technology. AIIRs, a Protective Environment, engineered sharps injury prevention 
devices and sharps containers are examples of engineering controls.  
Epidemiologically important pathogens. Infectious agents that have one or 
more of the following characteristics:  
1. are readily transmissible;  
2. have a proclivity toward causing outbreaks;  
3. may be associated with a severe outcome; or  
4. are difficult to treat.  
Examples include Acinetobacter sp., Aspergillus sp., Burkholderia cepacia, 
Clostridium difficile, Klebsiella or Enterobacter sp., Extended spectrum beta 
lactamase producing gram negative bacilli [ESBLs], methicillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus [MRSA], Pseudomonas aeruginosa, vancomycin-resistant 
enterococci [VRE], methicillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus [MRSA], vancomycin 
resistant Staphylococcus aureus [VRSA] influenza virus, respiratory syncytial virus 
[RSV], rotavirus, SARS-CoV, noroviruses and the hemorrhagic fever viruses). 
Hand hygiene. A general term that applies to any one of the following:  
1. handwashing with plain (nonantimicrobial) soap and water);  
2. antiseptic handwash (soap containing antiseptic agents and water);  
3. antiseptic handrub (waterless antiseptic product, most often alcohol-based, 
rubbed on all surfaces of hands); or  
4. surgical hand antisepsis (antiseptic handwash or antiseptic handrub performed 
preoperatively by surgical personnel to eliminate transient hand flora and 
reduce resident hand flora) 559.  
Healthcare-associated infection (HAI). An infection that develops in a patient 
who is cared for in any setting where healthcare is delivered (e.g., acute care 
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hospital, chronic care facility, ambulatory clinic, dialysis center, surgicenter, home) 
and is related to receiving health care (i.e., was not incubating or present at the 
time healthcare was provided). In ambulatory and home settings, HAI would apply 
to any infection that is associated with a medical or surgical intervention. Since the 
geographic location of infection acquisition is often uncertain, the preferred term is 
considered to be healthcare-associated rather than healthcare-acquired.  
Healthcare epidemiologist. A person whose primary training is medical (M.D., 
D.O.) and/or masters or doctorate-level epidemiology who has received advanced 
training in healthcare epidemiology. Typically these professionals direct or provide 
consultation to an infection control program in a hospital, long term care facility 
(LTCF), or healthcare delivery system (also see infection control professional). 
Healthcare personnel, healthcare worker (HCW). All paid and unpaid persons 
who work in a healthcare setting (e.g., any person who has professional or 
technical training in a healthcare-related field and provides patient care in a 
healthcare setting or any person who provides services that support the delivery of 
healthcare such as dietary, housekeeping, engineering, maintenance personnel). 
Hematopoietic stem cell transplantation (HSCT). Any transplantation of blood- 
or bone marrow-derived hematopoietic stem cells, regardless of donor type (e.g., 
allogeneic or autologous) or cell source (e.g., bone marrow, peripheral blood, or 
placental/umbilical cord blood); associated with periods of severe 
immunosuppression that vary with the source of the cells, the intensity of 
chemotherapy required, and the presence of graft versus host disease (MMWR 
2000; 49: RR-10). 
High-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter. An air filter that removes >99.97% 
of particles ≥ 0.3µm (the most penetrating particle size) at a specified flow rate of 
air. HEPA filters may be integrated into the central air handling systems, installed 
at the point of use above the ceiling of a room, or used as portable units (MMWR 
2003; 52: RR-10). 
Home care. A wide-range of medical, nursing, rehabilitation, hospice and social 
services delivered to patients in their place of residence (e.g., private residence, 
senior living center, assisted living facility). Home health-care services include 
care provided by home health aides and skilled nurses, respiratory therapists, 
dieticians, physicians, chaplains, and volunteers; provision of durable medical 
equipment; home infusion therapy; and physical, speech, and occupational 
therapy. 
Immunocompromised patients. Those patients whose immune mechanisms are 
deficient because of congenital or acquired immunologic disorders (e.g., human 
immunodeficiency virus [HIV] infection, congenital immune deficiency syndromes), 
chronic diseases such as diabetes mellitus, cancer, emphysema, or cardiac 
failure, ICU care, malnutrition, and immunosuppressive therapy of another disease 
process [e.g., radiation, cytotoxic chemotherapy, anti-graft-rejection medication, 
corticosteroids, monoclonal antibodies directed against a specific component of 
the immune system]). The type of infections for which an immunocompromised 
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patient has increased susceptibility is determined by the severity of 
immunosuppression and the specific component(s) of the immune system that is 
affected. Patients undergoing allogeneic HSCT and those with chronic graft versus 
host disease are considered the most vulnerable to HAIs. Immunocompromised 
states also make it more difficult to diagnose certain infections (e.g., tuberculosis) 
and are associated with more severe clinical disease states than persons with the 
same infection and a normal immune system. 
Infection. The transmission of microorganisms into a host after evading or 
overcoming defense mechanisms, resulting in the organism’s proliferation and 
invasion within host tissue(s). Host responses to infection may include clinical 
symptoms or may be subclinical, with manifestations of disease mediated by direct 
organisms pathogenesis and/or a function of cell-mediated or antibody responses 
that result in the destruction of host tissues.  
Infection control and prevention professional (ICP). A person whose primary 
training is in either nursing, medical technology, microbiology, or epidemiology and 
who has acquired specialized training in infection control. Responsibilities may 
include collection, analysis, and feedback of infection data and trends to 
healthcare providers; consultation on infection risk assessment, prevention and 
control strategies; performance of education and training activities; implementation 
of evidence-based infection control practices or those mandated by regulatory and 
licensing agencies; application of epidemiologic principles to improve patient 
outcomes; participation in planning renovation and construction projects (e.g., to 
ensure appropriate containment of construction dust); evaluation of new products 
or procedures on patient outcomes; oversight of employee health services related 
to infection prevention; implementation of preparedness plans; communication 
within the healthcare setting, with local and state health departments, and with the 
community at large concerning infection control issues; and participation in 
research. Certification in infection control (CIC) is available through the 
Certification Board of Infection Control and Epidemiology.  
Infection control and prevention program. A multidisciplinary program that 
includes a group of activities to ensure that recommended practices for the 
prevention of healthcare-associated infections are implemented and followed by 
HCWs, making the healthcare setting safe from infection for patients and 
healthcare personnel. The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations (JCAHO) requires the following five components of an infection 
control program for accreditation:  
1. surveillance: monitoring patients and healthcare personnel for acquisition of 
infection and/or colonization;  
2. investigation: identification and analysis of infection problems or undesirable 
trends;  
3. prevention: implementation of measures to prevent transmission of infectious 
agents and to reduce risks for device- and procedure-related infections; 4) 
control: evaluation and management of outbreaks; and  
4. reporting: provision of information to external agencies as required by state and 
federal law and regulation (The Joint Commission 
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(https://www.jointcommission.org/) [Current version of this document may differ 
from original.]).  
The infection control program staff has the ultimate authority to determine infection 
control policies for a healthcare organization with the approval of the 
organization’s governing body.  
Long-term care facilities (LTCFs). An array of residential and outpatient facilities 
designed to meet the bio-psychosocial needs of persons with sustained self-care 
deficits. These include skilled nursing facilities, chronic disease hospitals, nursing 
homes, foster and group homes, institutions for the developmentally disabled, 
residential care facilities, assisted living facilities, retirement homes, adult day 
health care facilities, rehabilitation centers, and long-term psychiatric hospitals.  
Mask. A term that applies collectively to items used to cover the nose and mouth 
and includes both procedure masks and surgical masks ([This link is no longer 
active: www.fda.gov/cdrh/ode/guidance/094.html#4. Similar information may be 




Multidrug-resistant organisms (MDROs). In general, bacteria (excluding M. 
tuberculosis) that are resistant to one or more classes of antimicrobial agents and 
usually are resistant to all but one or two commercially available antimicrobial 
agents (e.g., MRSA, VRE, extended spectrum beta-lactamase [ESBL]-producing 
or intrinsically resistant gram-negative bacilli) 176. 
Nosocomial infection. Derived from two Greek words “nosos” (disease) and 
“komeion” (to take care of). Refers to any infection that develops during or as a 
result of an admission to an acute care facility (hospital) and was not incubating at 
the time of admission. 
Personal protective equipment (PPE). A variety of barriers used alone or in 
combination to protect mucous membranes, skin, and clothing from contact with 
infectious agents. PPE includes gloves, masks, respirators, goggles, face shields, 
and gowns. 
Procedure Mask. A covering for the nose and mouth that is intended for use in 
general patient care situations. These masks generally attach to the face with ear 
loops rather than ties or elastic. Unlike surgical masks, procedure masks are not 
regulated by the Food and Drug Administration.  
Protective Environment. A specialized patient-care area, usually in a hospital, with 
a positive air flow relative to the corridor (i.e., air flows from the room to the outside 
adjacent space). The combination of high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtration, 
high numbers (≥12) of air changes per hour (ACH), and minimal leakage of air into 
the room creates an environment that can safely accommodate patients with a 
severely compromised immune system (e.g., those who have received allogeneic 
hemopoietic stem-cell transplant [HSCT]) and decrease the risk of exposure to 
spores produced by environmental fungi. Other components include use of 
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scrubbable surfaces instead of materials such as upholstery or carpeting, cleaning to 
prevent dust accumulation, and prohibition of fresh flowers or potted plants. 
Quasi-experimental studies. Studies to evaluate interventions but do not use 
randomization as part of the study design. These studies are also referred to as 
nonrandomized, pre-post-intervention study designs. These studies aim to 
demonstrate causality between an intervention and an outcome but cannot 
achieve the level of confidence concerning attributable benefit obtained through a 
randomized, controlled trial. In hospitals and public health settings, randomized 
control trials often cannot be implemented due to ethical, practical and urgency 
reasons; therefore, quasi-experimental design studies are used commonly. 
However, even if an intervention appears to be effective statistically, the question 
can be raised as to the possibility of alternative explanations for the result. Such 
study design is used when it is not logistically feasible or ethically possible to 
conduct a randomized, controlled trial, (e.g., during outbreaks). Within the 
classification of quasi-experimental study designs, there is a hierarchy of design 
features that may contribute to validity of results (Harris et al. CID 2004:38: 1586). 
Residential care setting. A facility in which people live, minimal medical care is 
delivered, and the psychosocial needs of the residents are provided for. 
Respirator. A personal protective device worn by healthcare personnel over the 
nose and mouth to protect them from acquiring airborne infectious diseases due to 
inhalation of infectious airborne particles that are < 5 μm in size. These include 
infectious droplet nuclei from patients with M. tuberculosis, variola virus [smallpox], 
SARS-CoV), and dust particles that contain infectious particles, such as spores of 
environmental fungi (e.g., Aspergillus sp.). The CDC’s National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) certifies respirators used in healthcare 
settings (Personal Protective Equipment for Healthcare Workers 
(https://www.cdc.gov/NIOSH/docs/2013-138/)). [Current version of this document 
may differ from original.]. The N95 disposable particulate, air purifying, respirator is 
the type used most commonly by healthcare personnel. Other respirators used 
include N-99 and N-100 particulate respirators, powered air-purifying respirators 
(PAPRS) with high efficiency filters; and non-powered full-facepiece elastomeric 
negative pressure respirators. A listing of NIOSH-approved respirators can be found 
at [This link is no longer active: 
www.cdc.gov/niosh/npptl/respirators/disp_part/particlist.html. Similar information 
may be found at NIOSH Respirator Trusted-Source Information 
(https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/npptl/topics/respirators/disp_part/respsource.html).]. 
Respirators must be used in conjunction with a complete Respiratory Protection 
Program, as required by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
that includes fit testing, training, proper selection of respirators, medical clearance 
and respirator maintenance.  
Respiratory Hygiene/ Cough Etiquette. A combination of measures designed to 
minimize the transmission of respiratory pathogens via droplet or airborne routes 
in healthcare settings. The components of respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette are  
1. covering the mouth and nose during coughing and sneezing,  
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2. using tissues to contain respiratory secretions with prompt disposal into a no-
touch receptacle,  
3. offering a surgical mask to persons who are coughing to decrease 
contamination of the surrounding environment, and  
4. turning the head away from others and maintaining spatial separation, ideally 
>3 feet, when coughing.  
These measures are targeted to all patients with symptoms of respiratory infection 
and their accompanying family members or friends beginning at the point of initial 
encounter with a healthcare setting (e.g., reception/triage in emergency 
departments, ambulatory clinics, healthcare provider offices) 126 (Srinivasin A 
ICHE 2004; 25: 1020; Respiratory Hygiene/Cough Etiquette in Healthcare Settings 
(https://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/infectioncontrol/resphygiene.htm) [Current 
version of this document may differ from original.])  
Safety culture. Shared perceptions of workers and management regarding the 
level of safety in the work environment. A hospital safety climate includes the 
following six organizational components:  
1. senior management support for safety programs; 
2. absence of workplace barriers to safe work practices;  
3. cleanliness and orderliness of the worksite;  
4. minimal conflict and good communication among staff members;  
5. frequent safety-related feedback/training by supervisors; and  
6. availability of PPE and engineering controls 620. 
Source Control. The process of containing an infectious agent either at the portal 
of exit from the body or within a confined space. The term is applied most 
frequently to containment of infectious agents transmitted by the respiratory route 
but could apply to other routes of transmission, (e.g., a draining wound, vesicular 
or bullous skin lesions). Respiratory Hygiene/Cough Etiquette that encourages 
individuals to “cover your cough” and/or wear a mask is a source control measure. 
The use of enclosing devices for local exhaust ventilation (e.g., booths for sputum 
induction or administration of aerosolized medication) is another example of 
source control. 
Standard Precautions. A group of infection prevention practices that apply to all 
patients, regardless of suspected or confirmed diagnosis or presumed infection 
status. Standard Precautions is a combination and expansion of Universal 
Precautions 780 and Body Substance Isolation 1102. Standard Precautions is based 
on the principle that all blood, body fluids, secretions, excretions except sweat, 
nonintact skin, and mucous membranes may contain transmissible infectious 
agents. Standard Precautions includes hand hygiene, and depending on the 
anticipated exposure, use of gloves, gown, mask, eye protection, or face shield. 
Also, equipment or items in the patient environment likely to have been 
contaminated with infectious fluids must be handled in a manner to prevent 
transmission of infectious agents, (e.g., wear gloves for handling, contain heavily 
soiled equipment, properly clean and disinfect or sterilize reusable equipment 
before use on another patient).  
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Surgical mask. A device worn over the mouth and nose by operating room 
personnel during surgical procedures to protect both surgical patients and operating 
room personnel from transfer of microorganisms and body fluids. Surgical masks 
also are used to protect healthcare personnel from contact with large infectious 
droplets (>5 μm in size). According to draft guidance issued by the Food and Drug 
Administration on May 15, 2003, surgical masks are evaluated using standardized 
testing procedures for fluid resistance, bacterial filtration efficiency, differential 
pressure (air exchange), and flammability in order to mitigate the risks to health 
associated with the use of surgical masks. These specifications apply to any masks 
that are labeled surgical, laser, isolation, or dental or medical procedure ([This link 
is no longer active: www.fda.gov/cdrh/ode/guidance/094.html#4. Similar information 
may be found at FDA: Masks and N95 Respirators 
(http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/GeneralHospit
alDevicesandSupplies/PersonalProtectiveEquipment/ucm055977.htm), accessed 
May 2016.]). Surgical masks do not protect against inhalation of small particles or 
droplet nuclei and should not be confused with particulate respirators that are 
recommended for protection against selected airborne infectious agents, (e.g., 
Mycobacterium tuberculosis). 
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